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Abstract
This thesis constitutes a study o f  the dominant and resisting discourses on women in the Polish 
parliamentary debates using the combined perspectives of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and 
feminist linguistics. It provides a study o f the discourses on women understood as dynamic 
ideological constmctions of gender in the political language. The analysis is aimed at highlighting 
issues of hegemonic power relations as well as possible resistance mechanisms in discourse using the 
dialectical understanding of discourse as social practice and its representation.
The understanding of discourse as a text is utilised in order to pinpoint some o f the ideological 
investments of the main discourses on women in two Polish parliamentary debates concerned with 
gender issues. The CDA is utilised to carry out this analysis. The concepts of categorisation, frames 
and repertoires are selected to highlight the constructions o f the two main discourses on women 
represented in the debates. This methodological approach provides means to explore the hegemonic 
power to define women as well as the power to resist the dominant constructions of fenhninity in the 
‘texturing’ o f the debates.
The second theoretical and methodological approach utilised for the study o f another parliamentary 
debate on women’s issues is the feminist linguistic concept o f the silencing mechanisms in 
interaction. This understanding o f mechanisms o f domination and resistance is applied to the study of 
one parliamentary debate conceived as a process and an interactive event. Using this perspective, 1 
point out how domination of particular discourses/positions is achieved in the concrete discursive 
situation. This allows me to highlight another dimension of the power in discourse used to maintain or 
resist the dominant constmctions of gender.
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INTRODUCTION
The problematic of language and power is fundamentally a question of democracy. Those 
affected need to take it on board as a political issue, as feminists have around language and 
gender ( .. .) '
This thesis aims to provide an insight into the ideological contents and functioning of 
the category ‘woman’ in the Polish political discourse using linguistic theoretical and 
methodological approaches. The power relations implied or enacted in the political 
struggles over gender are considered of paramount importance for this study and 
they are examined through a detailed linguistic analysis. Furthermore, the feminist 
critique of gender relations in society, particularly in my own Polish society, remains 
the general aim of this research. In this domain, T build on some of the existing 
explorations of the symbolic representation of Polish women.^ But in order to do
’ Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study o f  Language (London: 
Longman, 1995), 221.
 ^See especially, Anna Reading, Polish Women, Solidarity and Feminism  (Houndmills: MacMillan, 
1992) and also, Monika Platek, ‘Dziewice, kury domowe i dziwki. O sytuacji kobiet w Polsce’, 
(Virgins, Housewives and Whores. About the Situation o f Women in Poland), in Jolanta Szymczak 
(ed.) Kobiety o Kobietach (Warszawa: Women and Economics Global Working Group, 1995), 
Monika Baer, ‘Kategoria “kobiety” we wspolczesnych dyskursach publicznych. Przyczynek do 
dyskusji.’ (The Category “Woman” in Contemporary Public Discourses. A Point for Discussion) in 
Elzbieta Pakszys and Wlodzimierz Heller (eds) Publiczna Przestrzen Kobiet. Obrazy Dawne I  Nowe 
(Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe im. Adama Mickiewicza) and Joanna Bator, Wizerunek kobiety w
this, I follow both critical linguistic and feminist linguistic interest in language, 
gender, and power/
The connection made by Norman Fairclough above between language and gender 
and language and power research is a summary of where I situate my research 
interest: the interplay between politics and gender relations in discourse. Similarly, 
the notion of democracy invoked above brings forth the realisation that what is at 
stake here is not only social critique but also possible social transformation or social 
change generated out of the resistance to power. This point is also made clearly by 
Coupland and Jaworski: ‘A critical orientation is not merely ‘deconstructive’; it may 
aim to be ‘reconstructive’, reconstructing social arrangements.’"^ In the same vein, 
feminist linguists have been insistent on changing the direction of research from the 
study of gender inequality only, to the study of the women’s strategies in reclaiming 
language.^ Though this research interest is usually applied to language use, (the 
counteracting of sexism in language) I will try to point out to how women resist the 
domination in political language. Still, my own feeling is that a study aimed at de-
polskiej debacle publicznej: perspectywa feministyczna (The Image o f a Woman in the Polish Public 
Debate: a Feminist Perspective) (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 1999)
For a brief introduction into the contemporary feminist approaches in linguistics, see for example, 
Margaret Gibbon, Feminist Perspectives on Language (London and New York; Longman, 1999), 1- 
10.
Nikolas Coupland and Adam Jaworski, ‘Discourse’ in Paul Cobley (ed.) The Routledge Companion 
to Semiotics and Linguistics (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 147.
 ^See, for example, Mary Talbot, Language and Gender: an Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998), 218-225.
silencing^ women in a sexist environment (such as state politics) cannot be 
undertaken without the study of silencing itself.
This perspective involves the study o f discourse, in both the understanding of the 
term as Tanguage-in-use and language-use relative to social, political and cultural 
formations, i.e. language reflecting social order but also language shaping social 
order, and shaping individuals’ interaction with society’.^  In general, this 
understanding relies on the constructivist view of social reality.^ In relation to the 
meanings of language, this approach can be understood in Michael Halliday’s 
conceptualisation: ‘The option in the construction of linguistic forms -  sentences, 
and the like -  serve to realise options in meaning, which in turn realise options in 
behaviour that are interpretable in terms of social theory.’^
There are many reasons why this is a popular approach in social science in general, 
and in linguistics and language and gender in particular. But perhaps the most 
important is the acknowledgement of the increasing role that discourse (social 
semiosis) plays in the contemporary society, through the available institutions, 
media, the reliance on service industries and market economy, as well as through 
everyday interactions in all social contexts. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough point out:
 ^See Mary Crawford, On Gender and Language (London, Thousand Oaks and New Deli: Sage, 
1995), 176-177.
’ Coupland and Jaworski, 148. ,
 ^Crawlbrd, 17-18.
It is an important characteristic of the economic, social and cultural changes of late 
modernity that they exist as discourses as well as processes that are taking place outside 
discourse, and that the processes that are taking place outside discourse are substantively 
shaped by these discourses/^
These economic, cultural, political processes taking place outside of discourse are 
partly constituted through discourse or the discursive aspect of the social practices, 
which can be understood as ‘habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in 
which people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world’
In the contemporary society (or late modernity as Fairclough and Chouliaraki call it) 
many of the social practices are discursive, that is, carried out through language and 
other forms of social communication (or semiosis), for example through visual signs, 
such as in the media or advertising.
We can expect this discursive orientation to be reflected in the modem constmctions 
of gender in general, including the gendered political categories. Here discourse is 
what creates the social reality in the sense in which we perceive it and understand it; 
discourse is also a decisive element in the way we interact in society and try to 
impact on social life. This theoretical basis of critical social theory in general, and 
critical linguistics in particular, is the background and the basis of my thesis. On the 
other hand, feminist scholars have shared this engagement in language, and my own
 ^Michael Halliday, ‘Language in a Social Perspective’, in Nikolas Coupland and Adam Jaworski 
(eds) Sociolinguistics: A Reader and a Coursework, (London: MacMillan, 1997), 8.
Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical 
Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 4 
Ibid., 21.
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investigation starts from an interest in feminist linguistics. The more recent 
approaches to the study of language and gender have come to recognise the 
usefulness of a discursive approach to language on women. This is particularly true 
of feminist stylistics and feminist literary criticism but also of feminist linguistics.
Furthermore, the critique of a gendered aspect of the social life with its 
epistemological implications is needed to make critical social theory as critical and 
as reflexive as possible, without making it relativist. The feminist contribution to 
critical theory is in examining thoroughly the perspectives from which knowledge on 
women is produced, including the researcher’s self-positioning in relation to the 
studied material, as well as the implications and limitations of research for women’s 
agency. This self-reflexivity is particularly important for feminists researching 
various constructions of gender, because as Chris Weedon put it ‘even if we resist a 
particular subject position we do so from the position of alternative social definition 
of f e m i n i n i t y I n  this respect, feminist linguistics is similar to how Weedon 
describes feminist literary criticism:
All meanings have implications for the existing social relations, contesting them, reaffirniing 
them or leaving them intact. The meaning and the social and political implications o f a 
reading will be determined by the position within the discursive field from which the critic 
reads and the knowledge inscribed in the discourses with which she reads ( ...)  Every act of 
reading is a new production o f meaning.
11
This thesis constitutes an example of such a particular and partial reading of the 
gender constructions in the political discourse. As the reader, I am trying to engage 
self-reflexively with the gendered constructions of femininity for the purpose of 
going beyond the obvious and discovering some of the mechanisms in which both 
the exclusionary and the resistant discourses can he continuously constructed and 
reconstructed.
Yet, it has to be noted that this is not a post-modern approach. As Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough rightly point out, ‘although epistemic relativisim must be accepted -  that 
all the discourses are socially constructed relative to the social position people are in 
-  this does not entail accepting judgmental relativism -  that all discourses are equally 
good.’ "^^
In this thesis, m/particular interest lies in studying the constructions of femininity in 
the Polish political discourse using parliamentary debates as my data. My interest is 
in how women are being constructed in this form of discourse and whether 
predominant constructions may be challenged. This feminist perspective on political 
discourse arises out of an understanding that there is a very complex discursive 
relationship between the dominant state constructions of gender and women’s 
subject positions made available to them in everyday discourses and indeed in social 
reality. Interestingly, this relationship seems to be undergoing shifts and redirections
Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997),
Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 8.
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at a time of political transformation, as is the case in all East European and Post- 
Socialist states/^ Eiowever, the effects of such discursive shifts are particularly 
visible in Poland where the battles over women’s reproduction that have become a 
prominent feature of the political life, since the réintroduction of the restrictive anti­
abortion bill. As Gal and Kligman point out:
( ...)  any Polish politician’s position on abortion is a limitus test o f his opinions on diverse 
issues-such as church-state relations, health policy, and the national budget. This 
politicisation of abortion means that, at least since 1989, each change of president, 
parliament and government in Poland has brought a change in abortion laws, with very real 
consequences for the everyday lives o f men and women.
My aim is to investigate whether, how and to what extent, this discursive struggle 
has permeated other debates on gender issues. What have been the resulting 
perceptions of femininity constructed in these debates, which gendered constructions 
of the social, public and political life are being established through the political 
discourse? Finally, what can this investigation tell us about the mechanisms of power 
and resistance in discourse? This process of texturing the discourses on women 
demands further attention ftrom a feminist perspective, particularly in relation to the 
possibilities for resistance to the imposed forms, and the possibilities for creating 
women’s political agency out of such resistance. In this thesis, I will concentrate on 
how language is used to form the dominant discourses on women, and how such
See, especially Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, The Politics o f  Gender after Socialism  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 15.
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discourses are maintained and opposed in the discursive battles over gender in 
politics.
Using this approach to the study of discourse, and also concentrating on power 
relations in discursive practice, I argue for the construction of discourses on women 
as an ideological practice. In the first chapter, I introduce this approach by discussing 
the development of the concept of ‘women’s language’ and its criticism in feminist 
linguistic scholarship. This allows me to introduce the feminist linguistic approaches 
to the study of discourse and give an example of a particularly relevant theoretical 
and popular discourse on women.
This switch from ‘discourse/language of women’ to a more critical notion of 
discourse on women is then extended in the second chapter, in which I consider more 
thoroughly what a discursive approach to the study of gender means. That is, those 
theories that could be useful for conceptualising discourses on women are presented 
and discussed. I come to the conclusion that the most useful approach could come 
from adopting the theoretical insights into the nature of discourse offered by Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), and the feminist concern with the workings and effects 
of this discourse for women themselves. I consider whether these approaches go 
beyond a Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse and its workings in society. 
Furthermore, I am interested in what such conceptualisations can tell us about the 
resisting forms of power in relation to discourses on women.
Ibid., 34.
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The third chapter represents a point of transition from these introductory and 
theoretical concerns with the notion of discourse to the issues of methodology and 
categories of analysis needed for analysing my material: the debates on women’s 
issues in the Polish parliament. The aim of this chapter is to establish the adopted 
understanding of discourse and, following from this, to state my research questions 
and consider best ways of answering them. The double perspective of discourse as a 
moment of social practice and as a representation of that practice is established as 
central and methodological choices are made related to researching these aspects. 
The analytical tools chosen are a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis of the 
‘texturing’ mechanisms with p^ icu lar attention paid to the use of categories, 
frames, and repertoires. On the other hand, tools that are inevitable in a feminist 
linguistic research dealing with power in discourse, namely the mechanisms of 
domination and resistance in interaction are also pointed out and discussed. The 
material to be analysed is also introduced in this chapter.
Chapter 4 is part of the analytical application of the chosen perspective to the texts of 
the parliamentary debates. Two debates are analysed here: one concerning the 
proposal of equality legislation, and the other related to some changes in labour law, 
namely one concerning the extension of maternity leave. Categories, frames and 
repertoires are consistently used in these examples of argumentation to point to the 
ideological investments of the two main positions represented. The power to define
15
women by the political discourse is addressed here in relation to the textual elements 
of discourse.
The last Chapter is also an analytical one. This time it concerns the application of the 
feminist linguistic theorisation of domination and resistance to one parliamentary 
debate. The debate concerns the representation of women’s issues at a United 
Nations special session on women by the Polish government delegation. Here, I 
concentrate on the interactive aspect of the debate, following its progress, and 
considering individual speakers’ moves in order to show how the dominant positions 
are being established by particular speakers and how others are trying to resist these 
silencing mechanisms.
In the conclusion, I bring together my theoretical concerns and the answers to my 
research questions and consider them critically, trying to point out some of the 
strengths and limitations of the analysis.
16
CHAPTER 1 
From women’s language to a discourse on women: power and 
ideology in linguistic paradigms of language and gender
( ...)  studies o f ‘difference’ are not just disinterested quests for truth, but in an unequal 
society inevitably have a political dimension.
In this chapter I will trace the development of ‘women’s language’ as a discourse on 
women from the non-linguistic through the various linguistic paradigms and assess 
their ideological investment and the implied or theorised conceptualisations of power 
relations in language. I will also try to point to the possible evaluation of the 
directions in which the most recent theory leads in its treatment of power and 
ideology. My primary aim is to explore the importance and the possibilities of 
conceptualising women’s language as also an element of a discourse on women - as 
an ideological construct.
Deborah Cameron ‘Introduction’ in Jennifer Coates and Deborah Cameron (eds.) Women in Their 
Speech Communities (New York and London: Longman 1989), 5-6.
17
1.1 Woman’s language as an ideological construct
The concept of women’s language originates from non-scientific, everyday language, 
where it need not be a serious topic, but rather the subject of jokes and proverbs/^ 
Before an explanation of woman’s language as an ideological construct is presented, 
we need to explore and evaluate the areas in which the term has been used. It is 
precisely the meanings with which woman’s language has been inflected and its 
alleged ‘nature’ that may provide the first connection between language and 
ideology. The notion of ideology is multi-faceted and can be defined in a number of 
ways. However, to start my argument I will use a definition of ideology as a cultural 
construct that presents itself as a common worldview based on certain beliefs, but 
where ‘the salience or prevalence of particular ideas are themselves a form of 
power’. P u t  differently, ideology is a view of the social order or its representation 
aiming at naturalising this o r d e r . I n  other words, ideology may be seen as a 
worldview, a system of views which serves the purpose of justifying unequal power 
relations as well as maintaining the dominant definition of reality and excluding 
other understandings.
See, for example, Cheris Kramarae, ‘Gender: How She Speaks’ in Ellen Bouchard Ryan and 
Howard Giles (eds.) Attitudes Towards Language Variation (London: Edward Arnold, 1982), 87.
This working definition was developed on the basis o f Susan U. Philips ‘Language Ideologies in 
Institutions o f Power. A Commentary’ in Bambi B. Schieffelin, Kathyryn A Woolard, and Paul V. 
Kroskrity (eds.) Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory (New York and London: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 213.
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The primary and most readily available understanding of ‘women’s language’ comes 
from lay theories of gender and language, or ‘the common-sense beliefs’, which have 
sometimes been named ‘folklinguistics’/^ Stereotype is the key concept here, as it 
underlies this understanding of ‘women’s language’. Stereotypes may be understood 
as overgeneralisations and common-sense attributions that may or may not be false 
and negative, but which often are considered to be both.^^ What really matters for my 
understanding of ‘women’s language’ is that they do create a cultural reality against 
which individuals perceive themselves and others. Stereotypes are often treated as 
self-evident truths and are used for justifying a given position. It seems interesting 
that it is women’s linguistic behaviour that gets stereotyped more often then rnen’s. 
In any culture, there seems to be a rich repository of views on women’s language, 
which is usually seen as peculiar, funny, or at least markedly different from the 
standard, male linguistic behaviour. They are found most notably in proverbs, 
anecdotes and other fixed phrases and they are the stock supply of meanings for 
jokes.^^ A fairly comprehensive list of stereotypes about woman’s language is 
offered by Martin Montgomery;
Women, it is said, are less assertive (more tentative) in their speech than men: it is said that 
they use fewer taboo forms and more euphemisms than men, or conversely, that they talk
This understanding of ideology is based on critical linguistics theory, which will be exploredlater. 
See, in particular, Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 
87.
A discussion o f folklinguistics in early linguistic work is offered by Mary M. Talbot, Language and 
Gender: an Introduction (Cambridge, Oxford and Malden, MA: Polity Press 1998), 37-38.
This understanding is offered by Deborah Cameron ‘Introduction’, Jermifer Coates and Deborah 
Cameron (eds.) Women in Their Speech Communities (London and New York: Longman 1989), 8.
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less than men: that they are inclined to gossip, that they are more conservative in their speech 
and, at the same time, more sensitive to matters o f correctness, that their speech is more 
polite and so on.
This is a good introduction into my understanding of woman’s language as an 
ideological construct/^ stereotypical views are not only negative and potentially 
insulting, they are also at the very core of the dominant construction of femininity. 
This construction is concerned, firstly with the preservation of binary difference 
between men and women, and secondly, with maintaining the derogatory meaning of 
this difference for women, establishing them as the subordinate group (characterised 
by non-standard linguistic behaviour).
The first linguistic, and therefore, scientific explanations of the concept ‘woman’s 
language’ come from two areas of linguistic inquiry. The first is the work of the 
linguist, Robin Lakoff, who, in mid 70s became interested in the social phenomenon 
of gender. Lakoff^ is credited with providing a first ‘laundry list’ of markers of 
feminine speech on all levels of linguistic production. Writing from the standpoint of 
mainstream linguistic theory, Lakoff used her own native speaker intuition to 
generalise the women’s ‘special style of speech’:
Examples o f stereotypes related to female linguistic behaviour in English were quoted by Cheris 
Kramarae, ‘Gender: How She Speaks’ in Ellen Bouchard Ryan and Howard Giles (eds.) Attitudes 
Towards Language Variation (London: Edward Arnold, 1982), 87.
Martin Montgomery Introduction to Language and Society (London and New York: Routledge, 
1995), 151.
The most insulting stereotypes state that women are talkative, gossiping, their speech is unending, 
verbose, indirect, illogical, lacking sense o f humour, emotionally loaded and generally not to be taken 
seriously. See, Kremarae, 87.
Robin Lakoff, Language and Woman’s Place (New York: Harper and Row, 1975)
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Woman’s language shows up on all levels o f the grammar of English. We find differences in 
the choice and frequency o f lexical items: in the situations in which certain syntactic mles are 
performed; in intonational and other suprasegmental patterns.^’
According to Lakoff, these ‘feminine markers’ form a speech style characterised as 
soft, polite, non-conffontational and very insecure-sounding/^ Interestingly eiïough, 
the characterisation of ‘women’s language’ offered by Lakoff mirrors closely the 
views presented above as stereotypical. We may say that such a concept of ‘woman’s 
language’ is an ideological construct. It is ideological in that it theorises the 
behaviour of women by using exclusionary ideological views on women. That is, 
women themselves are presented as lacking assertiveness and being hyper-correct 
and over-polite, where all the terms assess women’s behaviour in relation to male 
patterns of speech.
Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall make the point that we should therefore treat Lakoff s 
findings as an inquiry into ‘the cultural expectations’ that is ‘rooted in cultural 
ideologies’ resulting firom the socialisation process of girls^^. Such an understanding 
would correspond to the notion of woman’s language as an ideological construct. 
Whether this was the case at the time is not clear, since Lakoff refers to the linguistic
Robin Lakoff ‘Extract from Language and Woman’s Place ’ in Deborah Cameron (ed.) Feminist 
Critique o f  Language: A Reader (London: Routledge, 1990), 221, 223.
A shorter version o f the argument appeared also in Robin Lakoff, ‘Why Women are Ladies’ in 
Charles Fillmore, George Lakoff and Robin Lakoff (eds.) Berkeley Studies o f  Syntax and Semantic 
vol. 1 (Berkeley; University o f California Press, 1974), 1-44.
21
reality in which women are not able to express themselves ‘as well, as fully, or as
* ^0freely as they might otherwise’. This formulation implies the male speech style as 
the norm that is ‘free’ and ‘full’.
Whatever the particular features of the so-called woman’s language are found to be, 
the underlying assumption is that the linguistic behaviour of women is significantly 
different from that of men. Thus, women are a clear cut, stable category. In other 
terms, there are two linguistic sexes, constituted by a binary understanding of 
difference between them. This would explain why the text in question was so widely 
accepted as supposedly illuminating the reality of the miscommimication between 
men and women, and became extremely popular even as a basis for training male 
actors for female roles. Again, Bucholtz and Hall point to this as a positive feature 
of Lakoff s text, claiming that it ‘parallels postmodern musings on the discursive 
construction of gender identity’ as it allows for the enactment of the ‘opposite’ 
style.^^ However, they fail to point out that in the popular imagination no such option 
is available unless to be used for the purpose of comic representation of the ‘Other’.
The second area in the linguistic investigations where meanings related to ‘women’s 
language’ are to be found is sociolinguistics, which, instead of introspection, uses
Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall, ‘Introduction: Twenty Year’s after Language and Woman’s Place' in 
Kira Hall and Mary Bucholtz (eds.) Gender Articulated: Language and the Socially Constructed S e lf 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 6.
Robin Lakoff ‘Extract from Language and Woman’s Place', 111.
Bucholtz and Hall, 5-8.
Buholtz and Hall, 7.
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ethnographie methodology. Most often quoted of these are William Labov’s^  ^ and 
Peter Trudgill’s^ "^  studies of sex and class variables in English-speaking 
communities. Both studies came to the conclusion that women used standard forms 
of pronunciation as opposed to the more vernacular forms preferred by males. Again, 
this mirrors the stereotypical representations of women’s speech. The research starts 
firom the assumption of the two sexes as given, stable and socially determined. The 
subsequent explanations for the differences in behaviour are simplistic, 
overgeneralising and often stereotypical. For instance, women are seen as more 
concerned with politeness, social prestige and the standard language as a way of 
counterbalancing their lack of other powers in the real world.^^ Thus, what these 
studies attempt to do is to provide scientific explanations of the existing status quo 
rather than critique it. This is a criticism of sociolinguistic approaches in general; 
though turning to the study of language in the social context, they do not try to 
problematise the social at all.^  ^ Most importantly, there is a definite bias in the 
treatment of male behaviour as the norm, and female behaviour as a departure from 
it, which is therefore in need of explanation.^^ For example, the material conditions 
of women’s lives were not taken into account. Instead, their behaviour was explained 
by certain psychological characteristics allegedly typical for women. Features such
William Labov, The Social Stratification o f  English in New York City (Washington DC: Centre for 
Applied Linguistics, 1966)
Peter Trudgill, ‘Sex, covert prestige and linguistic change in the urban British English of Norwich.’ 
in Jennifer Coates (ed.) Language and Gender: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998)
Talbot, 24.
The argument was best summed up by Deborah Cameron, ‘The language-gender interface: 
challenging co-optation,’ in Victoria L. Berg vail, Janet M. Bing and Alice F. Freed (eds.) Rethinking 
Language and Gender Research: Theory and Practice (London: Longman, 1996), 32-33.
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as conservatism, hypercorrectness, insecurity, lack of social status all enter such 
blanket explanations/^ Cameron also makes the point that there might be a hidden 
agenda behind this type of research concerned with making claims about female 
inferiority (or abnormal behaviour), which does no more than justify further male 
dominance/^ For feminist scholars, explanation in this instance can lead to 
justification/®
Thus, woman’s language can be seen as an ideological construct also in the 
empirically oriented, scientific discourse of sociolinguistics. Moreover, it is precisely 
this belief in empiricism that makes the ideology possible. This belief contends that 
the reality of a given community needs only to be studied with the assumption that 
whatever exists is right and serves some socially important function. The idea that 
‘the reality’ serves the purpose of maintaining unequal power relations, or the other 
way around, that it is these exclusionary power relations that create ‘the reality’ as 
we know it is not explored. That this is deemed unproblematic or unworthy of 
attention can only be claimed from within the dominant ideology of the more 
privileged, with their particular interests at stake.
See, for instance, Deborah Cameron and Jennifer Coates ‘Some problems in the sociolinguistic 
explanation of sex differences’ in Jennifer Coates and Deborah Cameron (eds.) Women in Their 
Speech Communities (London: Longman 1989)
Ibid., 14-23, and Sally Johnson, Gender, Group Identity and Variation in the Berlin Vernacular: A
Sociolinguistic Study {BQm: Peter Lang, 1995), 86-93. 
Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 35, 49.
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1.2 Power relations according to explanatory models o f feminist
linguistic research
Gender and language research has generally aimed at explaining the relationship 
between women and language and, at the same time, has attempted to problematise 
the stereotypical representations of women’s language. The key notion for any study 
of gender and language is the issue of power, and the available paradigms vary 
precisely in their theorisation of power in human communication. Another problem 
which we should try to address is whether and how the language and gender 
paradigms can be conceptualised in relation to their ideological investment, and, of 
course, in their assessment of the dominant ideology of ‘woman’s language.
Feminist research on gender and language can be seen as grounded in the early 
theorisations. In this respect, both the work of Lakoff and the sociolinguistic studies 
have been credited with starting the research interest in the language of women and 
supplying the first available explanatory paradigm of language and gender, known as
■ ■ 41the deficit paradigm. As the name suggests, this approach stresses the 
shortcomings of women’s style due to their different socialisation in early childhood. 
According to Lakoff, women are trained in both masculine and feminine styles, but 
whichever one they use they will be criticised as either losing their femininity and
Cameron, ‘The Language-Gender Interface: Challenging Co-optation’, 39, Talbot, 30. Though it 
can also be conceptualised as a part o f dominance model. See, for example Sally Johnson, ‘ 
Theorising Language and Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective, in Sally Johnson and Uhike Hanna 
M einhof (eds) Language and Masculinity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 9.
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becoming too masculine or simply for being too feminine, and thus not to be taken 
seriously/^
However, the deficit model falls into the trap of accusing women themselves of 
doing something wrong even if it is seen as a direct consequence of the socialisation 
process: women, though forced to a passive ‘bilingualism’, cannot become fluent in 
either of the two styles/^ This early interest in women’s language has been accused 
of reinforcing the dominant, white, middle-class, American ideology on femininity, 
which may explain its ‘acceptance by diverse groups of speakers as a valid 
representation of their own discursive exper i encesSimi la r  criticisms have been 
directed at early sociolinguistic explanations of female speech in relation to the 
‘male vernacular’. This view equated the use of conversational power with male, and 
the use of politeness with female speakers, while, at the same time, ‘acknowledging’ 
the ensuing ineffectiveness of women in interaction.
The second model, known as the dominance paradigm made male power in 
conversation, rather than female deficit, the centre of its attention. It points out how 
men dominate women even, or primarily, in everyday conversation. The research has 
shown that women are assigned the ‘maintenance work’ of conversation,"^^ that they
Robin Lakoff ‘Extract from Language and Woman’s Place 222.
Ibid.
Buholtz and Hall, 6.
Pamela Fishman, ‘Interaction: The W ork Women D o’ in Barrie Thome, Cheris Kramarae and 
Nancy Henley (eds) Language, Gendér and Society (Rowley, MA: Newbury House, 1983)
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are often interrupted, silenced"  ^ and evaluated negatively/^ The majority of earlier 
feminist linguistic research in cross-sex conversation seemed to support this 
generalisation. However, this approach lost popularity in the nineties, primarily 
because it was seen as overgeneralising the power of men, particularly stark in Dale 
Spender’s model of man-made language/^ Cameron stated that this approach marked 
the moment of feminist outrage at the power of men, and thus male power was 
presented as too monolithic without due attention to the context of conversation in 
which this power was displayed."^^
What follows is Cameron’s claim that in the 1990s we need to look for non- 
monolithic and more context-dependent understanding of power, where men are not 
inherently oppressive villains and women are not inevitably v i c t i m s . A s  Talbot 
points out ‘such a monolithic perception of patriarchy is useless (...) If we are going 
to make claims about male dominance, we need to be more sophisticated’.^ ^
Another important point is that the approach was seen as leading to uncomfortable 
confrontations with men, who ‘are unlikely to be pleased with the way someone 
researching into male dominance in conversation interprets their findings’. This
Don Zimmeraian and Candance West, ‘Sex Roles, Interruptions and Silences in Conversation’ in 
Barrie Thome and Nancy Henley (eds) Language and Sex: Difference and Dominance (Rowley, MA: 
Newbury House 1975)
Victoria Leto De Francisco, ‘The Sounds of Silence: How Men Silence Women in Marital 
Relations’ Discourse and Society 2, no.4 (October 1991)
Talbot, 131.
Cameron, ‘The Language-Gender Interface: Challenging Co-optation,’ 41.
Ibid., 42.
Talbot, 134.
Talbot, 135.
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problem may be seen as an existing conflict of private and professional values, 
which Talbot calls an ethical one. But this also shows that political values could have 
changed. As Cameron sums up, ‘the feminist outrage’ was no longer ‘the mood’ in
the 1990s/^
A parallel approach, though one which conceptualised the relations between men and 
women in interaction differently, became known as the difference paradigm. This 
approach again evoked the concept of bilingualism, claiming that men and women 
use different conversational styles, and have different goals in conversation which 
may lead to miscommunication. This is due to men and women living in two 
overlapping but different cultures, where socialisation in peer groups is seen as the 
source of different pattems.^"  ^ Thus, men’s conversational style aims at maintaining 
hierarchy and status, while women’s aims at maintaining positive and interconnected 
relationships. Cameron calls this research interest ‘a moment of feminist celebration, 
reclaiming and re-valuing women’s distinctive cultural traditions’.^  ^Understandably, 
the difference approach has lead to more research into specifically female 
conversational styles.^^
Cameron, ‘Rethinking Language and Gender Studies: Issues for the 1990s’, Career’ in Sara Mills 
(ed.) Language and Gender: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York and London: Longman, 1995),
Talbot, 131.
Cameron, ‘The Language-Gender Interface: Challenging Co-optation,’ 41.
See, for example Jennifer Coates, ‘Gossip Revisited: Language in All Female Groups’ in Jennifer 
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However, the difference paradigm became heavily criticised when it was popularised 
by Deborah Tannen’s You Just D on’t Under stand. W h e r e a s  the dominance 
paradigm was seen as overstressing and simplifying issues of male power, the 
difference paradigm, in Tannen’s version, was criticised for ignoring the issues of 
power altogether. This was seen as a reactionary stance, maintaining the status quo 
rather than challenging it and demanding change .The  notion that men and women 
live in or come from two different cultures was seen as problematic, while the 
assessment of the two styles as different but equally valuable was considered as not 
reflecting existing social relations. As Talbot puts it: ‘socially the two styles are not 
equally valid’.
The conceptualisation of women’s speech as distinct from men’s (but somehow less 
useful in the public sphere where the masculine model reigns) contributed to 
maintaining the ideology on women, and the understanding of genders as binary 
opposites, where women occupy the less prestigious, more problematic end of the 
spectrum. This point was made clearly by Cameron who also showed how the 
difference model can be co-opted by non-scientific popular media in order to 
problematise women’s behaviour, and to maintain ideological notions of femininity 
and masculinity.^^ Talbot also points to the political consequences of this approach: 
on the one hand ‘there is no unpleasant politics to think about and no one is to blame.
Deborah Tannen, (London: Virago, 1991)
See, especially Senta Troemel-Ploetz, ‘Review Essay: Selling the Apolitical’ Discourse and Society 
2, no.4 (October 1991)
Talbot, 142.
Cameron ‘The Language-Gender Interface: Challenging Co-optation, 36-37
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but also the approach ‘could be used to support the traditional, conventional 
idealisation of womanhood’/^ According to Cameron, this is exactly the reason for 
the popularity of Tannen’s book as well as its co-optation in advice literature for 
women. Not only are clear-cut ideas of femininity and accounts of gender difference 
reaffirmed, the advice becomes increasingly directed at women’s behaviour, even in 
the private domain, and it is women who are responsible for achieving any change in 
their interactions with men.^^ In this way, the ideological representation of women is 
reaffirmed, rather then challenged.
1.3 Power and ideology in the deconstructive approach
How can we avoid problematising women and using a monolithic concept of power, 
but still be able to study gender and language?^^ According to Cameron, the issue is 
to problematise the notion of gender itself so that it is seen as a ‘problem, not a 
solution’. W h a t  is considered inadequate is the conception of gender as a binary 
phenomenon arising from what men and women are socialised to do. In the words of 
Johnson, gender is better conceptualised as a verb rather than a noun: ‘Masculinity 
and femininity are ongoing social processes dependent on systematic restatement, a 
process which is variously referred to as “performing gender” or “doing identity
Talbot, 139, 138.
Cameron ‘The Language-Gender Interface: Challenging Co-optation,’36-39. 
Cameron, ‘Rethinking Language and Gender Studies: Issues for the 1990s’, 44.
64 Ibid., 42.
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work’” /^ Judith Butler is credited with introducing this performative notion of 
gender. Cameron sums up Butler’s claim that ‘who you are, and are taken to be 
depends on your repeated performance over time of acts that constitute a particular 
i d e n t i t y B u t l e r  reworks Austin’s^  ^ speech act theory to point to the creation of 
social realities and subjectivities through speech. In her more recent work^^ she 
claims that an act of signification is also an enactment of what it names: ‘The 
pronouncement is the act of speech at the same time that it is the speaking of an 
act’.^  ^Moreover, the social practice of speech acts is ritualised as it ‘accumulates the 
force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior or authoritative set of 
practices’. T h i s  may be said also of the practice of performing gender identity 
through speech.
This conceptualisation is acknowledged to have arisen out of post-structuralist 
approaches to language,^^ particularly out of the work of Michael Foucault.^^ The 
deconstructive paradigm seeks to see gender as fluid and performative. In the words 
of Johnson, ‘language does not simply mirror gender; it helps constitute it - it is one 
of the means by which gender is enacted’. L a n g u a g e  is a means by which
70
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knowledge and identity are enacted in the process of engendering. The fluidity of 
social practices means that positions can shift and are subject to change, a point 
which is welcomed by feminists as allowing for potential change and making an 
emancipatory feminist agenda plausible.^"  ^This new dimension for studying language 
and gender could be called ‘the dynamic paradigm , a l t h o u g h  it has also been 
referred to a s ‘performative’, o r ‘deconstructive’ approach.^^
In this view, not only does the language of gendered speakers amount to the 
performance of gender: if we take a post-structuralist view, the same can be said 
about any theorisations of gender itself (including the performative one). That is, we 
may say that all theories on language and gender are also constructions of gender 
(difference). This understanding of the connection between language of and language 
on women creates a more complex conceptualisation of gender and language.
Before we accept the new approach, we need to consider how it relates to the key 
issues of power and ideology in relation to gender. The prevailing view within 
language and gender theorists sees the deconstructive paradigm as the only answer to 
the problems with the dominance and difference paradigms.^^ As regards the issue of 
dominance, it allows for a more sophisticated, context-dependent study of power and 
resistance, where both men and women are involved in enacting, but also resisting
A point made by Johnson, ‘Theorismg Language and Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective’, 24, 
Cameron, 209, Talbot, 145.
Talbot, 145.
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the standards of masculinity and femininity. Contrary to the binary understanding of 
gender difference in the difference paradigm, men and women are not clear-cut, pre­
given categories at all, but are constantly being recreated as such. Thus, there is 
scope for numerous constructions of gender^^. This is a sophistication of earlier, 
simplistic notions of power and gender in discourse. According to Mills, in this 
Foucauldian understanding ‘power is dispersed through social relations, (...) it 
produces possible forms of behaviour as well as restricting behaviour’^ .^
However, this ‘productive notion of power’ can be criticised by some feminists as 
restricting the possibility of a critique of patriarchal relations in society. For 
example, it has been pointed out that such a dispersed notion of power may only be 
possible from the position of the privileged, the one placed at the centre of power 
and therefore hot useful for the mariginalised groups.^^ Indeed, it is hard for women 
and other marginalised groups who experience the negative effects of the prevalent 
power relations to accept the view that they are as implicated in the process of 
producing these power relations as these who control their private lives, their access 
to the public sphere, and so on.
See Johnson, ‘Theorising Language and Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective’, 19-21, for a 
discussion o f different masculinities. .
Sara Mills, Discourse (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 20.
Ibid., 20.
See, for example, Nancy Harstock, ‘Foucault on Power: A Theory for W omen?’ in L.J. Nicholson 
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Another important consideration relates to the concept of ideology. Mills claims that 
it has become considered problematic, and thus it is often substituted by the notion of 
discourse, due to the political climate of 1990s:
Many theorists have found themselves more comfortable with the notion o f discourse than 
aligning themselves with Marxist inflected theories through the term ideology’ it is 
possible to conduct a politically informed analysis based on the use o f discourse theory, but 
this political commitment is in no way as straightforwardly formulated as it is when using the 
term ideology.^^
Though Mills is probably trying to say that there can no longer be easy 
generalisations of power and that is why discourse is a better term than ideology, this 
assessment relies on a particular understanding of ideology. Ideology is seen here as 
producing false consciousness and blinded subjects, whereas discourse is seen as a 
site of incessant contestation over meaning, allowing for resistance:
Discourse, because of its lack of alliance to a clear political agenda, offered a way of
thinking about hegemony - people’s compliance in their own oppression - without assuming
83that individuals are simply passive victims of systems of thought.
This can be understood to mean that making a social subject, institution or social 
group responsible for consequences of discursive practices is becoming more 
problematic. But it may also mean that it is no longer possible, thereby presenting a
Sara Mills, Discourse, 29.
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threat to the feminist linguistic (and political) agenda; a point which is aclaiowledged 
by Mills herself:
An ideological analysis still, in the last instance, retains the notion of individual subject who 
is capable of resisting ideological pressures and controlling his or her actions. Discourse 
theory has far more difficulty in locating, describing and even accounting for individual 
subject who resists power.
Such developments within feminist scholarship in general have been critiqued by 
Hennessy/^ who claims that we are witnessing an assimilation of the emancipatory 
discourses into the mainstream academic culture, but in the form of Tudic’ 
postmodernism’. This signifies a turn to the celebration of difference and of multiple 
identities, especially seen as constructed through language, but without any analysis 
of the ways in which these differences are socially, materially constructed out of 
unequal power relations.^^ At the same time, she claims that concentrating on issues 
of language play, of signification and the creation of difference, may lead to ‘a 
watering down of feminism’, as it becomes ‘absorbed by the hegemonic culture’.
According to Hennessy, what feminist analysis needs to develop instead of ‘ludic 
postmodernism’, is a ‘resistance postmodernism’ which allows for a study of 
‘politics of the production and maintenance of subjectivities, that is, with language as
Ibid., 42.
^  Ibid., 35.
R. H ennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics o f  Discourse. (New York and London; 
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a social practice’/^ That is, ideology should not ‘disappear’ as a focus of analysis, 
but it should be seen as a more complex phenomenon, just like the concept of power 
has become. However, we need to consider further what would such a dynamic 
conceptualisation of ideological practices (rather than a stable ideology) mean also 
for language and gender study?
1.4 Dominance in performance as an approach to language and 
gender?
Apart from the notion of ideology and the fluid understanding of gender, the 
approach to power in language and gender must be carefully considered again. If we 
accept the notion that feminist scholarship should not lose its resistance and 
emancipatory aims, it seems that feminist linguistics cannot afford to give up some 
understanding of power-as-dominance, alongside a conceptualisation of difference. 
A similar point was made by Cameron in her discussion of difference, despite her 
discrediting of th e ‘dominance paradigm’:
(...)  Inequality can give rise to difference, rather than vice versa. The conventional view is to
see subordinated groups as oppressed because they are different. I am suggesting rather that
Ibid., 2.
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many o f the differences invoked to justify oppression, to the extent that they exist at all, have 
actually arisen historically .because of it. In the case o f these differences, there can be no 
place for relativism.^^
Thus, the new dynamic or deconstructive approach should not aim at celebrating 
multiple differences, as this would lead to a similar kind of relativism that the 
celebration of binary difference entails. Rather, it should reassert the notion of power 
and dominance, and thus rewrite the dominance paradigm. Otherwise, any 
feministically-informed research concerned with oppression and inequality, 
understood as asymmetrical relations in social interaction, will not be possible. As 
Johnson claims in relation to the study of masculine speech culture, we still need ‘an 
informed study of mechanisms of oppression, that is, of the specific ways in which 
men construct a world which so manifestly excludes and undermines women’ 
Clearly, a sophisticated notion of dominance resulting out of power inequalities must 
still be present in any such project. ,
The conceptualisation of gender within the deconstructive paradigm should be seen 
as both promising and problematic. Firstly, within the performative view of gender 
the notion of masculinity and femininity are no longer seen as binary categories, but 
rather as mutually constructed.^^ Yet, though a dialectical one, this relation is highly 
asymmetrical. In other words, the two genders seen as mutually constructed need not
Ibid., 3.
Cameron, ‘Rethinking Language and Gender Studies: Issues for the 1990s’, 41. 
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be equivalential at all/^ More often than not, masculinity is located at the relatively 
more prestigious, powerful end of the scale played against the relatively powerless, 
unprestigious femininity. This is why there is more at stake for men to avoid being 
called “feminine” than the other way around, as witnessed in various models of 
semiosis, such as ways of dressing and the perceived style of speaking. A similar 
point was made by Cameron when, in discussing the problem of the relativism of the 
difference paradigm, she mentions the two sexes ‘complementing’ each other. She 
argues that ‘complementarity does not mean equality. On the contrary, gender 
relations are predicated on the subordination of one group over another’. 
Subordination cannot be accounted for without turning to the notion of power and 
some understanding of how it is used systematically to subordinate, that is to 
dominate ‘the Other’ in a particular context.
Another point is that the dialectical relation between men and women is much more 
complex. The concept of the ‘generic man’ is allowed to mean more than the 
masculine as defined in relation to the feminine. Being the unmarked category the 
masculine is more readily taken to embody the typically human. Men are not always 
seen as men but as genderless, abstracted, typical human beings.^"  ^This notion of the 
genderless man is very much present in concrete social situations and institutions, 
just as much as in the structure of language or in scientific discourse. It is this
The notion of unequivalential mutual constructs, a dialectical relation understood as ‘differential 
internalisation’ was made by my director of studies, Erzsebet Barat in her notes to my chapter. 
Cameron, ‘The Language-Gender Interface: Challenging Co-optation’, 43.
A  particularly good investigation of the concept o f the generic man was carried out by Naomi 
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apparent lack of gender, lack of complete embodiment, that has previously 
legitimised men as undisputed policy makers, judges, managers and so forth, and has 
given them the right to decide on even specifically ‘feminine’ matters, such as the 
reproductive rights of women.
Women, on the other hand, are primarily seen through their gender, if not still 
through their body reduced to biological sex. Even when women are allowed into 
positions of power they do not act as genderless beings; their actions are always 
caught up within gendered and sexualised categorisation of their body. This is why 
deciding on issues considered as ‘traditionally’ male is rarely an open option for 
women: a group of exclusively male politicians may debate reproduction rights and 
female contraception, but a commission of women debating such issues as military 
organisations, national security^ and the like is still hard to imagine in most societies. 
In my understanding, any asymmetrical dialectical social construct cannot be 
explained without some notion of power, domination and ideology.
My point is not to return to a monolithic notion of power, one always exercised by 
the same people in the same way, as this is never the case. Perhaps, different forms 
of power permeate different social situations: in some localities power is more 
concentrated than in others and it need not be hegemonic power in all instances. Yet, 
Johnson stresses that ‘flexibility, inconsistency and contradiction must not be seen as 
irritations which distract from feminist accounts of hegemonic male power’. F o r
Johnson, 21.
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example, the dynamism and complexity of performing masculine gender need not 
distract us from ‘the complex role played by ‘difference’ in the construction o f 
‘dominance” /^
If we accept that dominance is still a valid way to understand power relations in 
interaction, how can this dominance be conceptualised? Domination involves power, 
or the appropriation of power by a particular interlocutor. However it is also a 
strategy, a process, a mechanism, and not necessarily attributed a priori to some 
interlocutors or social groups. It is still the process of ‘doing power’, and, perhaps, it 
need not remain unchallenged.
It seems to me that post-structuralist feminist theory,^^ and some of the recent 
language and gender research, does combine the notion of performance with the 
notion of dominance in power relations. One example of how the dynamic and the 
dominance paradigm can be combined in feminist research on everyday interaction is 
Elinor Ochs and Carolyn Tailor’s work on the dinner table conversations of 
couples.^^ In the study, husbands were shown to be routinely placed by their wives in 
the roles of evaluators, judges, and critics of the recounted behaviour of women (and 
children).However,  though the authors of this analysis speak of ‘gender 
asymmetry’ they operate within the ‘deconstructive paradigm’ and treat gender and
Ibid., 25.
See, for example Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998)
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power as enacted and recreated in the discursive creation of male and female 
identities. Thus, dominance is seen as a process, and one that is often created with 
the input of the women themselves, though the effects of it place women in a 
subordinated position.
Even more relevant for my research interest is a similar approach to communication 
in the public sphere. Dynamic mechanisms of domination operating in discourse, 
both understood as linguistic interaction and also in the Foucauldian understanding 
of the term, may be seen in the works of two authors analysing the same public 
sphere event, namely the Clarence Thomas confirmation controversy in the USA^^ .^ 
Norma Mendoza-Denton shows how on the micro-level of interaction power may be 
captured in the way male judges used silence, tag questions as opposed to yes-no 
questions, and topic-switching techniques to derail the woman’s case and support the 
testimony of the defendant. On a slightly more discursive level, she explores the 
ethnic speech styles used by the individual in order to present his case from a racial 
perspective, which were unavailable to the woman’s speech situation.
Another asymmetry in the same event was shown by Nancy Fraser, who pointed out 
the negotiation of the highly gendered notion of private sphere as a sacred domain.
The event was a televised inquiry into a sexual harassment charge filed against Thomas by a 
former employee, Anita Hill.
Norma Mendoza-Denton ‘Pregnant Pauses: Silence and Authority in the Anita Hill- Clarence 
Thomas Hearings’ in Kira Hall and Mary Bucholtz (eds.) Gender Articulated: Language and the 
Socially Constructed S e lf  (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 54-59.
The speech styles include 'Hestifyin, sermonizin and signifyin ”, Ibid., 63.
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which again was shown to operate for the benefit of the male defendan t /The  case 
was shown to be an example of social negotiation of gender and privacy, a key 
component of the public discourse on masculinity and femininity. Approaches such 
as the two presented above allow us to trace some of the intricate mechanisms of 
domination in communication, seen both as a linguistic behaviour and as social 
practice.
Summing up, ‘the dynamic paradigm’ does promise new possibilities to develop the 
study of gender and language. Interestingly, the deconstructive approach may go 
towards the celebration of the differences made even more relative than in the case 
of the traditional difference paradigm. Alternatively, and perhaps more usefully, it 
can be seen as a study of the fluid performance of gender, with multiple meanings 
available and with potentially open, though reciprocally related gender positions, but 
without bypassing the mechanisms of domination.
The deconstructive approach should adopt a non-monolithic notion of power in 
discourse, one which allows for the conceptualisation of new, non-prefigured, 
formations of gendered identities through discursive resistance. In order to do this, 
we first have to assess the construction of gender ideologies, which restrict the 
formation of gendered positions. On the level of gender ideology (ideological 
practice), the two gender constructs are fluid, dialectical but are maintained as
Nancy Fraser, ‘Sex, Lies and The Public Sphere: Reflections on the Confirmation o f Clarence 
Thomas’ in Joan B. Landes (ed.) Feminism, the Public and Private. (Oxford: Oxford Universit Press, 
1998), 321.
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socially asymmetrical/®"^ We need to account for the way the opposition is created, 
what mechanisms are used to establish it, and keep the asymmetrical relationship 
between the understanding of the masculine and feminine. Yet in order to be able to 
carry out such an account, we need to consider further what a discursive approach to 
power means in a wider theoretical/philosophical framework.
104 This in itself, is o f course also a construction of gender ‘theory’ or, o f a ‘discourse on women’.
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CHAPTER 2
Opening up new conceptualisations of discourse and power: critical 
and feminist discourse theory
‘Poststmcturalism” indicates a field of critical practices that cannot be totalised and that 
therefore, interrogate the formative and exclusionary power o f dis-course in the construction 
of sexual difference'®^
In Chapter 1 ,1 discussed the understanding of ‘women’s language’ as an ideological 
construct within linguistic approaches to gender, paying close attention to the 
treatment of power relations and the construction of gender that the particular 
theories imply. The most recent, ‘dynamic’ paradigm is based on the poststructuralist 
theorisations of language, and, in particular, on the work of Michel Foucault.'®® 
However, we have to assess this theory carefully, if it is to be used in the feminist 
scholarship on language and gender. As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, 
feminist scholars need a theory of discourse seen as social communication that can 
take into account power and domination, (or better, for the attempts at dominating). 
Moreover, the relationship between discourse and its social, or material effects is of
Judith Buttler and Joan Scott, (eds.) ‘Introduction’, Feminists Theorise the Political (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1992), xiii.
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central importance for feminist theory and politics. In this chapter, I will present 
materialist feminist and critical discourse approaches which present insights into the 
understanding of discourse that may be useful in researching gender, discourse and 
power. The different paradigms offered by discourse theory will be assessed, as they 
allow for a theorisation of discourse that is more in tune with the needs of a self­
reflexive, feminist, political agenda.
2.1 Discourse as social interaction
The shift from the study of ‘women’s language’ to the understanding of ‘woman’s 
language as an ideological construct’, which I presented in the previous chapter, is 
important as it corresponds to a similar shift in feminist and critical theorisations, 
from a stress on language as a n ‘existing reality’ to the study of discourse as a ‘social 
construction’. This poststructuralist approach is best summed up by Weedon:
If  language is the site where meaningful experience is constituted, then language also 
determines how we perceive possibilities for change. Language, in this sense, consists o f a 
range of discourses which offer different versions o f the meanings o f social relations and 
their effects on the individual. The way in which we interpret these social relations has 
important political implications.'®’
106 Michel Foucault, Archeology o f  Knowledge (London: Travistock, 1972)
'®’ Weedon, 82.
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I have to stress here that this approach implies several understandings of 
discourse/®^ One understanding of discourse corresponds roughly to the notion of 
language in use or ‘language in action’, that is, of particular communicative events 
with stretches of verbal interaction which can be studied with careful attention to its 
sequences, turns and context. This corresponds roughly to the notion of discourse as 
it would be used by a sociolinguist. The other is the study of discourse on a slightly 
more abstract level, where a discourse is understood as a representation, a total sum 
of statements, texts and interactions within a topical or institutional domain, 
including rules of their production.^®® This second understanding corresponds to a 
poststructuralist view of language as part of social practice. The two understandings 
of discourse are interconnected: in order to study discourse as a collection of 
available meanings on a particular subject, we need to turn to the analysis of 
particular communicative acts seen as perpetrating or challenging and extending 
those meanings. Both meanings are important for my analysis, however, it is the 
second meaning that provides a broader scope for the analysis of discourse in social 
context.
Yet, it is precisely this connection between discourse as representation and discourse 
as social practice that provides a basis for a newer understanding of power in social 
interaction and supports a view of language as a form of social practice imbued with 
power relations. This understanding of discourse as social interaction, and the issues 
of power and ideology, need to be examined here as the possibility of theorising
For an exploration of various understandings of discourse see, Ruth Wodak, Disorders o f  
Discourse (London and New York: Longman, 1996)15-16.
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domination and resistance in discourse depends on which understanding of the nature 
of discourse and ideology in social life we adopt. Perhaps the most important 
theorisations in relation to these issues have been provided by the work of Michel 
Foucault.
2.2 Poststructuralist (Foucauldian) understanding o f discursive power
Foucault’s understanding of discourse points to the mechanisms of exclusion, 
disciplining and restricting as discursive power: ‘In appearance speech may well be 
of little account, but the prohibitions surrounding it soon reveal its links with desire 
and power’. H e  enumerates the mechanisms of exclusion guarding the power of 
discourse, such as the development of disciplines, doctrines and the institution of 
authorship.^^^ Moreover, he points out that the very participation in discourse is 
restricted to some speaking subjects:
This amounts to rarefication among speaking subjects: none may enter into discourse on a 
specific subject unless he has satisfied certain conditions, or if  he is not, from the"outset, 
qualified to do so. More significantly, no areas of discourse are equally open and penetrable; 
some are forbidden territory. ( ...)  " ’
Mary Talbot, Language and Gender. An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 145.
Michel Foucault, ‘The Discourse on Language’, in Richard Kemey and Mara Rainwater (eds.) The 
Continental Philosophy Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 340.
See Foucault, Archaeology o f  Knowledge, 3-76.
Ibid., 349
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He also argues that sexuality and politics are two domains of discourse that are most 
highly contested and most controlled of all, in the sense that most power and 
restriction goes into their product ion /This  may well explain the feminist inquiry 
into and critique of both these discursive domains.
Moreover, his theory is important inasmuch as it points to the materiality and 
regulation of discourse through institutions, which would allow for some notion of 
domination mechanisms to be developed. However, the theory does not develop such 
an understanding, since the mechanisms are seen as inherent within discourse itself, 
or at least are placed at the limits of discourse. Discursive relations ‘characterise not 
the language (langue) used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is 
employed, but the discourse itself as a practice’. T h u s ,  it seems that it is the 
discourse itself that is exercising exclusion and restricting subject positions in the 
Foucauldian understanding of domination. The social reality is understood to be the 
primary source, a material for discursive formations, and these in turn determine the 
available understandings of the social reality. How to study the relationship between 
the nondiscursive and discursive practices is not pointed out.'^^ What is more, all 
possibility of change is dependent on chance, and therefore cannot be easily 
predicted:
I am supposing that in every society the production o f discourse is at once controlled,
selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role
Ibid., 340. .
" 'Ib id .,  46.
This point was made by Rosemary H ennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics o f  Discourse 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1993), 41.
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is to avert its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome
materiality. 116
In the light of this understanding of the nature of discursive power, Foucault’s theory 
proves interesting but also controversial for feminist scholarship. Firstly, power 
cannot be captured as it pemieates all discursive and social relations. Secondly, 
power is envisaged as ‘productive’ that is not only repressing and restricting 
practices but also producing them.^^^ As Nancy Fraser points out, this complex 
notion of power is normatively neutral, and does not allow us to clearly distinguish 
‘acceptable from unacceptable forms of p o w e r T h i s  does not make the notion of 
power particularly useful since there are no easy ways to point out who is repressing 
and who is resisting. In this view, domination means that the dominated are so much 
entangled in the power-ridden practicess that we cannot adopt a clear normative 
perspective. Yet, from a feminist perspective, women are, more systematically than 
Foucault’s theory allows us to grasp, placed in the less-powerful (if never completely 
powerless) positions. We cannot afford to claim that power, just like social change, 
cannot be captured in some centralised locations, contexts or institutions. Following 
Fraser’s critique ‘there can be no social practices without power - but it doesn’t 
follow that all forms of power are normatively equivalent nor that any social 
practices are as good as any other’.” ® According to Nancy Harstock, Foucault can 
only claim such a perspective looking from a privileged position, being to some
Foucault, ‘The Discourse on Language’, 340.
Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse,Gender in Contemporary Social Theory, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minessota Press, 1989), 27.
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extent close to the centre of power, yet maintaining that no centres of power can be 
penetrated.
As regards the notion of ideology, his theory is especially ambivalent. The concept 
of ideology is seen by Foucault as inherently problematic:
The notion of ideology appears to me difficult to use for three reasons. The first-is that, 
whether one wants it to be or not, it is always in virtual opposition to something like the truth 
( ...)  The second inconvenience is that it refers to, necessarily I believe, to something like the 
subject. Thirdly, ideology is in a secondary position in relation to something which must 
function as the infra-structure or economic or material determinant for it.'^*
Again, there are a number of problems with this approach. Feminist inquiry into the 
linguistic construction of gender is concerned with subjectivities, not only subject 
positions. No feminist perspective would be possible without a certain normative 
stance, that is, without privileging the truths of the subjugated over those of the 
dominant group, and most importantly, without conceptualising a link between 
discourse and ‘reality’ in its material, not merely discursive dimension. Furthermore, 
Foucault is not interested in evaluating any system of beliefs, but rather he suspends 
moral judgement and concentrates on how ‘power/knowledge regimes’ are 
produced.
Ibid,. 31,33.
Ibid., 32.
See, for example, Nancy Harstock, ‘Foucault on Power: A Theory for W omen?’ in L.J. Nicholson
(ed.) From Feminism to Postmodernism  (New York and London: Routledge, 1990)
121 Foucault (1979: 36), quoted by Mills, 32
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Nevertheless, Foucault’s insight is important inasmuch as it shifts the level of 
analysis form the state institutions or economy onto the level of the ‘politics of 
everyday life’.^ ^^  The contribution Foucault’s theory makes is the dynamic 
understanding of power, which functions on the level of everyday practices mediated 
through discourse. My concern is precisely with the construction of discourses on 
women as an ideology which is realised in social practice. We may therefore 
conceive of ideological practices in discourse. In my view, it is precisely through 
studying discursive practices that we may say something about the functioning and 
negotiation of ideologies.
2.3 Materialist feminist theory ofpower and discourse
The notions of ideology, and the materiality of discourse are taken up within a theory 
of materialist feminism, which sees discourse as a social practice, as well as a system 
of signification. In particular, Rosemary Hennessy’s^ ^^  materialist feminism argues 
for a close connection between the ‘reality’ and discourse, as well as reworking the
Fraser, 20.
Ibid,. 26.
For a further discussion/critique of feminist readings of Foucault, see for example, Nancy 
Harstock, ‘Postmodernism and Political Change: Issues for Feminist Theory’ and Amy Allen 
‘Foucault on Power: A Theory for Feminists’ in Susan J. Hekman (ed.) Feminist Interpretations o f  
M ichael Foucault (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996) and Janet 
Ransom, ‘Feminism, Difference and Discourse. The Limits o f Discursive Analysis For Feminism’ in 
Caroline Ramazanoglu (ed.) Up Against FoucauUt: Explorations o f  Some Tensions Between Foucault 
and Feminism  (London and New York: Routledge, 1993),
This discussion of materialist feminism is primarily based on Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist 
Feminism and the Politics o f  Discourse (New York and London: Routledge, 1993)
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concept of ideology with the purpose of a feminist critique of social relations in 
mind. Discourse is seen as producing the material relations in society by ‘inserting 
the social subject into the historical contest over meanings and resources 
Hennessy argues that postmodern academy should not only show the fluidity of 
subjectivities and the diversity of cultures or the difference and historicity of social 
organisation, but to attend to the connection between the knowledge and power 
shaping and creating these differences.
As a way of reading the texts of culture understood in this way, she proposes 
ideology critique, which must be committed to recognising and making explicit 
those concrete ‘contesting interests at stake in the discursive constructions of the 
social’. H e n n e s s y  also argues that despite the fluidity and multiplicity of 
meanings, the workings of power can be traced in the construction of the dominant 
views of ‘the truth’ and the social reality as suiting concrete social agents and their 
interests. The critique of such meanings is to be based on a processes of 
disarticulation and rearticulation whose legitimacy must be based on its explanatory 
power and its commitment to emancipatory social change.
The ideology critique must be understood in relation to the notion of ideology itself 
and to the concept of the social. Ideology, according to Hennessy, is similar to theory 
inasmuch as it is the very practice of meaning making which is understood as ‘the
126 Ibid., xvii. 
Ibid., 15. 
Ibid., 15.
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effect of struggles over resources and power that are played out through the 
discourses of culture and the modes of reading they allow’. T h e  way we 
understand what counts as ‘the social’ is aheady an ideology. To create a theory 
means to be engaged in concrete social practice, and, therefore, a theory is in itself 
an ideological construct:
As ideology, theory is one o f many cultural narratives ,(...) all theories are ways o f making 
- sense and as such have a materiality in that they help shape the formation o f social subjects
as well as what comes to count as the ‘real’ or the ‘truth’.
This notion of ideology applies to both scientific and common-sense theories of the 
social, and in this respect feminist scholarship can be understood as deconstructing 
the dominant ideologies, as well as proposing its alternative vision of the social. Of 
course, there is an ongoing struggle between feminist reconceptualisations of reality 
and the dominant discourses, which aim at incorporating the resisting discourses for 
the interests of institutions and powerful social and economic actors. Hennessy’s 
definitions of the social, theory and ideology and the materiality of 
language/discourse seem to be especially interesting for the study of any social 
discourse on gender, including, of course, feminist discourse itself. Hennessy’s 
notion of texts as ‘historically constructed, traversed by power relations and 
constitutive of social value’ is definitely valuable as a theoretical basis of an
Ibid., 14. 
Ibid., 7. 
Ibid., 12.
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analysis of the way discourse- is used to negotiate the dominant and subversive 
notions of gender.
This is especially relevant for my study of discourse on gender in the public 
sphere, understood as the institutional, state, and media setting more or less available 
for the general public, not always in the sense of participation, but at least in the 
sense of the availability of their discourses and their power of forming, 
institutionalising, or negotiating the dominant worldviews
2.4 Critical discourse theory
Another paradigm which is concerned with analysing the discourse and power 
interplay, both in particular interactions and in discourse seen as representation, is 
critical discourse analysis (CDA). It provides further relevant theoretical and 
methodological concepts, especially the dialectical relationship between discourse 
and reality. The theory summarised here is based on Chouliarki and Fairclough.^^^ 
This view sees social life as action and argues for an understanding of discourse as 
‘semiotic elements of social p r a c t i c e s D i s c o u r s e  is both social action, and a 
product of that action, a form of its representation. It comprises of both linguistic and
The methodological and linguistic categories and strategies needed to carry out such a critique will 
be addressed in Chapter 3.
Lilie Chouliarki and Norman Fairclough Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical 
Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999)
Ibid., 37.
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non-linguistic communication and other forms of social semiosis whose function is 
to both instantiate and transform social reality.
Thus, unlike in sociolinguistcs,- differences in language use or form are not seen as 
effects of pre-existing social difference, but as both effects and potential causes of 
it.^ ^^  Similarly, discourse is seen as permeated with the relationships of power, and, 
at the same time, is maintaining and can. potentially be transforming these 
relat ionships.This  view is compatible with the dynamic understanding of power, 
but does not do away with possible processes of domination. Instead, its own 
principle, referred to as ‘the logic of critical analysis’ is concerned with ‘assessing 
how the discourse moment works within social practice, from the point of view of its 
effects on power struggles and relations of d o m i n a t i o n T h e  notion of ideology 
reappears in connection with this:
Practices are partly discursive (talking, writing, etc. is one way o f acting) but they are 
discursively represented. In so far as such practices help sustain relations o f domination 
within the practice, they are ideological.*^^
This is definitely the case with any discursive practice aimed at preserving a single 
view on gender, which places women in an asymmetrical relationship to men in
Ibid., 47. 
Ibid., 38. 
Ibid., 67. 
Ibid., 37.
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whichever domain of social life, including language. The question of ideology in 
discourse is also discussed by Wodak:
Discourse does ideological work: Ideologies are particular ways o f representing and 
constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations o f domination and 
exploitation. ( ...)  to determine whether a particular type of discursive event does ideological 
work, it is not enough to analyse texts - one also needs to consider how texts are interpreted 
and received and what social effects texts have.
This view of ideology could perhaps be considered as a function of, what is referred 
to using Foucault’s, as ‘the orders of discourse’ and defined as ‘the socially ordered 
sets of genres and discourses associated with a particular social field, characterised in 
terms of shifting boundaries and flows between them’.^ "^ ° This does not only mean 
that the orders of discourse are constantly reworked as they are employed in 
discursive moments, but it may also mean that there are indeed possibilities for 
resistance, even within heavily ideological discourses. Thus, power and resistance 
are found to counteract each other. But, unlike in Foucault’s understanding, this does 
not preclude the possibility of pinpointing the discursive moves towards domination 
and how they are realised. Within CD A, the stress is precisely on disclosing the 
effects of the power struggle and its very work in action in particular moments of 
social interaction:
Ruth Wodak, The Disorders o f  Discourse (London and New York: Routledge, 1996),, 18. 
¥ovica.u\t, Archaeology o f  Knowledge, 5S.
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. . . [PJower is not simply exercised but fought over, and fought over in discourse, and (...) the 
interdiscursive articulation of different genres and discourses is (amongst other things) a 
strategy o f power struggle - a way in which power is internalised in discourse*'**
Another aspect of texts as ideological constructs is their social effect. In order to 
address the social effects of power struggles, and in order to be able to recommend 
changes,-the ‘explanatory critique’ needs to be carried out on multiple levels, starting 
from the perception of the discursively realised problem, through analysis pf the 
discursive practice at large and in its particular instantiation, to arriving at the 
understanding of the functions of the problem in the practice. Critical discourse 
analysis demands attention to both structure and interaction:
The structural dimension attends to how interaction is constrained by the network of orders 
of discourse, while the interactional dimension attends to how that network is interactionally 
worked and potentially restructured through a rearticulation of resources.*'*^
Moreover, both of these dimensions are characterised by intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity: ‘on one level it is the presence in my discourse of the specific 
words of the other, on another level it is the combination in discourse of different 
genres-or, we might add, different discourses’.
*'** Ibid., 62. 
*'*^  Ibid., 60. 
*'*^ Ibid., 59. 
*^ '* Ibid., 49.
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2.5 Feministpoststructuralist approaches to discourse, gender and
power
All the above-discussed theorisations can be linked to feminist poststructuralist 
approaches to discourse. Foucault’s theory is a starting point for all of them, and has 
been taken up but also reworked significantly by feminist poststructuralists. The two 
major differences concern the understanding of the effects of discursive power and 
the understanding of the subject of discourse. According to Chris Weedon, the 
dispersed power in discourse and the post-modern notion of unfixable meaning does 
not preclude the study of the (effects of) discursive power:
To subscribe to the provisional nature of meaning is not to imply that it does not have real 
effects. Whereas, in deconstruction, language is an infinite process o f difference and the 
deferral o f fixed meanings, feminist poststructuralism, concerned as it must be with power, 
looks to the historically and socially specific discursive production o f conflicting and 
competing meanings. These meanings are only fixed temporarily, but this temporary fixing 
has important social implications.*'*^
Thus, feminist post-structuralism firstly studies discursive practices precisely in 
order to pinpoint those meanings produced through discourse (on women) that have 
real and exclusionary effects on women themselves. Secondly, this approach does 
not make the subject ‘cease to exist’ at all. Though the understanding of multiple and 
shifting subject positions is still very much at the centre of attention, the woman as
145 Weedon, 82.
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an individual created by these subject positions is still present. Again, Weedon sums 
it up well:
Although the subject in poststmcturalism is socially constructed in discursive practices, she 
none the less exists as a thinking, feeling subject and social agent, capable o f resistance and 
innovations produced out o f a clash between contradictory subject positions and practices. 
She is also a subject able to reflect upon the discursive relations which constitute her and the 
society in which she lives, and able to chose from the options available.*'*^
Once we make such a differentiation between the woman’s subjectivity and her 
various subject positions there is indeed scope for research into the discursive that is 
potentially empowering for women, as it allows for a reflection of innovations, 
resistances and the moments of change. However, keeping this possibility in mind, 
we still have to consider carefully how the effects of discourse on women’s reality 
can be foregrounded.
As for the linkage of feminist and critical discourse theory, the elaboration of the 
dialectical understanding of discourse for the study of gender has been proposed by 
De Lauretis, who claims that ‘the representation of gender [in discourse] is its 
construction’, a n d  one that ‘assigns meaning (...) to individuals within society’.
In other words, the discourses on gender or femininity are a product of representation
•""Ibid, 121.
Teresa De Lauretis, Technologies o f  Gender: Essays on Theory, Film and Fiction (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1987), 3.
•"'Ibid., 5.
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that becomes inscribed in individuals as their self-representation.^"^^ This definition 
also follows in the footsteps of Foucault’s understanding of discourse, though it does 
not concern itself with understanding of merely subject positions. On the contrary, 
we may see also how discourse and actual people interact incessantly. Smith shows 
that it is women as actual individuals who produce their identity in discourse and 
produce the ‘reality’ through d i s c o u r s e .T h e s e  subject positions inscribe 
themselves in women as subjects and agents of discourse:
Members of discourse orient themselves to the order of the discourse in talk, writing, 
creating images whether in texts or on their bodies, producing and determined by the 
ongoing order which is their concerted accomplishment and arises in the concerting.'"’
This approach foregrounds the effects of discourse as constitutive of social reality; in 
particular the effects of discursive practice for women themselves. Such a theory is 
not at odds with a materialist feminist understanding of the production and effects of 
difference through discourse.
The notion of reconstruction is implied by Scott and Butler in their assessment of the 
feminist deconstruction of texts, this time referring to political theory itself as a form 
of discourse:
Ibid., 2.
Dorothy Smith, ‘Femininity as Discourse’, Texts, Facts, and Femininity: Exploring the Relations 
o f  Ruling (London: Routledge, 1990), 160.
Ibid., 161-162.
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To perform a feminist deconstruction of some of the primary terms of political discourse is in 
no sense to censor their usage, negate them, or to announce their anachronicity. On the 
contrary, this kind of analysis requires that these terms be reused and rethought, exposed to 
strategic instruments and effects, and subjected to a critical réinscription and 
redeployment.'"^
Thus, we have established that social practices are, to a large degree, discursive. 
According to Smith, the social practices of modem times are even more discursive 
than ever before, due to the amount, availability and importance of texts negotiating 
social reality, and especially g e n d e r . I n  this respect, our ‘actual’, material reality is 
to a large degree constituted by discourse, or even, it is discourse. This conception 
of the materiality of discourse is particularly important for justifying why an inquiry 
into language (discourse-based analysis of textual material) is also an analysis of the 
social reality.
In general, a post-stmcturalist feminist approach is a politically engaged and critical 
stance to the study of power relations and their effects established and mediated by 
discourse, but having a material functioning in a variety of ways; for example, 
through producing women’s subjectivities. This approach, similarly to a critical 
linguistic one, points to the importance of studying the discourses on women as the 
sites for the power stmggle over gender. But there are important decisions to be
'"^ Judith Butler and Joan Scott, Feminists Theorise the Political, New York and 
London; Routledge, 1992). xiv.
'"" Smith, 168.
'"" Ibid., 166.
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made with regard to which discourse locations and which discourses to foreground in 
such an analysis:
The options available to women in the battle to define onr femininity, social role and the 
meaning o f our experience are many. However, they exist in a hierarchical network of 
antagonistic relations in which certain versions o f femininity and the sexual division of 
labour have more social and institutional power than others. In order to develop strategies to 
contest hegemonic assumptions and the social practices which they guarantee, we need to 
understand the intricate network o f discourses, the sites where they are articulated and the 
institutionally legitimised forms o f knowledge to which they look for their justification.
The understanding of power relations is thus a primary aim of a feminist 
poststructuralist analysis. Yet, it is also important to evaluate the other, resisting 
possibilities of discourse. “
2.6Resistance through counter-discourse?
Having introduced some of the ways of conceptualising discourse, power, and 
ideology, as well as the dialectical understanding of discourse, it is important to 
return to the concept of resistance. Where does discourse theory, especially in its 
feminist, materialist and critical form, lead us in terms of a possible
Weedon, 122.
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reconceptualisation of power that will allow us to see the emancipatory, not just 
exclusionary workings of power in discourse?
Critical and materialist discourse theory makes it possible to conceptualise the power 
inherent in discourse in connection with ideology. But can we envisage a counter­
ideology discourse, or an alternative view of the social? Essentially there are two 
ways in which discourse can be seen as resisting power. The perspective offered by 
discourse theory in its various discussions of social reality in dialectical relationship 
with discourse also points to the dynamic nature of social interaction, which has not 
been overlooked by feminist linguists and became the basis of research within the 
‘deconstructive’ paradigm. Thus, Cameron points out that the study of the 
construction of gender should attend to its dynamic social existence: ‘each individual 
subject must constantly negotiate the norms, behaviours, and discourses that define 
masculinity or femininity for a particular community for a particular point in 
time’.^ ^^  That is, through the ideologies of women’s language, women communicate 
and negotiate their meanings, perform, but possibly also resist the hegemonic 
discourse in practice. Even though this negotiation takes place in everyday 
existence, it becomes especially unavoidable whenever women enter public sphere 
institutions which place contradictory demands on them. For example, Victoria 
Bergevall has shown how female engineering students negotiate the norms on
Cameron, ‘The Language-Gender Interface: Challenging Co-optation’, 45.
See for example the, study of the construction o f roles in marital conversations: Elinor Ochs and 
Carolyn Taylor, ‘The “Father Knows Best” Dynamic in Dinnertime Narratives’ in Mary Bucholtz and 
Kira Hall (eds.) Gender Articulated: Language and the Socially Constructed 5'e^(New York and 
London: Routledge, 1995), 97-120.
This happens because of the gendered and often, masculinist, character o f the public sphere which 
women must negotiate.
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femininity as juxtaposed with the norms of a masculinist institution in their day to 
day interaction, even when claiming that there is no such thing as discrimination or 
gender problematic in their lives.^^^
Thus, women do engage in negotiation with the dominant ideology, which is 
constantly reaffirmed and transgressed. This is why a study of discourse in action 
and in context may illuminate such resisting practices. However, though incessant, 
negotiation is not necessarily perceived as such by the participants, as BerevalTs 
example shows. Indeed, without the metalevel of any awareness of domination and 
resistance, can new subject positions be created? The question remains to be 
answered by further research into interaction.
The transgression of ideology is possible on another level, that of feminist critique. 
The recent work on verbal hygiene by Deborah Cameron is a good example of how 
feminist linguists in particular can offer criticism of the discourses on language and 
gender. Her analysis could be seen as an example of ideology critique in Hennessy’s 
understanding^Thus, feminist linguistics may also be an example of another 
understanding of women’s language. Feminist linguistics itself is a form of discourse 
on gender, as it elaborates, or problematises both folklinguistic, and scientific .views 
on women’s language. Without doubt, it has managed to problematise the dominant
Victoria L. Bergevall, ‘Constructing and Enacting Gender Through Discourse: Negotiating 
Multiple Roles as Female Engineering Students’ in Victoria L. Bergvall, Janet M. Bing and Alice F. 
Freed (eds.) Rethinking Language and Gender Research: Theory and Practice (London: Longman, 
1996), 173-201.
Cameron’s, Verbal Hygiene, 168-211.
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ideology to some extent, and it has been critical of those theorists within its own 
ranks that have been charged with maintaining the status quo/^^
Not only feminist linguistics, but feminist theory in general, could perhaps be 
understood as women’s language in this sense - as counter-ideological, or even anti- 
ideological discourse of women. In Hennessy’s terms, the understanding of feminism 
itself as ‘a way of making sense o f the world’ makes it possible to see it as a 
‘counter-hegemonic d i s c o u r s e I t  is possibly an anti-ideology because of its 
‘emancipatory reach’ and ‘disruptive work’, which it undertakes within the dominant 
practices and meanings, thus as a transgression of the dominant ideology. In this 
understanding, feminist theorisation becomes the erriancipatory ‘women’s language’.
Feminism as a political movement can also be defined as ‘women’s language’ or 
‘voice’, in the sense of women voicing a demand for inclusion in the public sphere as 
participants in this interaction, especially when it comes to defining their own roles, 
problems or interests. In this sense, feminism can be conceptualised as a discourse of 
participants in social interaction with the aim of changing women’s material 
position, as well as disclosing the mechanisms by which women’s contributions to 
public discourse were previously (and still are) muted, dominated and interpreted.
See, for example, Troemel-Ploetz’s critique of Tannen’s You Just D on't Understand - ‘Selling the 
Apolitical’, Discourse and Society 2, no. 4 (October 1991)
Hennessy, 38.
‘""Ibid., 38.
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without women themselves having a voice, even in the matters of their own interest.
164
The primary question is whether the counter-discourse manages to go beyond the 
dominant ideology, and whether it can indeed produce new models of identity, or 
‘femininity’ in relation to, but not in subordination to ‘masculinity’. To put it in 
Hennessy’s terms, the question remains whether, and to what extent, feminism is 
able to provide ‘a model for the articulation of a new subject of knowledge’, or 
whether it is ‘absorbed by the hegemonic culture’. S u s a n  Gal claims that: 
‘[practices of resistance] ‘ always occur in the shadow of domination and in response
Yet, even speaking of such alternative discourses as always acting in response to 
domination, she talks about ‘women’s language’ as an example of anti-language. 
Moreover, apart from studying the varying everyday practices of women as a way of 
finding the alternative women’s language, she suggests that: ‘Finding the attempts at 
resistance will tell us about where and how power is exerted, and knowing how 
institutions of power work will tell us where to look for possible signs of
Interestingly, in her recent work, Lakoff makes this point, stressing that women in western 
societies have gone through having no voice at all, to having no symbolic voice, understood as a right 
to participate in the negotiation o f social meanings, Robin Lakoff, ‘Cries and Whispers: the Shattering 
o f the Silence’ in Kira Hall and Mary Bucholtz (eds.) Gender Articulated: Language and the Socially 
Constructed S e lf  (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 30.
Hennessy, 2.
Susan Gal, ‘Language, Gender, and Power: An Anthropological Review’ in Kira Hall and Mary 
Bucholtz (eds.) Gender Articidated: Language and the Socially Constructed S e lf  (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1995), 176.
‘"■'ibid., 171.
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r e s i s ta n c e F o l lo w in g  this advice, we should also look at the institutions where 
power is invested and find out how women are trying to gain their voice and put 
forward their interests where they were traditionally excluded. Therefore, I intend to 
concentrate on the discourse on women in the Polish political debate, because, 
though women are present and active in this discursive location, there are indeed 
highly conflicting interests at work in terms of disciplining women into the 
acceptable discursive positions. Thus, it is a good example of an institution of power, 
particularly power invested in discourse on women. The question that remains is: to 
what degree is re-negotiation and change possible in this context?
Before the analysis is undertaken, it is important to establish the methodology which 
will allow us to translate the theoretical concepts into analytical tools. This will be 
the purpose of Chapter 3, which will also introduce and explain the choice of the 
material for analysis, the concept of the study, and the research questions to be 
answered in the course of the analysis.
168 Gal, 176.
67
CHAPTERS
From theoretical concepts to issues of methodology and the categories of 
analysis
For feminists, the attempt to understand power in all its forms is o f central importance 169
3.1. Translating theoretical concepts into analytical tools
The social understanding of language calls for an analysis of discourse, and hence, 
the material analysed by me is textual/interactive. This means employing particular 
textual and discursive categories which should allow us to make claims related to the 
theoretical level, that is to the proposed model for understanding discourses on 
women (which generates also what could be understood as women’s discourse). 
Finding the necessary tools for the analysis is essentially a process of translating the 
theoretical into the methodological categories. In this chapter, I present how I have
Chris Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 120.
The problem of translatability o f theoretical categories analytical ones is raised by Erzsebet Barat, 
‘A Relational Model of Identity’, PhD Thesis, Lancaster: Department of Linguistics and M odem 
English Language, 1999), 65.
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approached this issue, and what I have established as my methodological and 
analytical tools.
3.2 Introducing discourses on women in the Polish political sphere
The understanding of discourse as a site of social struggle over the meanings of 
femininity may be seen in any social institution. However, the stakes over discourse 
are high especially in the public sphere, as that is where the struggle over 
legitimisation of the dominant meanings as well as struggle for social transformation, 
takes place in, and through discourse.
In the Polish public sphere, there are ongoing battles over the meanings of 
femininity, the purpose of which is to construct the dominant ‘theories on women’, 
and limit available subject positions for women themselves. These struggles are 
particularly immediate if we consider the outcomes of this battle over what counts as 
women’s interest in the state institutions. The state is an institution invested with 
great power to transform the discursive into the material: the effects of parliamentary 
debates are legitimised and legalised shaping both the limits of ‘acceptable 
discourse’, as well as structiuing women’s experience in very real terms. Due to 
widespread conservative positions displayed, this institution can be seen as the site of
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the most exclusionary discourse on femininity, although it may potentially be also a 
site of social transformation.
These discourses are important to study as the representations of women are a site of 
a larger battle over the shape of social relations in the whole society, and this has 
material effects for women and for their social, economic and, political resources, as 
well as for the forms of agency available to them. On the one hand, it seems that the 
emergence of the new nation state and the developing capitalism have somehow 
been combined with the resurgence of traditionalist discourses on women. 
Obviously, the relationship between the nation state, new capitalism and gender 
relations is not a clear or straightforward one, but gender seems to be playing quite 
an important role as a focus of political and public sphere debate in Poland. This role 
definitely deserves some more focused research. On the other hand, it has been 
argued that the démocratisation process has opened up space for alternative and 
powerful discourse locations in the sites of the media, and various alternative 
political institutions, such as women’s organisations, that can freely oppose the 
dominant discourses. Moreover, Polish politicians are engaged in the contradictory 
battle for the return to the nation-state versus inclusion in global economy and supra­
national government structures by virtue of the integration into the European Union. 
In this contradiction may lie another key to the intensity of the struggle over national
Similar argument is made by Jocqui True, ‘Gendering Post-Socialist Transitions’ in Marianne H. 
Marchamd and Anne Sisson Runyan {ods.). Gender And Global Restructuring: Sightings, Sites, and 
Resistances (London: Routledge, 2000), 84, See also an assessment o f gender and nation state 
building in Eastern Europe in Tanya Rener and Miijana Ule, ‘Back to the Future: Nationalism and 
Gender in Post-Socialist States’ in Rick Wilford and Robert M iller (eds) Women, Ethnicity and 
Nationalism: the Politics o f  Transition (New York and London: Routledge, 1998), 121-125.
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identity, family, and morals, all of which generate the hegemonic, and possibly also 
the alternative discourses on women. The undeniable effect of the démocratisation 
process is that the dominant views, as exclusionary and hurtful as they may be for a 
lot of women, are in a state of partial and precarious domination. They are able to 
dominate within the political sphere for the moment, utilising Church and other 
sources of exclusionary meanings, such as science, to build their position in relation 
to women as the only acceptable one. Yet, they may also be faced with possible 
counter-discourses fighting for a redefinition of the acceptable positions for women.
It is this particular gendering discourse, that I am interested in analysing first of all. I 
am looking at the political sphere from within the academic interest on gender and 
language and critical discourse theory in order to capture this struggle over meanings 
of femininity in my linguistic material: the transcripts of parliamentary debates. I 
will analyse these competing discourses within the Polish political sphere using 
parliamentary debates in order to see how women are being constructed by the 
hegemonic discourse, and, similarly, what are the manifest counter-positions 
available. However, I suspect that the discursive struggle over femininity will also 
throw some light on the discursive construction of the state, social relations, 
citizenship or national identity.
Polish parliamentary debates are especially vital in this respect, as there is an explicit 
battle over the rights of women, and what is being negotiated has material effects for 
women’s lives. One important example is the anti-abortion bill, resulting from a
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heated discursive battle, fought in successive parliaments, in the Church and in 
women’s organisations/^^ The parliament’s division of power made it possible to 
introduce the anti-abortion bill, and thus to legalise one vision of femininity in 
relation to motherhood; control over sexuality and reproduction as well as morality. 
The right wing Catholic-nationalist discourse has thus been legitimised particularly 
in relation to women’s i s s u e s . T h i s  has also increased state regulation over 
women’s lives and has resulted in the ‘policing’ of reproduction (abortion as a 
practice did not disappear, although it is now illegal and very expensive, which has 
produced a lucrative abortion underground, and abortion tourism). In my analysis I 
will try to consider how such meanings are discursively constructed.
A possible division between the two distinct sides in the political discourse on 
women has been pointed out by Joanna Bator,^ "^^  who distinguishes between ‘the 
inequality discourse’ and ‘the equality discourse’ in Polish parliamentary debates. 
The former refers to the construction of womanhood and women’s roles as naturally 
and socially different from men’s, used for legitimising a conservative vision of 
women’s rights. What Bator calls ‘the equality discourse’, i s ,  within the 
parliamentary politics, mainly centred around liberal feminist and leftist values.
For a general assessment of the earlier stages o f the abortion debate see, Malgorzata Fuszara, 
‘Abortion and the Formation of the Public Sphere in Poland’, in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller 
(eds) Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from  Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) or Wanda Nowicka, ‘Ban on Abortion in Poland. 
W hy?’ in Tanya Renne (ed.) A nna’s Land: Sisterhood in Eastern Europe (Boulder and Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1997)
See, for example, Urszula Nowakowska, ‘The new Right and Fundamentalism’ in Tanya Renne 
(ed.) A nna’s Land: Sisterhood in Eastern Europe (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997).
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Bator argues that the two positions amount to two political languages, between 
which there is no communication or understanding possible, because the debate is 
both carried out on two different levels of culture, with the ‘inequality’ discourse 
representing a more backward, uneducated treatment of gender issues. While such an 
assessment makes sense for a political-scientific understanding of language as some 
set of values and rules that a particular political groups espouses, for a linguistic 
analysis it is not enough. I start from the assumption that there are two ideological 
perspectives, two distinct positions that are being constructed as incompatible in the 
process and in the representations of the debate. Moreover, I would like to find out 
how the ‘estrangement’ and ‘compatibility’ of the two positions is created, in what 
aspects they are constructed as different. My claim is that the supposed lack of 
communication results from deliberate interpretive choices that can be traced and 
analysed. This needs to be proved in the analysis itself.
3.3 The understanding o f discourse
An important aspect of discourse, which it is necessary to stress for the purpose of 
my analysis, is the relationship between discourse, power (hegemony), and ideology. 
Moreover, the dialectical nature of discourse, as an action and a representation of 
that action, must be stressed. Finally, the relationship between the discursive and
Joanna Bator, Wizerunek kobiety w polskiej debacie publicznej: perspectywa feministyczna  (The 
image of a woman in the Polish public debate: a feminist perspective) (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw 
Publicznych, 1999), 17,
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non-discursive practices has to be considered. All these aspects of discourse have 
been the concern of both feminist and critical discourse theories, however the most 
useful theorisation for the purpose of my work is that offered by Critical Discourse 
Analysis and some feminist theories, which go furthest in their critical explanation of 
the power struggles within discourse. These approaches are useful for building a 
theoretical framework to study the construction and functioning of gender in 
discourse. This means that while I am moving into analysing discourses on women, 
it is important to see that these discourses are also used by women interacting and 
performing the construction of their own femininity.
Critical Discourse Analysis sees discourse as a form of social interaction and a part 
of social practice permeated by power relations usually masked by ideology, 
which, in turn, serves the establishment and the maintenance of hegemony of some 
social groups over o t h e r s . Ideology, according to Norman Fairclough, means 
‘significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social 
identities) which are built into various dimensions of the forms and meanings of 
discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or 
transformation of relations of domination’. For me, the vital aspect of the 
relations of domination is the asymmetrical character of social relations between men 
and women, leading to unequal political and cultural power and unequal economic 
resources, as well as a marked control over women’s lives exercised by the state, the
Ibid, 23.
Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) 
Ibid., 87.
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church, the family, school, marriage and all other forms of male-dominated social 
institutions. This control, or at least the limitation of options and available positions 
for women, is achieved precisely through the ideological dimension of discursive 
practices, which create the dominant notions of femininity and naturalise them as 
common-sense, scientific truth, or morally based laws.
Hegemony is here understood as a partial, and therefore unstable, power or 
dominance of some social groups which needs to be secured continually through 
discourse. It is the unstable, fluid aspect of hegemony that allows for the 
conceptualisation of social change. Gender relations are constituted through a 
network of social, economic, and cultural relations that are constantly established 
through discursive practices. This means that discursive practices as social practices 
are both sites in the social struggle as well as stakes in it.^^  ^This is why an analysis 
of discursive data may shed light on the existing relations of power, and possible 
points of social struggle, as well as points of resistance to domination. It is precisely 
this aspect that makes it possible to pinpoint the struggle between various discursive 
interpretations of reality (including the relations between men and women) through 
discourse analysis and to see whether the given situation of struggle may also lead to 
social change.
Ibid., 92-93. 
‘^ ^Ibid., 67.
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Discourse is seen as constitutive of as well as a representation of social practice^
In simple terms, ‘discourse is a mode of action, one form in which people may act 
upon the world, and especially upon each other, as well as mode of 
r ep re sen ta t io n 'W h i le  discourse is both action and representation, these two 
dialectically related sides have implications for my understanding of language on 
women as ideological practice and a product of that practice. Thus, this dialectic 
understanding of discourse sheds light on the conceptualisation of women’s language 
as a product of discourse on women as well as an enactment of the ‘appropriate 
feminine behaviour’. This also corresponds to the understanding of discourse as a 
text and (social-discursive) practice. To rephrase this understanding of discourse, 
we need to be aware of its multifuctionality and its dialectical nature in relation to 
the non-discursive. Thus, discourse is multifunctional: we represent and understand 
reality through it, we act upon the reality through discourse in many ways and we 
also represent ourselves through it (perform our identities).
However, most of the time, women’s language is either understood as an 
unproblematic individual style or an unproblematic product of the reality of gender 
difference. In contrast to this view, ‘women’s language’ has already been discussed
This is based on the understanding of Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in 
Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 
38.
Voiiclough, Discourse and Social Change, 65.
Ibid., 73,79.
For a thorough discussion on this understanding of discourse see Norman Fairclough, ‘The 
Dialectics o f Discourse’ Textus XIV.2 2001, 231-242; Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse 
Analysis in Researching Language in the New Capitalism: Overdetermination, Transdisciplinarity and 
Textual Analysis’, forthcoming in L. Young (ed) Systemic Linguistics and Critical Discourse 
Analysis, Continuum 2003
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in the first chapter of the thesis in the sense of discourse on women, as part of textual 
representations of femininity - an ongoing construction motivated by ideological 
investment into defining and marking the feminine. The study of these constructions 
is as important as the study of the linguistic behaviour of women in communication, 
as it sheds light on how women are socially and discursively constructed before and 
during any communicative practice. This may lead to an analysis of discursive 
, situations as processes of negotiation, enactment or possibly subversion of these 
ideological constructs of femininity, as well as perhaps allowing for conceptualising 
alternative discourses on women that are non-exclusionary. In the second chapter, I 
considered the notion of ideologically invested discourse on women, and the 
possibility of counter-acting and subverting the ideological constraints by an 
alternative understanding of women’s discourse - one based on feminist critiques of 
the dominant ideologies of womanhood. In my view, apart firom further research on 
the construct and the practice of ‘woman’s language’ or ‘women’s communication 
styles’, it is important to take a broader look at the network of various discursive 
practices in order to see which ideologies in relation to gender, and especially in 
relation to femininity, are being constructed, supported, or perhaps transformed and 
imdermined in social institutions by both male and female speakers.
As I have mentioned earlier, poststructuralist feminism also stresses the important 
point that despite their dynamic, fluid functioning, such discourses amount to more 
than just language play of ‘words’ or ‘texts’ on women. As Hennessy demonstrates.
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discursive construction of difference has material effects as it shapes available 
positions, conceptualisations, categorisations and identities of men and women 
performing ‘the social construction of d i f f e r e n c e T h i s  leads to the construction of 
social subjects ‘appropriate’ for the dominant group’s in te re s t s .T h ese  interests 
may be of economic, political, or cultural kind; for example, the interests of leading 
political parties or social, ethnic or religious groups (or rather organisations claiming 
to represent or embody them).
This material power of discourse may manifest itself in the language of legal codes, 
scientific publications, marketing and media texts and messages, religious texts and 
literary works. It is a social process that aims to discipline certain subjects and 
phenomena that are considered ‘unacceptable’. It is also the process of creating 
systems of ‘scientific’ or ‘common-sense’ knowledge, of silencing/dominating 
practices aimed at regulating others’ input into social debate, and imposing limits of 
the speakable. In my view, a similar vision of he effects of discourse, and especially 
of the discourse on femininity, is offered by both Smith^^^ and de Lauretis^^^, who 
are concerned primarily with media discourses. Each author talks about the material 
relations between the discursive/textual constructions of femininity and the identities 
and experiences that they produce. Smiths calls this dialectic ‘textually mediated
Hennessy, 3.
Ibid., 9-10.
Dorothy Smith ‘Femininity as Discourse’ Texts, Facts and Femininity: Exploring the Relations o f  
iîu/m g (London and New York: Routledge, 1990)
Teresa de Lauretis, Technologies o f  Gender: Essays on Theory, Film and Fiction (Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 1987)
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social relations’, w h i l e  de Lauretis uses the term ‘the technology of gender’ 
Thus, the effects of power oLin discourse are seen as producing oppression and 
inequality, which does not exclude the aspect of self-production or self- 
representation of women in the practices in question. This material aspect of 
discursive relations means that the actual experience of women and their everyday 
practices are being produced through a text on femininity.
Also, materialist feminism advocates a position of ideology cr itiq u e^ in response 
to the discursive constructions of the ideology of gender. This critique may allow for 
rewriting the dominant categorisations and ascribing them with different 
m ean ings .Thus ,  in response to the exclusionary power within discourse, there is 
the power of resistance, which may lead to subversion/transformation, at least on the 
level of feminist theorisations and critical analyses of the discursive. As a result, 
discourses may emerge which may transform the dominant notions of gender and 
other social relations. This is why it may be possible to rewrite the notion of 
women’s language on the level .of theoretical practice, the possibility of which I have 
discussed in the previous chapter. To my mind, a critical feminist investigation into 
the hegemonic discourse provides the most insightful women’s discourse into the 
power structures, which may provide an empowering perspective. In this way, 
feminist discourse and scholarship opens up space for social transformation. This is 
also the motivation for this research. However, a degree of resistance often occurs
Smith, 167. 
de Lauretis, 10. 
Hennessy, 15.
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within the institutions of power as well, this is why, apart from investigating the 
hegemonic discourse itself, l am also interested in assessing the existing counter- 
discourses in order to trace and assess the degree of transformatory power at work. 
These counter-discourses testify to a struggle over social meanings, although this 
struggle may also lead to social transformation.
3.4 Epistemology: the positioning of the researcher
The problem of the positioning _of the researcher needs to be tackled here as it is tied 
to the choice of methodology which will follow the adopted perspective from which 
knowledge is being produced. My stance corresponds, to a large extent, to the 
commitments of critical social science, and in my particular research area, with 
Critical Discourse Analysis, which treats theory itself as a form of social practice.
As far as feminist approaches to research are concerned, the main position in 
question is feminist standpoint epistemology, which maintains the necessity of 
knowledge generated from the margins by the mariginalised themselves, and which 
demands strong reflexivity and accountability on the part of the researcher. As has 
been argued by feminist scholar, this contextuality, or positionality does not preclude
' ' ‘ Ibid., 3.
Erzsebet Barat, 83-84.
See especially, Sandra Harding’s concept o f strong objectivity in Sandra Harding, ‘Rethinking 
Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong Objectivity”? ’ in L. Alkoff and E. Potter (eds) Feminist 
Epistemologies (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 57; Donna Haraway, ‘Situated 
Knowledges: The Science Question and the Privilege o f Partial Perspective’ in Simians, Cyborgs and 
Women: The Reinvention o f  Nature (London: Free Association Books, 1998), 253-254.
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either objectivity nor some forms of responsible general isa t ions.On the contrary, 
it should lead to a development of ‘accountable k n o w l e d g e A l th o u g h  I would 
identify with this position, it represents a certain feminist ideal, and is definitely not 
easy to achieve.
In the name of this feminist ethical commitment to self-reflexivity, I do 
engage with the data from an interested perspective, and do believe in the need to 
make the researcher accountable for her choices. For me, this is not a question of 
objectivism or subjectivism but a question of strong engagement with the texts (their 
production, content and interpretation), thus a question of reflexivity in relation to 
one’s material and one’s motivation for carrying out the research.
Most importantly, as has been pointed out by Smith, we have to speak from within 
the practices that constitute us:
Central to this approach is the positioning of the inquirer in the actualities o f her local 
everyday/everynight world, the same world in which this text is written and read, and the 
same world in which the discourse o f femininity is brought into being as actual practices. 
( ...)  We can only know society as insiders, regardless o f the sociological artifices 
constructing social systems and structures external to the knowing subject"^
194 See especially Harding 65,69, o f equal importance here is Haraway's concept o f ‘situated
knowledges’, 253-254.
Hennessy calls this knowledge project ‘materialist feminist’ or ‘critical cultural studies’ which are 
capable to produce ‘global analytic’. This approach takes materiality o f discourses and practices into 
account, and it is not totalising, even if  it deals with social totalities: Hennessy, 11,16.
Dorothy Smith, ‘Femininity as Discourse’ in Dorothy Smith, Texts, Facts and Femininity: 
Exploring the Relations o f  Ruling (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 164.
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As a woman, the researcher is never outside of these constructions of femininity, or 
outside the discursive struggle over it. In this respect, my own position in analysing 
the emerging feminist and anti-feminist discourse in the Polish political sphere is 
definitely interested as I am undertaking the research to disclose any hegemonic 
positions of power engaged in defining women in particular ways (me being one of 
them). Similarly, I want to provide a reflexive criticism of the feminist response to 
exclusionary practices, in order to add to the production and possible effectiveness of 
resisting practices with which I identify and in which I participate as a feminist, 
within and out of academic context.
However, I believe that as a researcher, one is both an insider of a particular practice 
and an outsider to the extent that she is reflecting on that practice despite being 
constituted.by it. I definitely engage in my analysis of discourse from the position of 
someone who had been affected and structured by this discourse while also beyond it 
at the same time. I privileged enough to see and occupy other subject positions, such 
as an academic, a person currently living abroad and therefore not so constrained by 
the Polish public sphere discourse and having many available identities that go 
beyond that discourse. I definitely am a member of the academic community situated 
outside of Poland, and I am also a member of various politically motivated feminist 
groups, both academic and activist, in and out of Poland. Therefore, I am speaking 
out of partial identification (in the sense of positioning myself rather than actually 
being in exactly the same position) with the developing feminist discourse in Poland.
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Moreover, I am looking at thé hegemonic discourse from the position of someone 
who has been to some extent constituted by its effects but is primarily concerned 
with undermining its power through the critical analysis of it.
3.5 The methodological approach
Within critical approaches to language I have found several, often overlapping, 
approaches that can be helpful in finding the analytical tools that correspond closely 
to my interests. First of all, my approach originated from an interest in feminist 
linguistics, or gender and language research.
While most of what is usually labelled ‘feminist linguistics’ deals with the issue of 
sexism in language and with the possibilities of critically assessing and changing 
linguistic practice, I am trying to research whether particular power struggles related 
to gender might be analysed in social communication in terms of a more discursive 
understanding of interaction. Although, starting with Foucault, power has been 
theorised in various social scientific theories, it is feminist linguistic and language 
and gender research (now affiliated with discourse theory) that has provided-more 
‘tangible’ analytical categories with which it might be possible to research the actual 
textual effects of this power beyond its often decontextualised theorisations. Thus, I 
see my project as feminist linguistics in as much as it tries to find categories of 
analysis suitable to researching power in discourse in relation to women.
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This approach is shared by critical l inguisticsespecially in that it is concerned 
with studying what Hodge and Kress term ‘gender systems in language’, understood 
as ‘not simply the product of individual texts but rather part of larger-scale social 
p r o c e s s e s M i l l s ’ own scholarship, which she calls feminist stylistics, is also 
relevant here as it is concerned with the study of gender systems in texts, especially 
since she does not separate the study of literary texts from other forms of social 
semiosis.^^^ I believe my research is to a large extent compatible with questions of 
‘discourse sociolinguistics’ as defined by Wodak:
[WJhat exactly are ‘disorders of discourse’ and how can they be identified in a given 
context? How are those in power able to linguistically predominate and thereby continually 
reproduce power relations? Do those who are disadvantaged have any chance o f successfully 
asserting themselves? Which related disciplines, which sociological concepts, for example, 
are appropriate for delineating the macro-context, such as hospital? To what extent does the 
specific discourse (institutional, media, etc.) determine the methods and tools o f analysis?^''
As Wodak states, this approach marks an interdisciplinary turn in sociolinguistics, in 
particular the convergence of sociolinguistics and discourse theory, as well as the 
employment of other social sciences in order to explore, rather than take for granted, 
the social context of any human interaction.^^^
See, for example the discussion of critical linguistics in Sara Mills, Feminist Stylistics (London and 
New York: Routledge: 1995), 10-14.
Hodge and Kress, cited in Mills, 11. See also Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress, Social Semiotics 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 64-68.
‘" Ib id ., 17.
Ruth Wodak, The Disorders o f  Discourse (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 6.
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The convergence of these feminist and critical perspectives can, in my view, be taken 
furthest within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Moreover, for my study of 
discourse, the insights of CDA are vital as they stress intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity of texts and interactions:
The analysis o f discourse proper (a particular discourse) is simultaneously oriented to 
structure and interaction - to the social resource (orders o f discourse) which enables and 
constrains interaction, and to the way that resource is interactively worked, i.e. to 
interdiscourse and its realisation in language and other semiotics.^°^
It is this interdiscursivity/intertextuality that allows us to explore both the 
process of discourse construction and the produced texts of discourse by pointing out 
how available texts/discourses are being reworked. For the purpose of my research, 
the main question is to find categories of analysis that will demonstrate these aspects 
of discourse in the material I am studying.
3.6 The research questions
My engagement with the theory on discourse as social practice and my reading of the 
existing conceptualisations of the discourses on women in the Polish public sphere 
have lead me to ask two general questions:
Ibid., 6.
202 Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 63.
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1. What insights can we provide into the mechanisms o f power operating within and 
between discourses on women in Poland?
2. To what degree does feminist discourse enter institutional discourse on politics 
and does it oppose the dominant discourse effectively?
These initial general questions have lead me to formulate more detailed research 
questions for this thesis:
R.Q.1 How can the effects o f power struggle be captured in the construction o f 
discourses on women in the political debates? In other words, what are the 
ideological investments o f the competing discourses on women in the Polish public 
sphere?
• R.Q.1.1 How is the construction o f dominant ideology and exclusion o f other 
theories o f the social, the corresponding subject positions, social relations o f 
women and men achieved in the Polish political discourse?
• R.Q.1.2 How does the counter-discourse negotiate the meanings o f femininity in 
this context? That is, what are the alternative constructions o f  femininity that are 
put forward as less- exclusionary discourses on women?
R.Q. 2 How can the power struggle between the two discourses on women be 
captured in the course o f a political debate? In other words, how can the interaction 
o f different subject positions either secure or subvert domination?
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• R. Q.2.1 How, on the level o f interaction does the dominant discourse exclude the 
counter-discourse or dominate the process o f constructing the meanings o f  
femininity? '
• R.Q.2.2 How does the counter-discourse resist and subvert the domination in 
order to open space for the negotiation o f the meanings offemininity?
The analysis that I intend to undertake is meant to provide some insight into these 
mechanisms, and to open up space for exploration rather than give any definite 
answer. But in order for the analysis to be successful, the main analytical categories 
have to be chosen in such a way as to provide the best tools to shed light on the 
workings and the effects of power in discourse; the two main concerns implied in the 
research questions. I will argue that the analysis of discourse as text and discourse 
as a process/practice are both a necessary lens for highlighting the workings/effects 
of power in discourse. This distinction between text and process follows from the 
dialectic understanding of discourse as a social practice (process) and as a 
representation of this practice (text), which I discussed earlier.
Therefore, I will utilise the Tens’ of discourse as text, in order to provide some 
answer to R.Q.1. In order to do this, I will concentrate on some text-related 
categories of analysis, rather than present an extensive textual analysis of my 
material. On the other hand, I will adopt the perspective of discoiuse as a 
process/practice in order to investigate the dynamic power play that takes place in 
interaction. In order to investigate and provide some answers to R.Q.2,1 will employ
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the notion of mechanisms of domination and resistance in analysing my data of 
parliamentary debates. In the next two sections I show how I have arrived at these 
key categories of analysis.
3.7 Power in discourse as a representation: Critical Discourse Analysis 
approach
The first research question concerns the different ideological investments of the two 
discourses, which can be understood as effects of the power struggle over the 
dominant and alternative meanings of femininity (as part of a larger construction of 
the dominant vision of the social). This, in my view, demands a concentration on the 
discourses in question as texts. The distinction between discourse as text and 
discourse as practice is made by Fairclough, though it is acknowledged to be a purely 
analytical stép.^^  ^ Such a perspective corresponds to my theorisation of ideology on 
women as a construct, though it in no way negates or undermines the way in which 
ideologies are always in the process of construction; that ideology becomes a 
construct through practice. However, for the purpose of actual analyses, we may 
dissect discourse into its constituting textual elements, especially when such 
elements are persistently used from within particular positions.
Fairclough, A Social Theory o f  Discourse, 73-74.
The analytical categories of CDA are especially concerned with discovering the 
ideological functioning of very concrete elements of text. Within the analysis of 
discourses on women as texts, I have decided to centre my attention on what has 
consistently presented itself as vital linguistic mechanisms of the struggle over 
meaning: categories, frames and repertoires. I believe these elements to be most 
vital because they help in maintaining a constraint on discourse summarised by 
Fairclough as a constrain on the contents of discourse, with implications for 
knowledge systems and beliefs.^®'  ^ These have obvious implications for the other 
effects of discourse, namely for the discursive constraints of social relationships and 
social identities.
I find categorisation a necessary analytical focus, not as a cognitive process, but as a 
linguistic process used in the social negotiation of meaning. Thus, I understand 
categorisation in a way similar to David Lee’s^ °^  notions of classification, selection, 
or simply codification. According to Lee, ‘coding creates reality, rather than simply 
reporting it’ and this creation constitutes ‘the imposition of structure on our raw 
experiences (...)[that is] closely bound up with questions of perspective’. T h e  
perspective mentioned here corresponds to what I refer to as positions characterised 
by ideological investments.
Fairclough, Language and Power, 74.
David Lee, Competing Discourses: Perspective and Ideology in Language (London and New 
York: Longman, 1992), 2.
Ibid.,2.
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The process of categorisation in text is most salient and indeed, most easily 
accessible, through the selection of vocabulary with its subsequent changes in word 
meaning that is being put across the well known example of a choice between 
‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom fighter’ cannot be underestimated here as an example of 
such contentious categorisation.^^^ Instead of using the word ‘vocabulary’, 
Fairclough suggests several alternatives such as ‘lexicalisation’, ‘signification’ or 
simply ‘wording’ to denote the key linguistic process of various significations of 
‘reality’ or ‘experience’ constructed in discourse.^^^ This is how I understand 
categorisation. Of course, categorisation is a linguistic mechanism that may be 
realised in a variety of ways, not just through word meaning or choice of vocabulary 
exclusively; it may happen through grammatical processes such as nominalisation or 
it may be facilitated by text cohesion/^^
Still, the primary implication of categorisation is in putting forward the ‘label’ on a 
chunk of meaning which is to be accepted as unproblematic. The more a category is 
presented as common sense, the more power has been invested in its creation. Here 
the codification of a meaning of a category represents the ultimate legitimisation of 
it.^^° Yet, in most cases the meanings and the boundaries of categories need to be 
constantly reassessed, and there is much more ideological difference possible as the 
control over meanings and possible changes are being fought over. In this respect.
Ibid., 75.
Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, 74-75.
Norninalisation in this function is pointed out by Lee, 6; and Fairclough also discussess the 
ideological categorising effect o f norninalisation and presents an example o f text cohesion in 
conflating categories in Zangifflge nncf Power, 50, 97.
Fairclough, Zongt/oge Power, 92-93.
90
analytical attention should not so much be centred on the choice of category itself, 
but on the use to which a category is put in the process of discursive practice, for 
example in how it helps in building an argument, and, following form it, a coherent 
world view:
One focus for analysis is upon alternative wordings and their political and ideological 
significance, upon such issues as how domains of experience may be ‘reworded’, as part of 
social and political struggles (...). Another focus is word meaning, and particularly how the 
meanings o f words come into contention within wider struggles: I shall suggest that 
particular structurings between the relationships between words and the relationships 
between the meaning of the words are forms o f hegemony.^"
I am interested in highlighting this process of rewording employed in order to 
reproduce as well as resist the dominant notions of femininity in social life.
One feminist linguistic text, which makes this connection between categories and the 
exercise of power in discourse, is Susan Ehrlich’s^ ^^  article on how sexism is 
discursively performed. In describing the treatment of feminist categories such as 
‘date rape’ or ‘sexual harassment’, she points to some mechanisms by which the 
meaning of these terms is denied, trivialised or changed by writers. The strategies 
enumerated by her include:
VdiixcXoVi^, Discourse and Social Change, 11.
Susan Ehrlich, ‘Critical Linguistics as Feminist Methodology’ in Sandra Burt and Lorraine Code 
(eds) Changing Methods: Feminists Transforming Practice (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 
1995)
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1. The elimination or obscuring of aspects of a term’s definition, or redefining 
prototypical case. The ensuing construct manages to depoliticise the initial 
meaning.
2. Expanding the category so that it comprises ‘phenomena beyond reason’. This 
results in trivialisation.
3. Complete obliteration of a term’s referent, which is considered here as a ‘violent 
form of redefinition’.
Another important, and not unconnected analytical category is that of frames, which 
I see as corresponding to discourses in the sense of particular narratives or stories 
about the world. Chouliaraki and Fairclough describe frames as ‘the sort of language 
used to construct some aspect of reality from a particular perspective, for example 
the liberal discourse on politics’. I  also decided to use frames rather than 
discourses as my analytical category to preserve the distinction between the general 
meaning of discourse and the particular sub-discourses (narratives, frames).
The analytical category of frame is used by Fairclough in analysing an excerpt from 
a romance- novel in relation to constructions of femininity, where frames are 
understood as ‘accounts of what women are and do’.^ ^^  One such frame describes 
women as ‘independent persons’ while the other as ‘traditional subservient’ women.
Ibid., 54-58.
Fairclough and Chouliaraki., 63. 
Fairclough, Language and Power, 80.
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This example is particularly. relevant as I discuss opposing constructions of 
femininity, which are also the subject of my analysis.
It seems to me that frames function like categories as they are central in creating a 
particular worldview, but by using whole narratives rather than single elements of 
language. The building of narratives that seem coherent versions of reality is 
particularly important in the building of social theories of gender. Of course, in this 
sense they are triggered by single elements that are put forward and that correspond 
to larger structure of meaning.
There is one more analytical category that is vital in putting forward social meanings 
through discourse. Lia Litosseliti uses the notion of interpretive repertoires, which 
are ‘similar to discourses in their broader sense’, that is as cultural themes that are 
evoked in discourse for the purpose of presenting a coherent worldview in particular 
texts or in actual arguments made in texts.^^  ^Repertoires allow for evoking different 
moral and gendered standpoints in argumentation by ‘favouring one rhetorical rule 
over a n o t h e r f r i  this meaning, repertoires are ‘interpretive frames’ that function 
like discourses in describing ‘entities or worlds consisting of words, acts, behaviours, 
assumptions, beliefs, attitudes and values that we all, as speakers, writers and readers
Litosseliti Lia, Moral Repertoires and Gender Voices in Argumentation PhD thesis. Department of 
Linguistics and Modem English Language, Lancaster University, 1999, electronic version, no page 
numbers.
Litosseliti Lia, ‘Head to Head’: Gendered Repertoires in Newspaper Arguments’ in 
Litosseliti, Lia and Jane Sundersland (eds) Gender Identity and Discourse Analysis (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 2002), 129.
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evoke in our speaking, writing and r e a d i n g . T h o u g h ,  it must be noted that 
repertoires can be understood as superordinate to discourses (frames), in the'sense 
that they make various discourses possible; for example various discourses on 
marriage or relationships may.be constructed through resorting to a repertoire of 
individual versus collective values .^In this way, repertoires help pre-select frames 
and categories, and make them into a ‘logical’ whole that can be constituted from 
within a particular perspective.
Thus, the previously mentioned example from a romance novel could be analysed 
within a slightly more abstract repertoire: ‘independence versus dependence’, where
we have two types of meaning themes that can be applied to various arguments, not
- •
only about what women are, but also in relation to children, employees, etc. It is, of 
course, very important to note how such a repertoire is so often used in relation to 
women, and what contradictory frames it makes possible. I will divide frames and 
repertoires for the purpose of my analysis, while I am in no way going to resolve all 
the theoretical implications of such a division.
In my view, the category of repertoires is particularly important in linking to what 
Fairclough refers to as ‘commonsense assumptions and expectations of the 
interpreter’ that people use to interpret texts. That is the why Litosseliti claims that
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
220 Fairclough, Language and Power, 78.
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‘repertoires belong to society rather than to individual speakers’. H o w e v e r ,  the 
choice of which repertoire to evoke or use as central in an utterance is one way in 
which speakers try to push forward a particular interpretation consistent with a 
particular perspective or position in discourse and informed by particular ideological 
investment. Categories and frames are also used by the originators of texts to hirther 
assign or restrict certain interpretations: ‘The sense of coherence of a whole text is 
generated in a sort of chemical reaction which you get when you put together what’s 
in the text and what’s already ‘in’ the interpreter - that is the common-sense 
assumptions and expectations of the interpreter.
All of these choices are interpretive as they are used in building a particular 
perspective or a position within discourse. More than that, such choices may also 
function as ‘weapons’ in the discursive contestation over meaning. This may mean 
either an imposition of a model of interpretation or a negotiation of meaning. This 
vital differentiation between ‘imposition’ and ‘negotiation’ of modes of 
interpretation is made by David Lee.^^  ^The latter provides an insight into potentially 
transformative moments in discourse, while the former corresponds to the 
maintenance of a hegemonic discourse. I find this to be a vital distinction for the 
purpose of differentating between the meanings of the dominant and counter­
discourse in my own material. While the hegemonic or dominant discourse will use 
categories, discourses and repertoires to impose and maintain dominant meanings.
Litosseliti, Moral Repertoires and Gender Voices in Argumentation 
Ibid., 79.
The distinction is made in relation to categorisation and selection, Lee, 21.
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other, subdominant discourses will try to negotiate with and possibly transform the 
dominant meanings.
3.8 Power in discourse as a process: feminist linguistic approach
Since discourse is also a process of social interaction, studying particular discursive 
situations should allow us to capture the workings of power ‘in action’. The notion of 
discursive power I adopt implies concrete mechanisms by which this power is 
executed. These mechanisms have been theorised by feminist linguists and can be 
summarised as ‘mechanisms of domination and resistance’. Thus, I am interested, 
whether (and in what ways) power can be seen to function in relation to the 
discourses on women.
In relation to domination on the level of public discourse or general social 
interaction, the recent work of Robin Lakoff lists the following strategies of 
domination of women’s discourses:
• interruption and topic control,
• nonresponse ,
• interpretive control^ "^^
Robin Lakoff, ‘Cries and Whispers: The Shattering of the Silence’ in Kira Hall and M ary Bucholtz 
(eds) Gender Articulated: Language and the Socially Constructed S e lf  (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1995), 29
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Though these mechanisms are theorised in relation to verbal interaction, Lakoff s 
material (specific public sphere events) approximates the wider discursive 
understanding of social interaction. However, the last one may be seen as the basis of 
domination in any cultural communication: it is the appropriation and control of 
meaning. In my understanding, interpretive control may include all mechanisms of 
domination in discourse, including those working on textual level.
The mechanisms of domination can also be subsumed under the general term: 
silencing. This term was used in a similar way by Cameron,^^^ although for her it 
referred to communication, in the strict linguistic sense, as face-to-face interaction. 
Silencing denotes ‘a personal experience of being “silenced” (interrupted, ignored, 
not called to speak, not confident enough to speak).^^^
Interestingly enough, similar strategies of domination have been analysed in 
supposedly ‘gender-neutraf electronic interaction. Susan Herring, Deborah A. 
Johnson, and Tamara DiBenedetto analysed two discussions on the Internet, which 
showed characteristics that are, according to them, similar to female participation in 
other public discourse a r e a s . W h a t  the authors noticed was both the asymmetry of 
male and female contributions and the silencing techniques used in response to 
topics adopting a ‘feminist’ perspective, or even voicing a complaint of sexism:
225
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Deborah Cameron, Verbal Hygiene (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 201. 
Ibid.
Susan Herring, Deborah A. Johnson, and Tamara DiBenedetto, ‘This Discussion is Going too Far: 
Male Resistance to Female Participation on the Internet’ in Kira Hall and Mary Bucholtz (eds)
Gender Articulated: Language and the Socially Constructed S e lf (New York and London: Routledge, 
1995), 67.
97
Male members reacted in each case by employing a variety o f silencing strategies: first they 
avoided addressing the women’s concerns by dismissing them as trivial or by 
intellectualising the discussion away from its original focus; then they erupted into anger and 
accusations when women persisted in posting messages on the topic; and finally they co­
opted and redefined the terms o f the discourse as a means of regaining control3^^
This study is important for my work as it pinpoints concrete strategies of domination 
and because it also researches the corresponding strategies of resistance, called here 
strategies of empowerment on the part of the women. The primary achievement of 
the women involved was breaking the silence and introducing the problems centred 
on women’s experience into the discussion. Persistence of focus on these meanings 
as well as ‘solidarity’ or persistence of perspective’ across individuals’ was also 
noted^^^. The most important of them, and the most general one, was simply the 
awareness of precisely the strategies of domination used by some male participants, 
and then naming them publicly for what they were^ *^^ .
This insight is important for my analysis of discourse in the public sphere, as it is 
concerned with a dynamic understanding of power in interaction where mechanisms 
of domination are answered by corresponding mechanisms of resistance. The authors 
have analysed discourses where domination is at work, and they have tried to assess 
the extent to which resistance is successful in the particular contexts. This work
Ibid., 68. 
^ " ib id ., 90. 
Ibid., 91.
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became a general model for my approach as it correspond to my perspective on the 
dynamic workings of power, suggesting also concrete discursive mechanisms to 
consider in my material.
What is interesting is that it was a ‘feminist discourse’ that was being dominated. 
Similarly, I am interested in seeing the power struggle between discursive positions, 
rather than between male and female speakers. I will use similar mechanisms “in the 
analysis of a discursive situation involving both men and women representing 
distinct discourses on women. .In this understanding, the feminist discourse can, at 
least to a degree, be used by male speakers who identify with such a position while 
some women may identify with what I have called a ‘hegemonic’ or ‘dominant’ 
discourse on women.
The mechanisms of domination most important for the purpose of my analysis are:
• Exclusion and nonresponse: lack of discussion on some argument or 
contribution or lack of an answer to a point raised. This seems to be the most 
direct assertion of power in interaction or in discourse.
• Depreciating, diminishing, trivialisation: through jokes, negative evaluations, 
irony, insults etc. This mechanism silences through undermining the position or 
the speaker.
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• Co-opting of discourse: silencing as position by appropriating part of a discourse 
content for one’s own position, probably the most subtle mechanism of 
interpretive control.
On the other hand, we need to be able to account for the possible mechanisms of 
resistance, that would correspond to subverting the dominant interpretations and aim 
at a negotiation of meaning between the different position. If we adopt the view that 
strategies of resistance are always answers to strategies of domination, we should 
be able to see the following mechanisms at work:
• As an answer to exclusion/ nonresponse - a persistence of focus or a persistence 
of perspective: systematic bringing up of a topic, insisting on some discursive 
position that is being excluded.
• As an answer to diminishing, trivialisation- insisting on the seriousness of the 
discourse, pointing out of the above strategies, possibly counter-diminishing of 
the dominant discourse.
• As an answer to co-optation - reclaiming the discursive position/contribution and 
pointing out co-optation.
In my view, the feminist linguistic theorisation of power in communication can also 
be used for the purpose of discourse analysis, when we analyse discourse as a form 
of social interaction. In the case of my material, the discourses I will analyse all 
originated in actual verbal interactions. I believe that by concentrating on key
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mechanisms of domination and resistance between discursive positions we may 
provide an .insight into the dynamic workings of power within the understanding of 
discourse as a process, and as social interaction. This should provide an analytical 
framework allowing me to answer the second research question, formulated in 
section 3.6, in relation to the two discourses on women in the chosen parliamentary 
debates.
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CHAPTER 4
An analysis of discourse as a construct: categories, frames and 
repertoires forming discourses on women in Polish parliamentary 
debates
The possibility o f resistance is an effect o f the processes whereby particular discourses 
become the instruments and effects o f power.^^’
4.1 The analytical perspective
In this chapter I utilise the perspective of discourse as a construct, that is, textual 
representation of reality, in order to analyse the content of two distinct discourses on 
women that are constructed through parliamentary debates. The purpose of this is to 
provide an answer to Research Question 1 : What are the ideological investments of 
the competing discourses on women in the Polish political sphere? In my view, 
concentrating on textual elements providing the content of the discourses on women, 
such as categories, frames and repertoires would allow us to give an answer to this 
question. The analysis of categorisation, frames and repertoires can describe the
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ideational/propositional content of the texts studied. Consequently, we should be 
able to locate the representations constructed through the studied texts within 
differentiated networks of values and expose the ideological investment into the 
construction of women implied in particular representations.
4.2 Introduction of the debates
Initially, my analysis had included several parliamentary debates. The debates
studied come from the same parliamentary cycle (1997-2001), and concern topics
related to women. I had looked at the following debates in chronological order:
1. Equal status debate (on gender equality bill): 04 March 1999
2. Equal status debate (on a parliamentary commission on equality): 03 November 
1999
3. Debate on the penalisation of pornography: 14 December 1999
4. Debate on the annual report on the implementation of anti-abortion bill (for the 
year 1998): 14 April 2000
5. Debate on the Polish delegation at the UN Conference on Women (New York, 
June 2000): 29 June 2000
6. Debate on the extension of maternity leave: 11 January 2001
7. Debate on the annual report on the implementation of anti-abortion bill (for the 
year 1999): 18 January, 2001
231 Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory ( Oxford; Blackwell, 1997), 107.
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The insights generated from these analyses are very much part of my research 
project, even though not all of them could be included in this thesis. I have 
deliberately decided to include an earlier and a more recent debate in this chapter, in 
order to provide a set of textual material on the basis of which to make some 
generalisations about persistent meanings that are generated in the political discourse 
on women. I have chosen the first of the ‘equal status debates’ and ‘the maternity 
leave debate’ for that purpose. Both of these debates are at the very core of the 
negotiation of femininity and possible changes in the discursive construction of 
women.
The equal status debate, which took place in March 1999, provides material for the 
most explicit questions about how women are understood in relation to rights, 
discrimination, and citizenship from within the two discourses. It is also one of the 
few attempts to propose gender equality legislation, coming from some left-wing and 
centre MPs (and particularly ftrom the Parliamentary Women’s G r o u p ) . T h e  
maternity leave debate (January 2001), concerns another key aspect of the 
construction of femininity: motherhood, and it originates in the right-wing political 
parties. I will attempt to show through my analysis that the two debates, which 
occurred at different times, essentially construct the same discourses on women. The
In fact two debates ‘on equal status of men and women’ took place in 1999, one considering" the 
possibility o f a gender equality legislation, and the second one concerning the creation o f a 
parliamentary commission on equal status. Both of the proposals were rejected, but the debates have 
been widely discussed in feminist circles in Poland, m the understanding that they were they key to 
the possibility o f change in women’s situation in Poland.
104
initial division of the two discursive positions is based simply on a particular 
speaker’s voiced attitude towards a particular proposal (for or against). The Polish 
texts are given, but the analysis is carried out in English. Indeed, for most of my 
analytical tools, namely the categories, frames, and repertoires the English 
translation manages to capture the original meaning well. Where there are important 
differences in categorisation, implied by the Polish text, this is also discussed.
4.3 The analysis
4.3.1 The equal status debates: ‘equality as an international obligation’ 
and ‘women’s rights as human rights’
First, I shall analyse the construction of the discourse on women coming from the 
proponents of the legislation on equal status, and a section of the introductory speech 
in the debate will serve this purpose here:
(la) MP Teresa Jasztal:
(...) Spolecznosc miqdzynarodowa dostrzegla rôwniez, ze we wszystkich spoleczenstwach w  mniejszym 
lub wiqkszym stopniu kobiety nalezq, do grup szczegôlnie uposledzonych. W 1979 r. zostala przyjqta 
konwencja w sprawie likwidacji wszelkich form  dyskryminacji kobiet, ratyfikowana przez Polskq w 
roku 1980. Konwencja zawiera m.in. defînicjq dyskryminacji kobiet i zobowiqzuje rzqdy do 
przeciwdzialania nierôwnosciom ze wzglqdu na plec we wszystkich sferach zycia  - zarôwno 
publicznego, ja k  iprywatnego. (...)
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(...)  The international com m unity also noticed that in all societies women, to a larger or smaller 
degree, belong to particularly disadvantaged groups. In  1979 a convention on the abolition o f  all 
fo rm s o f  w om en’s discrimination was adopted [by the UN], and was ratified by Poland in 1980. The 
convention includes, among other things, a definition o f  w om en’s discrimination and obliges the 
governments [o f the signatory countries] to counteract the inequalities o f  gender in all spheres o f  
life - public as well as private. (...)
The first extract is important as it introduces the key discourse used throughout both 
debates: fhe discourse on international obligationsf, referring to signed legal 
documents that provide an interdiscursive resource for legitimising claims for this 
argumentative position. In connection with this, the examples of ‘other countries’ are 
also implied (belonging in the ‘international community’), and especially those of 
the European Union. This choice immediately brings into the debate the ^frame of 
European integration o f Poland’ and allows to further legitimise the argument that 
equality legislature is important. This theme utilised as a source of argument 
provides space for the construction of important categories, such as ‘inequality ’ and 
‘discrimination’.
But using these particular categories as part of an argumentation depends also on 
larger meaning structures, such as the repertoires used. Here, this refers to the way 
Poland is categorised as a political entity. The choice is between POLAND AS AN 
INDEPENDENT - VERSUS A DEPENDENT ENTITY. In other words, the choice 
is between the treatment of Poland as a self-sufficient whole, which presupposes Hhe
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frame o f the nation state’, or Poland as a part o f Europe’, (the international 
community discourse), dependent on other countries and international structures. In 
the second understanding, the internal social policy ceases to be internal, especially 
in the context of the expected and desired political integration (with the European 
Union). This also means that civic rather than national categorisation of women is 
presupposed: only as citizens can women demand equality with men in all spheres of 
life - public as well as private. may be less feasible if the nation state frame is 
used, where woman is charged with special duties of symbolising and preserving 
national identity that make her a Pole in a different way than a man is, making 
demands of equal treatment at least partially incoherent.
The next extract, from the same speech, introduces other key categories taken from 
the feminist frame that structure the proposed way women are to be seen:
(Lb)
. .)Uznawanie przez wiqkszosc spoleczenstw sfery prywatnej za domenq kobiet, a sfery publicznej za 
domenq mqzczyzn sprawilo, ze dopiero w latach dziewiqédziesiqtych dostrzezono przemoc w rodzinie i 
uznano za powazny problem spoleczny, a takze lamanie praw czlowieka. Zrodlem przemocy w 
rodzinie je s t zakorzeniony we wszystkich spolecznosciach patriarchalnych nierowny status kobiet i 
mqzczyzn.(...)
(...) Considering, in most societies, the private sphere as a women’s domain and the public sphere 
as men’s domain has caused the violence in the family to be acknowledged as a social problem, and 
as violation o f human rights only in the nineties. The source o f violence in the family is the 
unequal status o f  women and men rooted in all patriarchal societies. (...)
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It should be noted that, the choice of POLAND AS A DEPENDENT ENTITY 
within the repertoire mentioned above is still used here in order to make the criticism 
of the Polish society possible in relation to ‘most societies’. Then, the introduction of 
categories: ‘private sphere’, ‘public sphere’, ‘violence in the family’, human 
rights’, unequal status’ makes sense as part of the criticism of the situation of 
women in a global feminist understanding: ‘in all patriarchal societies’. There are 
two main frames used in the first two sentences: that of international human rights 
and of feminist critiques of society. The first one allows for the introduction of the 
category of human rights, and the second for that of ‘patriarchal societies’, and 
‘unequal status’. When brought together they allow for the formation of the frame of 
women’s rights as human rights. The above-mentioned repertoire of international 
dependence and interconnection makes it possible to apply these debates for the 
purpose of arguing for the necessity of legislation on equal status.
It is interesting to see how the feminist frame is further used in this debate to 
redefine the dominant understanding of the social and of women’s position within it:
(2) MP Danuta Waniek;
(...) Generalnie jednak zrownanie statusu kobiet i mqzczyzn nie tylko w konstytucji i ustawach, ale 
przede wszystkim w naszej obyczajowosci, sluzy kobietom, a przez to calemii spoleczenstwu. 1 
niezaleznie od tego, co siq dzisiaj z  roznych trybun i ambon môwi na temat "feminizmu", a w ustach 
politykôw prawicowych brzmi to najczqsciej ja k  obelga, prawda polega na tym, ze kobiety 
wspôîczesne, rôwniez te o poglqdach prawicowych, korzystajq z  efektôw wytrwalej i cz^sto
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desperackiej walki tych nielubianych przez nich fem inistek  - lub, inaczej, sufrazystek czy 
emancypantek - w rodzaju Emeliny Pankhurst, dziqki ktôrym kobiety staly si^ obywatelkami, 
uzyskujqc po I  wojnie swiatowej prawa wyborcze. To ona wlasnie krzyknqla na poczqtku naszego 
wieku: "Kobiety i mqzczyzni - nacieramy na Izbq Gmin!” (...)
( ...)  In  general however, the equalising o f  the status o f  men and women not only in the constitution 
and codes but primarily in our mentality serves women, and because o f  that serves the whole 
society. And, regardless o f  what is being said today from  various rostrums and pulpits on the 
subject o f  fem in ism  ’, and coming fro m  the lips o f  right-wing politicians it usually sounds like an 
insult, the truth is that contemporary women, also those with rightist views, benefit from  the effect 
o f  persistent and often desperate fig h t o f  those disliked fem in ists - or in, different words, 
suffragists, or emancipationists - o f  the kind o f  Em ily Pankhurst, thanks to whom women became 
citizens, gaining after the fir s t world war voting rights. I t  was her who shouted at the beginning o f  
our century: Women and m e n -le t’s charge the House o f  Com m ons’. ( ...)
In this extract, the feminist discourse is accredited as a source, or a foundation, 
which the authors of the bill use to support their argument. The open assertion that 
the bill is to contribute to ‘equalising of the status of men and women’ and especially 
the support offered for this statement: [because it] serves women, and because o f that 
serves the whole society, may be seen as using a radical fem inist frame. However, 
because the collective is here categorised as ‘society’, the statement again establishes 
the category of women as citizens in exactly the same way as men, hence the 
‘equalising of men and women’ can be later categorised as ‘a necessity’. Feminist 
activism is acknowledged here as a source of history for the struggle for women’s 
rights, and this implies the identification of the authors of the bill as the ‘followers’
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of earlier liberal feminists: ‘suffragists’ and ‘emancipationists’ are established as 
predecessors of ‘feminists’. The evoked appeal of Emily Pankhurst to charge the 
House o f Commons is meant to provide the discursive situation with a historical 
significance as another ‘charge’ of the parliament, this time the Polish one.
But the invocation of the history of women’s movements also provides a way to 
criticise the dominant discourse on grounds of accountability. The discourse is first 
only alluded to indirectly 'regardless o f what is being said today from various 
rostrums and pulpits on the subject o f feminism where the rostrum metonymically 
represents political institutions, while the pulpit evokes the Church. Then, a more 
direct accusation is levelled at right-wing politicians: and coming from the lips of 
right-wing politicians it usually sounds like an insult. The speaker is here criticising 
the dominant discourse and its base of legitimacy, and the criticism is then further 
directed at conservative female politicians, identified as ‘the women who benefit 
from the effects of feminists’ fight^^ .^ Yet, it can also be understood in relation the 
whole dominant discourse, as exposing its ideological investment. The conservative 
construction of women is exposed as having little to do with the ‘lives’ of even those 
women that are champions of such views. What is implied here is the awareness of 
the unitary vision of femininity in the conservative discourse that in no way matches 
the experiences of women. -
This is a very widespread criticism occurring in these debates in several different forms
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Interestingly, the feminist frame is not only used as a source for emancipation, 
arguably, it is also occasionally denied legitimacy within this position:
(3) MP Anna Bankowska
( ...)  Niektorzy prôbowali wmawiac nam, inicjatorom tej ustawy, ze ta ustawa to wyraz tylko i 
wylqcznie feministycznych pomyslôw. Nie bardziej blqdnego. To walka z  bezprawiem, to walka o to, 
zeby standardy europejskie zaczqly funkcjonowac w naszym kraju. Faktycznie wzbudzila ona, ja k  
dowodzi zycie, wiqksze zainteresowanie wsrod kobiet zasiadajqcych w tym parlamencie, i to 
szczegôlnie po lewej stronie sali. Mozna siq zastanowic dlaczego. Czy moze jes t to wyraz Iqku przed 
utratq rzeczywistychpraw zdobytych i zakorzenionych w mentalnosci mqzczyzn? Padlo w dyskusji 
wiele niesprawiedliwych i nieprawdziwych zarzutôwpod adresem tej ustawy, a ona nie wywyzsza 
zadnej zp lci, lecz wylqcznie gwarantuje rôwnosc praw, i to glownie w odniesienhi do pracy i 
godnosci osobistej. Czy to tak wiele? Czy w demokratycznym panstwieprawa oczekiwanie na rôwny 
status kobiety. i mqzczyzny to fanaberia czy koniecznosc? Na pewno koniecznosc. Na potrzebq  
uchwalenia ustawy wskazuje zycieprzepelnioneprzykladami najczqsciej - podkreslam slowo: 
najczqsciej, bo nie tylko - slabszejpozycji kobiety w wielu dziedzinach naszego zycia codziennego.
Kto tego nie widzi, kto tego nie slyszy, je s t slepy i gluchy na krzywdq ludzkq.(...)
(...) Some have tried to tell us, the initiators o f the bill, that this bill is just and only an expression 
o f feminist ideas. Nothing is more wrong. It is a fight for the European standards to start 
functioning in our country. Indeed, as life shows, it [the bill] has aroused bigger interest among the 
women sitting in this parliament, and especially on the left side o f the chamber. One could wonder 
why. Can it be an expression offear o f losing real rights won and rooted in men’s mentality? In the 
discussion, numerous unjust and false accusations directed at this bill were thrown, but it [the bill] 
does not extol one o f the sexes, but only guarantees the equality o f rights, and that especially in 
relation to work and personal dignity. Is this so much? Is the expectation o f equal status o f the man 
and woman in a democratic state o f law a whim or a necessity? Definitely a necessity. The need to
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vote [the bill] is pointed  out by life filled  with examples o f  usually-I stress usually, but not only- 
weaker position o f  woman in m any domains o f  our everyday life. Who does not see it, who does not 
hear it is blind and dea f to human misery.]...)
It is interesting to note that in this excerpt the speaker strategically moves away from 
the feminist interpretations, to stress the liberal and international frames which 
indeed provide the main basis for this debate. But by using the category fight’ 
(which in previous excerpt referred directly to feminists) the fem inist discourse is 
still alluded to, even if now the base of legitimising the argument is ‘the fram e o f  
international obligations and fram e o f  European integration ’ and ‘international 
human rights’’, a fight for the European standards to start functioning in our 
country. Furthermore, the liberal category of ‘right’ and ‘equality’ are joined to 
form a category the equality of rights’, which is seen as a goal of the bill: the 
equality o f rights, and that especially in relation to work and personal dignity.
The problematisation of opposition to this goal is achieved by the use of rhetorical 
questions: Is this so much? Is the expectation o f equal status o f the man and woman 
in a democratic state o f law a whim or a necessity? At the same time the feminist 
frame, though seemingly undermined, reappears in theorising the lack of male 
politicians’ interests: Can it be an expression o f fear o f losing real rights won and 
rooted in men’s mentality? This rhetorical question would not be possible without 
the feminist fram e o f  society as patriarchy, with its negative assessment. Of course.
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the criticism is not very strong: the implied meaning was probably not lack of 
interest of male politicians, but lack of acceptance for the bill.
Further on, a set of questions reasserts the liberal frame: the fram e o f  society as 
democracy. In referring to ‘democratic state of law’, the legitimacy for the voting of 
the bill is asserted. Moreover, the action of voting the bill is categorised as a 
‘necessity’, which is another categorisation of what earlier was referred to as ‘fight’. 
These two categorisations make sense when used within the liberal democratic and 
feminist frames respectively, and we can see how the speaker is trying to combine 
the two into a meaningful whole. The two frames, with their categorisations of 
‘women’s rights’, are also joined within the two final sentences, which appeal to 
experience -‘everyday life’, as a source of knowledge of the discrimination of 
women, but also, occasionally, of men too.
In this way, the key argument of the whole debate is upheld: opposing the more 
widespread discrimination against women, does not discriminate against men, but 
serves the whole society. However, first and foremost, the key categorisation of 
‘women’s rights as human rights’ is established here. The category of human 
suffering’, when read against ‘the weaker position of women’, or, in other words, 
discrimination, constructs this understanding, endowing it with moral dimensions: 
those who oppose the bill are ‘blind and deaf to human suffering’, which implies that 
their actions must be negatively assessed. In this way, the counter-discourse is also 
providing inroads into the dominant discourse’s monopolising of morality, which in
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the case of the Polish sphere has occurred through the excessive use of religious 
discourse in the political language (originating in and revolving around abortion 
debate and the resulting discourse). Here, an alternative notion of what is (im)moral 
is being constructed.
We can see from the above few extracts that the meanings of this discourse are not 
stable. On the contrary, they are taken from several frames for the purpose of 
building a particular argument The speakers move between various themes and 
categorisations to construct their arguments. All these arguments, however, 
constitute a meaningful, though internally differentiated whole: an understanding of 
society where women are to be considered citizens with equal rights. Another way of 
binding these categorisations and frames is to make them correspond to the 
formulation of POLAND AS A DEPENDENT ENTITY, within the appropriate 
repertoire, which covers both the fram e o f  international obligations and the 
international feminist frame, therefore constructing women’s rights as not nation- 
dependent but internationally established. In this way, a repertoire provides the 
binding elements for the various frames and categories used, all for the purpose of 
describing women as a social group and not a biological or national category. Below, 
I present the results of this part of my analysis in the form of a table:
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Examples Repertoires Categories Frames Argument
1 Poland as a 
DEPENDENT (VS 
INDEPENDENT) 
ENTITY (European 
reference)
inequality
disadvantage
discrimination
society
society, international 
community 
unequal status 
human rights 
public and private 
patriarchy 
family violence
‘ international law ’, 
‘European 
Integration '
‘human rights 
(justice) ’
‘fem inist critique o f  
society'
w om en’s rights as 
human rights
legislation on equal 
sta tus is 
internationally 
recognised and 
necessary in Poland
2 Poland as a 
DEPENDENT (VS 
INDEPENDENT) 
ENTITY (European 
reference)
women and society 
feminism 
voting (political) 
rights
‘fem inist fram e  
‘history o f  feminism ’
legalisation on equal 
sta tus serves men 
and women
3 Poland as a 
DEPENDENT (VS 
INDEPENDENT) 
ENTITY (European 
reference)
fight, necessity 
m en’s rights 
equality of rights, 
equal status 
patriarchy, 
democracy, 
women’s rights as 
human rights 
human suffering
‘ international 
obligations 
‘European 
Integration ’
‘human rights ’
‘ society as 
democracy ’ 
on society as ‘society 
as patriarchy ’ 
‘morality ’
opposing 
discrim ination 
serves the whole 
society
Table 1 The equal status debate, position 1
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The notion of femininity constructed here stresses the categorisation of equality of 
women rather than the notion of women’s inherent difference. The social, not the 
national frame of reference in categorising women is preferred, as is the 
categorisation of woman as citizen. We can see that this discourse establishes itself 
as possessing a high degree of legitimacy and power of demanding change in the 
dominant construction of women, even though all of the proposed arguments fail in 
this institutional context. What is most interesting to observe is the ability with 
which discourses on feminism, and on international politics are reworked and 
rejoined to construct a newer understanding of gender relations and to legitimise the 
argumentation which demand change: the introduction of the gender equality 
legislation.
4.3.2 The equal status debate: ‘equality in difference’: ‘women’s rights 
as natural rights’
Below, I present the reassertion of the meaning of femininity that is meant to stir the . 
debate away from the discourses, categories and frames offered by the proponents of 
the bill, and to reassert the exclusionary discourse on women. Even while engaging 
in the debate in the ‘technical’ sense of taking turns, the dominant discourse
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arguments are centred around preventing any negotiation of meaning by proposing 
an irreconcilable version of the ‘appropriate femininity’. The first and one of the 
most important categorisations used by several speakers is that of ‘women’s rights’ 
a s ‘natural rights’.
(4a) MPBarbara Frqczek:
(...) Tezq wyjsciowq je s t  rzekome nieposzanowanie praw  kobiet w naszym kraju, praw, ktôre 
gwarantuje Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w art. 33, praw, ktôre gwarantujq liczne dokumenty 
miqdzynarodowe, wreszcie praw  naturalnych, praw niespisanych, ktôre wskazujq kazdemu 
czlowiekowi jego obowiqzki i prawa, jesli czlowiek chce zachowywac siq godnie - ja k  czlowiek.
Juz starozytni Rzymianie rozrôzniali prawo naturalne ius i stanowione przez ustawodawcq 
lex i na prawie naturalnym opierali wszystkie przepisy. Prawa naturalne czlowieka nie zalezq od  
niego, sq dziedzictwem ludzkosci i nalezq do osoby ludzkiej jako takiej. Nikt nie moze ich od nowa 
ustanowic, nawet suwerenne zgromadzenie demokratyczne. Nikt tez nie moze ich zmienic, one sq 
zastane, tak ja k  czlowiek je s t zastany, i wymagajq tylko, by je  respektowano. W brakii ich 
respektowania tkwi kwintesencja rzekomej dyskryminacji kobiety. (...)
(...) The initial thesis [o f the authors o f  the bill] is the alleged lack o f  respect fo r women’s rights in 
our country, the rights which are guaranteed in the Constitution o f the Republic o f Poland in 
art.33, which are guaranteed by numerous international documents, finally [lack o f respect] o f  the 
natural rights, the unwritten rights, which show to every human being his obligations and rights, i f  
the person wants to behave with dignity -like a human being.
Already ancient Romans differentiated between the natural law Hus’ and the one 
established by the legislator- Hex’ and it was on the natural law that they based all the laws. The 
natural rights o f a human being are independent o f him, they are the heritage o f humanity and 
they belong to a human person as such. Nobody can write them again, not even an independent 
democratic gathering (parliament). Nobody can change them, they are given just like a human
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being is given, and they demand respecting them. In the lack o f respecting o f  them lies the 
quintessence o f the alleged women’s discrimination. (...)
This speech, which marks the beginning of the debate and establishes the position of 
the hegemonic discourse, introduces the category of ‘natural laws’.^ "^^ But, before 
this is done, the notion of women’s discrimination is first defined as ‘lack of 
respect’ (for women’s rights understood as part of natural rights) and is undermined 
at the same time by the use of the passive participle ‘alleged’. The speaker also uses 
the interdiscursive resources of ‘the constitution’, as well as ‘international 
documents’, to establish what is considered an unproblematic ‘reality’: ‘women’s 
rights’ are already ‘guaranteed’. The fram e o f  international obligations, utilised 
extensively in the previously analysed position, is here generally alluded to by the 
use the phrase ‘international documents’, though for the purpose of building the 
opposite argument - no further legislation is necessary. It is important to note, 
however, that the first document mentioned is the Constitution, thus establishing the 
primacy of national fram e over the international one. Both are meant to present a 
simple principle: if  something such as ‘women’s rights’ is guaranteed by a legal 
document, it exists in reality. That is, there is either no trespassing on these rights, or 
it is such an abstract entity that no more beyond a suitable written ‘guarantee’ can be 
done to ensure them being respected.
The polish word ‘prawa’ can mean both ‘rights’ and ‘laws’, thus the construction o f women’s 
rights as natural rights is easily generated from within the discussion of ‘laws’.
118
With regard to the notion of ‘natural rights’, the argument must be seen as proposed 
exclusively in relation to women’ rights, for the purpose of stating that no legislation 
on equal status is necessary, but also for the purpose of implying the categorisation 
of women as nature. This, of course, relies on the repertoire of NATURE VERSUS 
CULTURE/SOCIETY. It is in this context that the breaking of laws can be seen as 
possible only by a select few, those that go against the ‘essence of humanity’, where 
‘unwritten rights’: show to every human being his obligations and rights, i f  the 
person wants to behave with dignity -like a human being.
It can then be stated further where this notion of ‘natural rights’ stems from. It is 
vital, that the natural rights and the differentiation between ‘ius’ and ‘lex’ is 
mentioned persistently in relation to women’s rights. Of course, the key argument is 
not about rights/laws, but about the nature of womanhood. By constructing the 
category of ‘natural rights/laws’ (Polish category of ‘prawa’) as ‘ancient’ and 
‘given’, what is really being constructed is the ‘unchangeable’, and essentialist 
notion of femininity as part of the natural order, coherent with REPERTOIRE OF 
WOMAN AS NATURE VERSUS CULTURE. It is within this repertoire that the 
natural order precedes and overrides the social order, as nobody can write them [the 
natural laws] again, not even an independent democratic gathering. Nobody can 
change them. In this way, the limits of democratic rule of law are constructed in 
relation to women.
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No negotiation of femininity is possible in this framework, because femininity is 
natural, essential and, for the purpose of constructing this understanding, the whole 
history of human civilisation is presented as stable, ‘given’, and ‘independent’ of 
human beings themselves. The reality is also presented as independent of historical 
change, hence the Roman civilisation is established as a model of the existing 
‘reality’, not a historically specific culture. It is a social world without inequality in 
relation to class, race or gender, based on human ‘dignity’ and ‘natural rights’ that 
are ‘given’ by some source of power that precedes humanity. This source will later 
be supplied by religious discourse, as we shall see in other excerpts.
In contrast to its ahistorical presentation, this proposed construction of femininity, is 
compatible with the needs of the emerging capitalist relations, painstakingly 
constructed on the seperation of the feminised private and male-dominated public 
sphere, with women placed outside of public life in a primordial state of nature. It is 
also more than compatible with Catholic nationalist discourse. Both can be seen as 
discursive resources used to supply this vision of the social in relation to women. In 
a later part of the same speech, the speaker supplies further meaning to this 
construction of femininity:
(4.b;
{...)W  przededniu dyskusyjnego swiqta, jakim  je s t Dzien Kobiet, chcq przypomniec, ze prawdziwy 
awans spoleczny kobiety wymaga przede wszystkim przywrôcenia wartosci macierzynstwu, 
malzenstwu i rodzinie. Najwazniejsza i najzaszczytniejsza praca kobiety przebiega w rodzinie. Wiqc 
nie uchwalenie ustawy o rownym statusie kobiety i mqzczyzny, ale podjqcie prac nad ustawq
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dowartosciowiijqcq pracq kobiety w rodzinie, moze usatysfakcjonowac wiqkszosc polskich kobiet i 
winno bye przedmiotem pracy Wysokiej Izby.
Trzeba wlasciwie ukierunkowac predyspozycje kobiety, by pomoc s iq je j odrodzic i zrozumiec 
swojq godnosc, bowiem kiedy odradza siq kobieta, odradza siq caly narod. (...)
(...)  I  would like to rem ind you on the eve o f  the disputed holiday o f  W om en’s D ay that the real 
social promotion o f  a woman demands firs t o f  all the re-establishment o f  the value o f  motherhood, 
marriage and fam ily. The m ost important and the m ost dignified work o f  a woman takes place in 
the fam ily. Thus, not the voting o f  a bill on the equal status o f  a man and woman but starting work 
on a bill that would re-evaluate the w om an’s work in the fam ily, may satisfy the majority o f  Polish 
women and should be the subject o f  the H igh Chamber [the parliament].
The predispositions o f  the woman m ust be channelled in the right way, to help her become 
reborn and to understand her dignity, because when a woman is reborn the yvhole nation is re­
born.
In this excerpt, all major discourses favoured by this position are evoked. The frame 
of private sphere as women’s sphere is evoked by categorising women’s social roles 
as ‘motherhood’, ‘m arriage’ and ‘family’, and by placing women’s work ‘in the 
family’. In stressing motherhood and wivehood, and what is later referred to as ‘the 
predispositions of the woman’, both the biological and the religious definitions of 
women’s roles are established. Finally, the frame o f women as reproducers of the 
nation is utilised to provide the contextual framework for refuting the debated bill 
and advocating another one. The suggested bill, which 'would re-evaluate the
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woman’s work in the family, might be the bill on the extension of paid maternity 
leave.
The nationalist discourse presented here through the metaphor of ‘rebirth’ of the 
woman-nation is particularly essential in all of the arguments. This discourse relies 
on the REPERTOIRE OF POLAND AS AN INDEPENDENT VERSUS 
DEPENDENT ENTITY (THE NATION STATE VERSUS SOCIETY) within which 
no comparison to ‘international standards’ makes much sense, as in this repertoire 
the foreign countries become the ‘Other’ that must remain different, that cannot be 
easily compared to the Polishness that is being evoked here. It is vital to note that in 
the Polish discourse on national identity the difference rests on women-related 
issues. It is precisely the traditional model of family, the ban on abortion, and the 
myth of ‘Polish Mother’ that differentiate ‘the (present) Polish state’ from other 
nations. In the process, a construction of femininity is put forward which undermines 
women’s rights or women’s experience of discrimination. The categorisation of 
‘woman as nature’ stems out of these frames and repertoires, and makes it possible to 
argue against the proposed change in legislation.
The next expert carries on this line of argumentation:
(5) MP Zdzislawa Kobylinska:
(...)Wniesiony, glownie przezposlow  opozycji, projekt ustawy o rownym statusie kobiet i mqzczyzn 
wydaje mi siq dosé kuriozalny i to z  wielu powodow. Po pierwsze, tak naprawdq nie wiadomo po co i 
komu ma sluzyc podobna ustawa, ktôra dotyczy faktu tak oczywistego, jakim  je s t rôwny status kobiet i 
mqzczyzn, co potwierdza nie tylko zdrowy rozsqdek, lecz takze art. 33 konstytucji, ktôra to rôwne
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status quo gwarantuje, a takze instytucja rzecznika praw obywatelskich dodatkowo chroniqca przed 
ewentualnymi nieprawidiowosciami. Prôba wiqc doprecyzowania rôwnoscipîcipoprzez ustawq 
sugeruje, iz w Polsce ta zasada je s t îamana czy naruszana, ze mamy do czynienia niejako z  kolizjq 
p lc i odmiennych, co natychmiast nasuwa mi skojarzenia z tzw. ideq walki klas, ktôra wlasnie legla u 
podstaw walki plci, kategorii tak chqtnie wykorzystywanej przez feminizm socjalistyczny, ja k  okresla 
ten rodzajpostawy p r o f  Roman Tokarczyk. (...)
( ...)  The project o f  a bill, p u t forw ard m ainly by opposition MPs, seems to m e quite bizarre and fo r  
m any reasons. Firstly, in reality, no one knows fo r  what and fo r  whom this bill is to serve, which 
concerns such an obvious fact, that is the equal status o f  men and women, which is supported not 
only by common sense but also by article 33 o f  the Constitution, which guarantees this equal status 
quo, and additionally by the institution o f  the hum an rights ombudsman, which additionally 
protects fro m  possible wrongdoings. The attempt at specifying gender equality through a bill 
suggests that in Poland this principle is broken or violated, that we are dealing with a kind o f  
collision o f  opposite sexes, which immediately brings association with the so called class struggle, 
which in fa c t layd at the basis o f  the war o f  the sexes, the category so willingly used by socialist 
fem inism , as this type o f  stance is called by professor Rom an Tokarczyk.
This speech, which in some sections almost repeats the previously analysed one, is 
important in as much as it provides some more categories and frames used from 
within this position. First, it categorises ‘women’s rights’ as ‘obviousness’ and 
‘common sense’, invoking the REPERTOIRE OF COMMON SENSE VERSUS 
IDEOLOGY, and by appropriating common sense’: constructing this position as 
having a monopoly of rationality. Of course, there could be no category other than 
‘common sense’ that would point better to the ideological investment of the
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hegemonic discourse. This choice can be seen as an attempt at naturalising the 
proposed vision and masking its ideological investment in what is referred to as 
‘equal status quo’.
By referring to the bill as an invocation of ‘the war of the sexes’, and constructing 
this ‘war’ as parallel to the class w ar’, the communist discourse is deliberately (and 
ironically) evoked to bring forward the signification of ‘the ideological’, /the 
absurd’, ‘the politically suspect’ (as such categorisations function in the Polish 
political discourse). Through the REPERTOIRE OF COMMON SENSE VERSUS 
IDEOLOGY, with the feminist critique of the society classified as ‘ideology’ in the 
above-mentioned sense, the hegemony of the discursive position is maintained. This 
‘common sense’ position, referring to right-wing discourse as opposed to ‘socialist 
feminist’ position, is interdiscursively supported by using an academic authority of a 
Polish (male) professor.
The final example of the hegemonic discourse is perhaps the best ‘summary’ of the 
hegemonic discourse on women’s rights, showing how all the previously mentioned 
categorisations and discourses are combined to construct a particular vision of 
femininity in the Polish context.
(6) Ewa Sikorska -T re la
(...) Kobieta zawsze w Polsce byla i je s t dobrze traktowana. Oddawano je j  nalezyty szacunek i 
obdarzano licznymi godnosciami i zaszczytami. Miala i ma otwartq drogq do kariery zawodowej, 
naukowej i politycznej. Moze siq realizowac w wielu miejscach i na wielu plaszczyznach swojego
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zycia. Z  dumq mowi siq o nas "matki Polki" dla podkreslenia naszej donioslej roli w zyciu zarowno 
rodzinnym, ja k  i narodowym krajii. Jestesmy w przytlaczajqcej wiqkszosci krajem chrzescijanskim i 
katolickim. To w naszej religii i kulturze chrzescijanskiej kobieta zajmuje szczegolnq rolq. Bog  
stworzyl mqzczyzn^ i kobietq I  dal im odmienne role w zyciu. Nie nalezy zmieniac tych rol i poprawiac 
Stworcy w jego  zamyslack. Kobieta to przede wszystkim matka i glowa rodziny i pomagajqc je j  w 
spelnieniu tych rol wywiqzemy siqjako ustawodawca ze swojej roli. W innych rolach kobieta w Polsce 
daje sobie rad^. Nie mozna domagac siq praw, ktôre sq ju z  w sposôb naturalny zagwarantowane. 
Kazdy bowiem czlowiek rodzi siq wolny i rowny niezaleznie od plci i nie nalezy domagac siq tej 
rôwnosci poprzez paragrajy ustaw. Ona po  prostu jest. Dlatego je s t  dla mnie calkowicie 
niezrozumialy pomysl uchwalania przez polski parlament ustawy, zgloszonej przez gnipq poslôw z 
SLD, zatytulowanej: o rownym statusie kobiet i mqzczyzn. (...)
(...)  A  woman in Poland has always been and is treated well. She has been given the proper respect 
and she was given numerous positions and honours. She has had and she has now an open way to 
professional, scientific, and political carrier. She can realise h erse lf in m any places and on m any  
levels o f  her life. We are proudly referred to as Polish Mother* to stress our momentous role in the 
fa m ily  as well as national life. We are in an overwhelming majority a Christian and a Catholic 
country. I t  is in our religion and Christian culture that a woman occupies a special role. God 
created a man and a woman and gave them different roles in life. These roles should not be 
changed and the Creator should not be corrected in his plans. A  woman is fir s t o f  all a mother and  
the head o f  the fam ily, and by helping her in fu lfilling  these roles we will fu lf i l  our role as the 
legislator. In  other roles a woman in Poland manages well. You cannot demand rights, which are 
already guaranteed in a natural way. Every hum an being is born fre e  and equal, regardless o f  sex, 
arid one should not demand this equality through the articles o f  a legal bill. I t  [equality] simply is. 
That is why, fo r  m e it is a completely incomprehensible idea to vote a bill by Polish parliament, 
proposed by a group o f  M Ps from  SLD, entitled: on the equal status o f  men and women \
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The coherence of this construction relies on two key aspects: the presentation of 
‘women’ as a singular, abstract category: ‘kobieta’ (a woman), meaning either a 
typical example or a generic category ‘the woman’, both made possible and 
intercheangable by the lack of articles in Polish. Another aspect is the ahistorical 
narrative, this time referring to the history of Poland, presented as a stable entity in 
itself, not a progression. This collapse of specificity and change is achieved by using 
the present and past tenses together in a single sentence referring to the position of 
women: ‘byla’ (was) with ‘jest’(is), referring to the present, and together amounting 
to something as ‘has always been and is good’. Similarly noticeable is the repetition 
of phrases ‘in many places’, ‘on many levels of life’ with a very vague descriptive 
meaning. The same can be said about the enumeration of ‘positions and honours’.
These grammatical and lexical choices then provide a means of binding the utilised 
discourses into a coherent fram e o f  the ^Polish womanhood\ This construction 
utilises the frames that go into building dominant constructions of national identity 
(through history) and of femininity combined to form this discourse on women. Y et, 
the lexical and grammatical choices in themselves point to the existence of some 
repertoire that would allow for such meanings to be constructed. It could perhaps be 
called the REPERTOIRE OF POLAND AS AN ABSTRACT VERSUS A 
CONCRETE ENTITY. The abstract meaning is clearly chosen here, if the ‘concrete’ 
option had been used, such glossing over historical change or experiences of 
different circumstances of women would not have been possible. We are dealing
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here with the understanding of the country as a value-laden, abstract idea, and it 
should be noted that such a representation is continuously tied to the construction of 
femininity.
The nationalist meaning of womanhood is particularly pronounced by the use of the 
archetype of ‘Polish M other’ (Matka Polka): We are proudly referred to as ‘Polish 
Mother’ to stress our momentous role in the family as well as national life. The ‘we’ 
introduced here is meant to be an inclusive we, referring to Polish women, and the 
speaker herself as ‘speaking for the group’. It is interesting to note how in the next 
sentence the ‘we’ refers not to Polish women but to Poland as a collective marked by 
common religion: ‘ We are in an overwhelming majority a Christian and a Catholic 
country ’.
This transition shows how much the collective of women in Polish 
catholic/nationalist discourse is used for the purpose of marking the national identity; 
that is, who ‘we’ are. Apart from nationalist identity frame, the fram e o f  religion as 
a source o f  gender difference is explicitly stated: God created a man and a woman 
and gave them different roles in life. These roles should not be changed and the 
Creator should not he corrected in his plans. Having thus clearly established the 
authority of this discursive position through nationalist and religious discourse, the 
speaker then moves to state the meaning of femininity as motherhood: A woman is 
first o f all a mother and the head o f the family, and by helping her in fulfilling these 
roles we will fulfil our role as the legislator.
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The categorisation of a woman as ‘head of the family’, normally used to refer to men 
is rather interesting. In fact, it almost suggests a presence of some kind of 
^matriarchal frame^ which shows women as having real power of deciding on 
family matters, and, therefore, also capable of dealing with other spheres of life: In 
other roles a woman in Poland manages well. This discourse has been 
interdiscursively triggered by the ‘common wisdom’ of classifying women’s double­
burden as a ‘success story’. Within this understanding women are better educated 
then men, have full-time employment, and, at the same time, have retained their 
traditionally decisive role of the manager of the family. Again, this is an 
ideologically motivated construction which was used in socialist times to gloss over 
the exhaustion of women, inequality in the labour market and sexual violence by 
constructing the notion of a ‘superwoman’, a modernised ‘Matka Polka’ of some 
kind. It is quite interesting to see this discourse co-opted from the more socialist 
construction of femininity. This and the previous frames are used for the purpose of 
supporting the argument that equality ‘simply is’ and one should not demand this 
equality through the articles o f a legal bill.
This argumentation follows from, and perpetuates, the construction of womanhood 
structured by the above frames, and bound together by formal features such as 
singularity, using the past and present tenses in one sentence, repetitions, noun 
phrases with vague descriptive meaning, personal pronouns and modality. Also, the 
repertoires making essential meanings of womanhood and nation are persistently
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implied. All this helps to present reality as ahistorical, stable, commonsensical and 
morally right. What is most important though, is that the opposite position is in this 
way presented as not only ‘incomprehensible’ but as socially dangerous: it becomes 
an assault on the stable reality that has just been discursively constructed as the only 
way of seeing the social world. Again, any possibility of change is denied in this 
vision of the social world.
The arguments against the legislative proposal pointed out in this section provide a 
means of not only refuting the proposal of legislative change but of negating the 
possibility of any change of the social relations between women and men. For this 
purpose, a strategic use of repertoires, frames and categories maintains a seemingly 
stable and exclusionary construct of ‘the Polish woman’. These components can be 
summed up in the form of a table :
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Examples Repertoires Categories Frames Argument
4 a & b Poland as an 
INDEPENDENT 
(VERSUS 
DEPENDENT) 
ENTITY (National 
frame o f reference)
natural rights/laws 
lack o f respect 
human dignity 
woman as nature 
motherhood, 
wife, family 
Polish woman 
rebirth o f the nation
‘ international 
obligations ’
‘the essence o f  laws ’ 
‘national identity’ 
‘private sphere as 
w om en’s sphere ’
w om en’s right are 
n a tu ra l rights and 
canno t be legislated
5 COMMON 
SENSE/RATIONAL 
ITY VERSUS 
IDEOLOGY
equality as obvious . 
fact, common sense 
ideology 
war o f the sexes 
class war
‘ rational knowledge ’ 
‘national law ’ 
‘feminism as a 
communist ideology ’
w om en’s rights are  
obvious and 
com m on sense and 
need not be 
legislated
6 Poland as an 
ABSTRACT 
(VERSUS A 
CONCRETE) 
ENTITY
the woman/a woman 
Polish Mother 
woman as family 
woman as nation 
head o f the family, 
motherhood 
Poland as Catholic 
country
women’s roles as 
different
‘woman as nation 
(religious)’ 
‘religious fram e o f  
gender difference’ . 
‘matriarchal 
discourse ’
Polish women have 
always been equal 
and therefore no 
laws need to change
Table 2 The equal status debate, position 2
We can see from the above that the analysis points to how women are discursively 
constructed primarily as mothers, as ‘equal but different’, and defined by 
unchangeable nature. Even more precisely, because women’s lives and women’s 
understanding of their position is constantly changing, the purpose is to create an 
illusion of stability where there is change and of singularity where there is 
difference, and to then maintain this vision as the only ‘true’ and even ‘common 
sense’ representation of ‘reality’. It is here that we see the struggle over meaning as
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the struggle between the positions that aim at the control and closure of meaning of 
femininity and the position that allows for some negotiation, change or 
transformation of this meaning to accommodate difference (both, between men and 
women in terms of rights, and among women themselves).
4.3.3 The maternity leave debate: ‘protected motherhood’ versus 
‘protective discrimination’
The maternity leave debate provides a further example of a discursive field for the 
construction of a coherent notion of womanhood by the conservative political 
discourse. It forms an extension and an instantiation of the categorisations, which I 
have addressed in the previous section. Here, the notion of motherhood as the key 
category through which Polish women are to be seen is inserted into the discussion 
of particular regulations to be adopted in relation to parenting. I have chosen this 
particular debate as a second chunk of material to be analysed in this chapter because 
it relates to the key aspect in the negotiation of femininity: motherhood. In the light 
of the earlier idéologisation of motherhood through the abortion debates, this is a 
logical ‘policy’ outcome: re-valuing motherhood through extending paid maternity 
leave. Yet, this debate also ties in with the previously analysed categorisations of 
women in relation to rights, equality and difference. It concerns already functioning 
notions of women’s right to employment as opposed to the ideology of motherhood 
as woman’s main duty.
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The core of the debate is the extension of maternity leave and its conditions, but the 
debate turns into a debate on a particular aspect of the possible changes: whether or 
not a woman may be allowed to stop it half way through (after 16 Weeks) and go 
back to work, while the father would then be allowed to take the rest of the leave. 
The main voice here was the male MP assigned the role of reporting on how this 
issue was settled in the appropriate parliamentary commission:
(7)Reporting MP Antoni Szymanski:
Na pytanie pani posel mogq odpowiedziec jedynie zgodnia z  Kodeksem pracy. Wedlug niego to nie 
je s t  tak, ze mozna z  pewnej ochrony korzystac lub nie korzystac, rowniez w odniesieniu do uriopu 
macierzynskiego.(...)
Chcialbym powiedziec, ze w pracach Komisji Nadzwyczajnej bardzo mocno argumentowano, ze 
wôwczas moze dojsc do rozmaitego typu naciskôw pracodawcôw, ktôrzy bqdq oczekiwali, ze 
pracownica zadeklanije, czy wczesniej skonczy urlop macierzynski, co bqdzie uderzaio wlasnie w je j  
prawo do tego uriopu. Dziqkujq bardzo. (Oklaski)
I  can only answer the question o f  the lady M P only in accordance with the labour code. According 
to it, is not like that: you  cannot [choose to] use or not use a certain protection, also in relation to 
maternity leave. (...)
I  would like to say that in the proceedings o f  the extraordinary commission it was being argued 
strongly that [ i f  women could come back to work after h a lf  o f  the maternity leave] then various 
types o f  pressures by the employers could take place, who would expect that the woman employee 
declare whether she will fin ish  her leave earlier, which will impact exactly her right to this leave. 
(Applause)
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In this fragment, the reporting MP uses two ‘labels’ to categorise what maternity 
leave is: ‘protection’ and ‘right’. Importantly, the two are used almost 
simultaneously but for completely different reasons. First, ‘protection’ allows for the 
use of the fram e o f special treatment o f  women in relation to maternity, already 
legalised in the labour code. Protection here means that you cannot [choose to] use 
or not use a certain protection, thus it is understood as an obligatory legal state. The 
use of conjunction ‘also’ in ‘also in relation to maternity leave’, establishes the 
category of maternity leave as just one among many examples of such a principle of 
protection. But because no such examples are given, the intended argumentation is 
only being masked by the ‘and’, since maternity leave is not a usual labour code 
provision. On the contrary, it is a special case, since labour law is primarily 
concerned with the protection of (male) workers, not with the rights of mothers. On 
the other hand, the use of ‘protection’ introduces the key frame of women as 
deserving special treatment and ‘protection’ from the (masculine) state.
This patriarchal frame includes all the notions of ‘taking care’ of women as young 
mothers, also because motherhood is classified here similarly to an illness, implying 
the weakness of the woman and lack of autonomy as well constructing the woman’s 
inability to work. This categorisation immediately evokes the fram e o f chivalry 
towards women ascribed to Polish men (as an element of men’s politeness). In turn, 
the existence of such a frame and its interdiscursive availability contributes towards
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the creation of the argument at hand and towards the construction of femininity that 
the argument stems from and supports.
What is interesting is that this categorisation is also possible because of the presence 
of a repertoire of WELFARE VERSUS LIBERAL STATE, the first of which is 
bound with the categorisation of work as something that may be ‘demanded’ of 
women, despite the protective law. In this way, the ‘right’ becomes the right to the 
maternity leave and not the right to work, as the liberal state repertoire would imply. 
In the second section of the utterance this is made clear as the constructed danger: 
'various types ofpressure could take place’. The threat for a woman is not losing a 
job as a result of a long absence form, work but losing her ‘right’ to this extensive 
maternity leave.
Here, we have a good example of how the category of ‘right’, which, in relation to 
male employees would bring forth the categorisation of ‘right to work and decent 
pay’ as guaranteeing the individual’s freedom and responsibility in relation to 
employment, is being reclassified. Although ostensibly still within the discourse of 
the law, such a categorisation is used to argue for women’s primary right not to 
work, which might be jeopardised by the employers ‘pressuring’ her to come back to 
work half way through maternity leave. Of course, together with such a classification 
of rights comes the implied notion of women’s responsibility, which now coherently 
refers to child rearing and not to providing for the family through employment. The 
REPERTOIRE OF WELFARE STATE VERSUS LIBERAL STATE is still utilised
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here, juxtaposing the right to social protection of workers with the idea of 
responsibility and freedom of choice of the individual. It is notable that in this 
position, which would normally favour the liberal principles over social welfare, the 
situation of women is readily classified precisely as demanding protection from the 
pressures of employers and not as a freedom to chose whether to work or not.
Thus, we can say that this construction of the ‘woman as mother’ is being carried out 
through strategic choices on the level of categorisation (what ‘protection’ and ‘right’ 
mean), frames invoked by these categories, such as ‘the frames of special treatment 
and chivalry to women’, and on the level of repertoires, where the WELFARE 
STATE construction is used and not the LIBERAL STATE one.
In the following excerpt, the dominant construction of motherhood and femininity 
was more explicitly stated by the only female MP who problematised the option of 
‘flexible’ maternity leave in this debate:
(8) M P U rszula Wachowska.-
Ja rowniez chcialabym zapytac...po wypowiedziach pah poslanek z SLD, czy urlop macierzynski jest 
w tym celu ustanowiony, zeby tylko chronic kobietq, czy tez jest takze ustanowiony z mysl^ o 
dziecku? Jest to symbioza i trzeba koniecznie w swietle tego egoistycznego patrzenia pah feministek 
zastanowic siq nad tym, jakie korzysci z uriopu, ktory nazywa siq macierzyhski, ma dziecko, dziecko, 
ktore ma matkq, i ktora powinna siq nim w tym najmlodszym okresie najtroskliwiej osobiscie
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opiekowac. Babcia nie z a s t^ i  matki. Dlatego trzeba koniecznie nauczyc polskie kobiety 
macierzyhstwa i tego, zeby wiedzialy, jakie obowiqzki (Oklaski) plynq_z macierzyhstwa i zeby siq z 
tych obowiqzkow umialy wywiqzywac. (Oklaski, okrzyki, poruszenie na sali)
I  also would like to ask ... after the utterances o f  fem a le  M Ps from  SLD  [the Alliance o f  
Democratic Left], i f  the maternity leave is set up fo r  the purpose o f  protecting the woman, or is it 
also set up with a thought towards the child? I t is a symbiosis and it m ust necessarily be considered, 
in the light o f  this egoistic view o f  the ladies fem inists, what benefits from  the leave, which is called 
^maternity*, has the child, a child who has got a mother who should at this earliest age, in a most 
caring way, personally look after i t  A  grandmother will not substitute a mother. That is why, Polish 
women m ust be taught motherhood, and that they know what obligations (applause) stem from  
motherhood, so that they fu l f i l  these obligations, (applause, shouts, commotion in the room).
This female voice is exemplary in its evocation of several key aspects of this position 
triggered by the discussion on maternity leave. First of all, the category of 
‘protection’ is referred to again, but for the purpose of relating it to the child: if  the 
maternity leave is set up fo r  the purpose o f protecting the woman, or is it also set up 
with a thought towards the child? Yixsi, the category of ‘symbiosis’ is introduced, 
immediately triggering the repertoire of MOTHERHOOD AS BIOLOGICAL 
EXPERIENCE, rather than MOTHERHOOD AS SOCIAL TASK. We cannot fail to 
notice the contradictory meaning of the category ‘symbiosis’. It suggests a biological 
co-existence of two organisms where each benefits from, and cannot survive without 
the other. But in this discourse on motherhood, there is to be a selfless, uninterested 
sacrifice of the mother for the child.
136
The accusation of egoistic view o f ladies feminists means that feminists, by default, 
have the wrong, ‘egoistic’ perspective on motherhood.^^^ But what does this 
‘egoism’ consist of? The redirected notion of the protection of the child is clearly 
defined as demanding the total, selfless attention of the mother: a mother who should 
at this earliest age, in a most caring way, personally look after it. Of course, the 
frame that makes this categorisation possible, and which is being established as the 
only right one, is that on ^motherhood as woman’s vocation \  which in turn relies on 
religious and biologically deterministic categorisations of gender based on 
essentialist notions of femininity. We may even talk about an available 
REPERTOIRE OF SEX VERSUS GENDER here, where the only choice is that of 
sex. This choice states that biologically, and/or by God’s design, (hence ‘vocation’) 
women are predisposed to motherhood, and it is their duty (later renamed as 
obligation) that must be fulfilled. Here, we have a coherent answer to the accusation 
of egoism: if a woman is only partially and only for a shorter time devoted to the role 
of the primary caretaker, she is not a ‘proper’ mother and, consequently, she can be 
classified as ‘egoistic’ and ‘feminist’.
Importantly, another repertoire is made use of here, namely that of 
CHILDREARING AS A COLLECTIVE VERSUS SOLITARY TASK. This 
repertoire allows for a choice between two notions of family where motherhood is 
carried out: the extended family and the nuclear family. By stating that a 
grandmother will not substitute a mother the speaker clearly proposes a choice of
I have noticed in other sources, especially in women’s magazines, that the accusation o f ‘egoism’
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nuclear family where only the biological mother and no other women must fulfil ‘the 
vocation’ (and most certainly not men). The moral tone is strengthened by the use of 
modality: ‘should’ is used in relation to the mother. This tone suggests that what we 
are dealing with is a construction of an ideal type of motherhood and family: the 
nuclear family.
Of course, this masks both the experience of motherhood that women in Poland have 
commonly shared with other women, and, in all probability, this experience was also 
part of the speaker’s own life, as a daughter or mother. The nuclear family with a 
non-working mother was obviously not the common model under communism, 
precisely because women worked, they needed the help of (female) relatives or day­
care centres in parenting. Here, the proposed extension of the leave is clearly a 
discursive move to reverse the situation, and either come back to earlier patriarchal 
notions of women as non-working mothers (though this would still imply the frame 
of motherhood as a collective women’s task) or rather new, ‘pseudo-traditional’ 
motherhood is being argued for. The construction is characteristically framed in 
nationalist discourse, as if to mask its economic and social significance as secondary 
to the national.
The employment of ‘Polish women’ is an extremely widespread and also a key 
phrase. Throughout the debates I have noted that the usual way in which the 
dominant discourse will categorise women in the plural is as ‘Polish women’.
is often directed at any woman who refuses to have children or even to get married.
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However, this does not only refer to the collective of women put in the repertoire of 
NATION VERSUS SOCIETY, but it also evokes the archetype category of Polish 
Mother (Matka Polka) that lies at the core of the frame of womanhood conceived as 
both motherhood and nationhood in Poland. Evoking the construction of woman as 
the signifier of the nation and the archetype category of Polish Mother nullifies the 
understanding of women as citizens, with equal roles and equal rights.
Also, actual women are placed against and negatively evaluated in not being Polish 
Mother-like: that is why Polish women must be taught motherhood. The national 
identity fram e  is used here to present a negative assessment of the reality in relation 
to the mythical, in order to argue coherently that the option of coming back to work 
after a half-period of maternity leave is not ‘fulfilling the obligations’ of 
motherhood. This problematises women as well as patronises them (or ‘matronises’ 
them); they are now constructed as not good mothers and therefore not good ‘Polish 
women’. At the same time, what is being argued for is a new society where women 
are ‘re-traditionalised’ to fit neatly the newer construction of the family and work 
relations.
We may restate the major components of this discursive position as:
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Example
7
Repertoires_________
WELFARE 
(VERSUS 
LIBERAL) state
Categories____________
maternity, right (to 
maternity leave) 
protection________
Frames_________________
special treatment o f  
women ’
chivalry to women ’
Argument__________ _____
long m aternity  leave 
is a protection for 
women as m others
Motherhood as a
BIOLOGICAL
(VERSUS SOCIAL)
experience
Motherhood as a
INDIVIDUAL
(VERSUS
COLLECTIVE)
TASK
NATION (VERSUS 
LIBERAL) state 
SEX (VERSUS 
GENDER)
protection, child
symbiosis,
obligation
Polish women (Polish 
Mother)
motherhood as a 
vocation and fa te  o f  
women ’
fram e o f  national 
identity ’
‘woman as nation ’
long m aternity  leave 
serves the child’s 
interest
women m ust be 
taught m otherhood
Table 3 The m aternity  leave debate, position 1
This discourse represents an instantiation of the logic of ‘equal but different’, which 
I have analysed in the previous section also in relation to women’s rights. The 
understanding of difference in relation to maternity is supplied here with the 
meaning of ‘unique women’s vocation’ which is to serve the child and the nation. 
Therefore, even the concept of women’s right to employment (and equal pay) can be 
undermined in fighting for an obligatory maternity leave that cannot be shared with 
the father or other members of the family. Biologically understood, motherhood is 
constructed as a woman’s obligation, and, paradoxically, as a privilege (by virtue of 
getting compensation for being out of work). Again, this position is engaged in 
constructing the abstract, ideal womanhood, in order to shape the social relations 
accordingly. But more importantly perhaps, once put into the frame of biological and
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national duty motherhood is constantly reworked as the marker of nationhood and of 
national identity that cannot be discursively (and therefore socially) negotiated.
The response of the counter-discourse relied on resistance to and problematisation of 
the ‘ideal type’ rhetoric. While arguing for the more flexible maternity leave (second 
part of which could be taken by the father), and while problematising the extended 
length of the leave, this discourse constructs a different notion of motherhood, and, 
consequently, femininity.
These are two examples of the problematisation of the bill by exploring its effects for 
women:
(9) MP Maria Gajecka-Bozek:
(...}Czy zdajecie sobiepanstwo sprawq z  tego, ze wiele kobiet nie decyduje siq na urodzenie drugiego 
dziecka, dlatego ze boi siq, iz tak dlugi urlop macierzynski nie pozwoli im powrocic do pracy? 
(Poruszenie na sali) Znam wiele takich przypadkow, ze kobiety, bojqc siq o utratq miejsca pracy, nie 
decydujq siq na drugie i kolejne dziecko.
(...) Do you realise that many women decide not to have a second child, because they are afraid 
that such a long maternity leave will not let them go back to work? (Commotion in the room) I  
know many such cases that women, being afraid o f losing their job, decide not to have a second 
and next child.
(10) MP Joanna Sosnowska:
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Partie Marszalku! Wysoka Izbo! Mam takie pytanie. 26 tygodni to je s t p ô l rokii. Chcialabym, zeby mi 
pan sprawozdawca podal, za jakq  kwotq miesiqcznie kobieta bqdzie uwiqzana w domii z dzieckiem, 
bez prawa do pracy, konkretnie w liczbach, po prostu, z czego ta rodzina bqdzie zyla przez te pôl 
roku?
(Glos z sali: Milosc nie ma ceny.)
I  have this question. Twenty six weeks [the length o f  the maternity leave] tha t’s h a lf  a year. V d  like 
M r reporting M P to tell me fo r  what sum [o f money] per month will the woman be tied to the home 
with the child, without the right to employment, in concrete numbers, simply, on what will this 
fam ily  live fo r  a year?
(A voice fro m  the benches: Love has no price)
In terms of the progress of argumentation within this debate. Excerpt 9 is an answer 
to the position of the reporting MP, who problematised the option of returning to 
work earlier. However, we have to notice that the proposed construction of women 
constitutes an answer to the ‘ideal type’ vision of motherhood. The speaker decided 
not to talk about women as Polish mothers, instead she uses ‘many women’ in 
plural, a categorisation which allows for the differentiation between social groups 
and personal preferences of particular women. But what is implied as a primary 
reason for choosing not to have children is economic motivation: the need to keep 
one’s job as a source of income. This understanding is supported by an appeal to 
experience: I  know many such cases, which also presupposes a non-unitary vision of 
women. While not denying that some women may be happy with the extended leave, 
she stresses that ‘many women’ are already finding maternity leave problematic 
because they either have to or want to keep their job: because they are afraid, that
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such a long maternity leave will not let them go back to work. This presents 
maternity leave as a ‘th reat’ to women’s labour rights, as women are afraid o f losing 
their jobs. This discourse does not deny that women are mothers (here it is presented 
as concerning women who aheady have a child), but it chooses to represent women 
primarily in the frame of women as workers, even if this is due to economic 
conditions.
In the second excerpt (10), the speaker uses an even more direct appeal to economic 
necessity by asking what will the maternity leave amount to in sum; which implies 
that the amount of money will not be sufficient, an implication made clear by the 
phrase on what will this family live. Although the speaker is talking about ‘the 
woman’ in the singular, she is not talking about the ideal type at all. Instead, she is 
talking about the ‘average’, as if trying to show an example; ‘this family’ serves the 
same function. Similarly, the length of the maternity leave is negatively evaluated: 
twenty six weeks that’s half a year, which, in the context of the following question 
about money, implies that it is too long.
What is most noteworthy, however, is the categorisation of maternity leave itself as 
‘confinement’, evoked by the phrase the woman will be tied to the home with the 
child. The metaphor of being physically bound applied to a woman on maternity 
leave provides an obvious answer to the construction of maternity in the dominant 
discourse, as a state of happy ‘symbiosis’, meaning selfless attention to the child. 
Here, the centre of attention is the woman, not the child, and the experience of
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staying at home is seen as discriminatory, especially in the context of economic lack. 
This utilises the frame o f  women^s poverty, but also implies an alternative 
discourse on maternity (as a frustrating or difficult experience for women).
It is this assessment of motherhood that is immediately counteracted by another 
MP’s intrusive remark. This short aside, in interactive terms, would be characterised 
as an attempt at trivialising the argument of economic need. However, it also serves 
the purpose of forcefully bringing the categorisation into ‘the right’ perspective: by 
alluding to love, the speaker reasserts the value of motherhood as an instinctive, 
emotional experience, and also as a primary duty. Because romantic love is a light 
and often humorous as well as a pleasant ‘topic’, the discussion of economic 
hardship is undermined, and women are constructed as emotional beings for whom 
the love of the father and child is the only need in life.
Both of the excerpts quoted here have tried to move the discursive construction of 
womanhood away from either of the dominant repertoires, frames and 
categorisations. Instead, they have used appeals to the ‘experience’ of women as 
rational beings, taking decisions about maternity based on economic and labour 
situation. This counter-discourse, which we could call discourse on mothers as 
workers, needs to evoke different choice within the available repertoires, not of 
MOTHERHOOD AS A BIOLOGICAL OR RELIGIOUS DUTY, but of 
MOTHERHOOD AS SOCIAL TASK. Only this interpretive choice allows for 
making the argument that the experience of various women is different: it implies
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different social groups or classes of women facing different problems. Motherhood, 
conceived as a social task, is not given or stable, but depends on the social 
conditions, while the decision to have children can then be envisaged as not 
informed by either moral, religious or national duty, but as individual and also 
collective decisions based on the perception of economic needs and conditions. It is 
important to note that these needs and conditions are ascribed not to the woman but 
still to the family, the decision to keep their job is not women’s egoistic whim, but an 
economic necessity for the whole family.
The final example of the counter-discourse constitutes an answer to the accusation of 
egotism and ‘feminism’, levelled at the women taking this position by the speaker in 
example 8.
(11) MP Renata Szynalska,
Chcialam tylko powiedziec, ze feminizm to je s t walka o rowne prawa kobiet i mqzczyzn, pan i posel, to 
po pierwsze, i w zwiqzku z  tym mam pytanie do pana posla: czy tylko kobiety muszq zajmowac siq 
dziecmi i czy ten zapis n iepowoduje tego, ze jezeli mqzczyzna i kobieta, rodzice, bqdq chcielipodjqc 
wspôlnq decyzjq, kto bqdzie zajmowal siq dzieckiem - nalezy tu rozumiec okrespo 16. czy 14. tygodniu 
od momentu urodzenia - bqdzie to ja k  gdyby wiqksza odpowiedzialnosc dla obydwojga rodzicow?
Ijust wanted to say that feminism is a fight for equal rights o f men and women, Ms MP, that firstly, 
and in connection with this, I  have a question to Mr reporting MP: is it that only women must take
This argument may also state that is there is no economic need the woman should stay at home and 
bear the confinement rather then go back to work. This is not perceived in this way often in Poland, 
because such a situation is quite rare, and because women have successfully been previously .
145
care o f  children, and does that passage [referring to the second part o f  the leave as optional fo r  
either parent] not cause that i f  a man and a woman, the parents, want to m ake a jo in t decision 
about who will take care o f  the child  - the period after the sixteenth or fourteenth  week from  birth 
should be understood here - that this somehow will be a bigger responsibility fo r  them both?
The definition of feminism offered here is among the most positive and assertive 
statements on the topic I have seen in all the parliamentary debates analysed. The 
definition also introduces the fram e o f  women and men as equal in order to counter 
the dominant construction of. motherhood as the motivation/effect of woman’s 
difference. Thus, equality is being argued for as the right way to approach also the 
maternity leave issue. That is why the linking phrase ‘in connection with this’ can be 
used to introduce the question: is it that only women must take care o f children, 
which is in fact a formulation of the argument. This is achieved by listing both the 
man and the woman and by the choice of the category ‘parents’. Such a discursive 
position allows for bringing men into the picture, and thus for talking about 
‘parenting’.
Moreover, within REPERTOIRE OF MOTHERHOOD AS A COLLECTIVE 
VERSUL INDIVIDUAL TASK, the choice of the former is implied also by the 
categorisation of ‘joint decision’. It is important to note that all spealcers can 
potentially make use of either repertoire, and therefore evoke certain meanings about 
childbearing that will be coherent in a particular context. Here, the choice of one
constructed as workers. But it does make sense in the new, capitalist perception of ‘traditional’ 
women’s role proposed in this debate.
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brings forth the argument that flexible maternity leave should be adopted in the law. 
It is within the repertoire of PARENTHOOD AS A COLLECTIVE TASK that 
notions of shared responsibility in the context of child-caring can be constructed, 
this time not in relation to extended family but to the couple. Parenting understood in 
this way is argued for as a bigger responsibility fo r  them both. Note that here we 
have both the construction of nuclear family as the ‘right’ context for child-rearing 
and we have an ‘educating’ purpose: what ‘will be’ [a bigger responsibility] can be 
understood as meaning ‘should be’. This means that what the speaker is performing 
is also a construction of femininity in relation to motherhood as well as a 
construction of the family. However, it is being argued here that the nuclear family 
should be of the ‘partnership’, kind, where women are not categorised as solely 
mothers and men as solely breadwinners; on the contrary, men should be able to take 
over part of the parenting, including the maternity leave.
All in all, this position constructs a visibly different notion of motherhood and 
femininity than the dominant one, while maintaining some of the dominant 
categorisations, notably that of the nuclear family. The main points analysed in this 
counter-position can be seen in the table:
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Example
9&10
Repertoires
Motherhood as a 
SOCIAL (VERSTUS 
BIOLOGICAL) task
Categories 
many women, 
motherhood as 
decision,
right/need to work 
motherhood as 
confinement
Frames
‘women as workers '
‘fem ale poverty'
Argument
a long maternity 
leave
is a th rea t to 
w om en’s/family’s 
economic needs
11 Motherhood as a 
SOCIAL (VERSTUS 
BIOLOGICAL) task 
Motherhood as a 
COLLECTIVE 
(VERSUS 
INDIVIDUAL) task
feminism 
equal rights 
parents, 
joint decision 
responsibility
‘'men and women as 
equal’
‘marriage as 
partnership ’
m aternity  leave 
should be shared by 
the two parents
Table 4 The m aternity  leave debate, position 2.
The analysis of the texts coming from this debate provides a particularly good 
example of the precarious and unstable dominance of the hegemonic discourse. 
While arguments for extended family leave are raised for the purpose of discursively 
securing the ‘obligatory motherhood’ and ‘traditional family values’ even better, the 
debate is used to demand a change in the attitudes to parenting, possibly with men 
taking over part of the role, including maternity leave itself. Nevertheless, the debate 
presents the interpretive implications of the choice between the discursive positions 
analysed in the previous debate. Here, the logic of women’s difference and women’s 
essential nature is shown in a debate on the key aspect within this understanding: the
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obligatory and essential task of motherhood as the duty of the woman which is to 
override her other subject positions, also that of a worker. On the other hand, the 
counter discourse manifests here the implications of arguing from within the logic of 
equality: the need to redefine maternity to include men as caretakers (or at least to 
leave open such a position), and the need to balance the length of maternity leave 
with women’s other economic and professional needs and their other social roles.
4.4 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to provide an answer to Research Question 1 : How can 
the effects of power struggle be captured in the construction of discourses on 
women in the political debates? (What are the ideological investments of the 
competing discourses on women in the Polish political sphere?). The sub-questions 
to be explored were:
R.Q.1.1 How is the construction of dominant ideology and exclusion of other 
theories of the social, subject positions, social relations of women and men achieved 
in the Polish political discourse?
R.Q.1.2 How does the counter-discourse negotiate the meanings of femininity in this 
context? That is, what are the alternative constructions of femininity that are put 
forward as less- exclusionary discourses on women?
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In order to provide an answer to this general question I have decided to concentrate 
on the understanding of discourse as textually constructed representation, which 
meant analysing the ‘content’ of particular texts. This also meant that the contextual 
and interactive aspects of the debates were not analysed in this chapter. But any 
textual analysis is potentially infinite, which is why I have decided to point out and 
compare specific elements of the proposed texts: categories, repertoires and frames 
used in building arguments. These elements, I believe, constitute very useful tools 
for the study of ideologically constructed discursive constructs of femininity.
My analysis suggests that in the parliamentary debates there are distinct positions 
which argue for a completely different vision of femininity. In one of them the 
preferred categorisation is that of ‘woman as mother’ and of ‘woman as different 
from man’. This goes hand in hand with the categorisation of ‘woman as nature’, but 
it also serves as signifier of the nation and as a biologically or religiously determined 
essence. The categories constructed and frames utilised are bound together by a 
strategic choice of repertoires. This position can be labelled ‘ a hegemonic discourse 
on women’, because it overgeneralises women as a homogenous group, not leaving 
any space for a discussion of particular women’s position or experiences: women 
have no choice in self-definition or aspiration other than as mothers, not even as 
mothers with different needs and choices.
In obvious ways this discourse also ignores actual women by constructing abstract 
‘ideal femininity’; women’s experiences of discrimination, economic hardship, the
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need to combine various social roles are secondary to the dominant unitary 
perception of women. Similarly, the reality of discrimination is masked by the 
assertion that equality ‘simply is’. This brings us to the most exclusionary aspect of 
this position: while collapsing specificity, historical change or the notion of 
experienced discrimination, (or, for the purpose of this debate the notion of 
experience as such) this discourse at the same time appropriates rationality, common 
sense and knowledge. It presents the only ‘right’ vision of the social, thus negating 
the very possibility of critique of and debate over the social relations of women. It is 
interesting to see to what extent this discourse on femininity (and through it, the 
political discourse as a whole) is slowly being colonised by the religious discourse 
and how the ensuing political discourse uses gender debates to maintain its “claim 
legitimacy. It is not only the representation of women that is being reworked and 
established but also the dominant understanding of politics and the national identity, 
social relations and the relationship between citizens and the state.
The contents of the second position (R.Q.1.2) are visibly different. The proposed 
categorisations are of women as usually both mothers and workers, which does not 
presuppose that some may be seeing themselves as only one or the other. Also, 
women are primarily constructed as citizens. In such a categorisation, the notion of 
equality is stressed, rather than that of difference. It must be noted that equality is not 
constructed as sameness either between women or between genders, but equality is 
aspired to, regardless of differences. Because seeing women as a social group, rather 
than the woman-archetype or ‘ideal-type’, the experience of violence and
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discrimination can be made visible in arguments. The same goes for the specific 
discussion of motherhood, envisaged as a collective task rather then solitary task, a 
decision rather than vocation.
This position is definitely less-exclusionary because it does open up possibilities for 
the differentiation between women, their experiences, and differing needs. It is not a 
revolutionary position; it shares a lot of meanings with the hegemonic position (for 
example the appreciation of nuclear family, and in this particular set of debates at 
least, of heterosexuality). However, it does not exclude other meanings or the 
possibility of a further negotiation of femininity. It does seem to come closer to a , 
feminist women’s discourse; indeed, to a degree it utilises the feminist critique of 
society. As it strives to be emancipating, this position comes closer to a non- 
exclusionary discourse on women (and of women). This discourse is, for the 
moment, the resisting one, trying to bring back and put forward onto the public 
agenda the notion of equality, which has been overshadowed by a newly re- 
traditionalised vision of femininity offered by the hegemonic discourse.
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CHAPTER 5
An analysis of discourse as a process: domination and resistance 
mechanisms in a Polish parliamentary debate on women
( ...)  it is by looking at a discourse in operation, in a specific historical context, that it is 
possible to see whose interests it serves at a particular moment/^^
5.1 The analytical perspective
In Chapter 4 I analysed the discourses on women as constructs, where the struggle 
over meaning was seen in the textual ‘content’ of the opposing discourses. The 
interactions within which these meanings were fought over were not analysed. 
Rather, I looked at a number of texts taken out of their immediate context and even 
co-text to pinpoint larger constructions of femininity through discourse. This was 
necessary in order to provide meaningful insights into the effects of power to define 
women from particular ideological positions. In this way, we have gained some 
access to the different constructions of femininity in the Polish political discourse.
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However, as I have pointed out earlier in my discussion of the dialectical 
understanding of discourse within CD A, the ‘representations’ of women are always 
achieved through a series of ‘presentations’, where the meanings are by no means 
stable: they need to be put forward over and over again to constitute ‘a discourse on 
women’. In other words, the construct is always a construction in progress. This 
aspect could also be shown on the textual level to some extent where in the previous 
chapter I analysed the ideational content of a particular position at the intersection of 
categorisation and frames and repertoires.
In this chapter, I would like to illuminate the dynamic, situational, performative side 
of discourses on women. That is, I am now interested in tracing not only what is 
being constructed but, particularly, how it is being discursively secured in a given 
interactive event. In this chapter I will analyse the discourses on women using the 
imderstanding of discourse as a process. In this way, I will show how power is 
exercised ‘in action’, within an institutional, situational, and discursive context of a 
parliamentary debate related to women’s issues. The aim of the analysis is to provide 
an answer to Research Question 2: How can the power struggle between the two 
discourses on women be captured in the process of a political debate?
I would like to trace how the struggle over meaning is performed in one instance of a 
parliamentary debate. The main analytical tools I will use in the analysis are the
237 Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory ( Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 108.
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strategies of domination and resistance as theorised by feminist linguistics. The 
domination aspect may be seen as corresponding to ‘silencing’ seen as part of the 
more abstract understanding of discourse, as verbal interaction. In addition, we 
could see the silencing/voicing or domination/resistance as a struggle over ‘terms of 
access’, not only related to women as such, but also to particular subject positions/ 
discourses on women.
5. 2 Contextual and interdiscursive background o f  the debate
The debate I have chosen to analyse is somewhat similar in its subject matter to the 
debate on equal status, which was part of my material in the previous chapter. In this 
respect, it also represents another focal point in the struggle over discourses on 
women. The discourses represented are essentially similar constructs to the ones I 
analysed in Chapter 4: ‘women’s rights as international obligations’ versus 
‘women’s rights within the religious, nationalist discourse and the abortion 
discourse’. The content of the two positions and the constructs of femininity they put 
forward being already familiar, I should be able to concentrate on how the two 
positions ‘interact’ in this particular discursive moment.
There were two further reasons why this particular debate was chosen. Firstly, it is 
shorter than most of the parliamentary debates I have looked at, and therefore more 
manageable to analyse as a whole. The reason for the relative shortness of the debate
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itself is that it is not a part of the legislative process: it does not constitute one of the 
readings of a bill. Instead, it comes from a framework of ‘MPs’ questions time’, 
which is a time at the end of a day’s proceedings in the parliament reserved for the 
purpose of discussing particular political events, posing questions to government 
officials by particular MPs, or simply offering a statement on an issue of an MP’s 
concern. Though shorter in terms of the allotted time for contributions and debate, 
the discussions to arise in this context are just as much part of a parliamentary 
discourse as the explicitly legislative points of the agenda. However, this particular 
sub-genre of parliamentary discussion is also interesting in as much as it is slightly 
more spontaneous, allowing the MPs to raise and debate very ‘topical’ issues. In this 
respect, the contributions are shorter as well as more spontaneous; coming closer to 
informal interaction, while still following all the rules of parliamentary conduct 
(such as being controlled by the Speaker who gives floor to speakers and who allots 
the floor time they are allowed to use).
5.2.1. Description of the selected data
The debate I have chosen is initiated by a female MP from the Parliamentary 
Women’s Group, on the topic of the performance of the official Polish delegation at 
the United Nations Conference on Women in New York in June 2000. The 
discussion takes place on 29 of June 2000. The problem concerned both the head of 
the delegation seen as ‘unsuitable’ for the role and the content of his position on 
women’s issues. The question asked by the MP criticises the head of the delegation
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and his alleged position at the conference itself, as well as at a press conference 
following his return.
This is an interesting situation to consider, as it seems to represent one of the most 
successful instances of an intrusion of feminist discourse into the parliamentary 
sphere. In fact, the successful launch of the debate would suggest a transformative 
process at work in the political discourses on women, possibly stemming from the 
renegotiation of femininity that is ongoing in other spheres of social communication. 
Therefore, it is particularly interesting to see the strategies by which this discursive 
position is trying resisting the dominant one, and the corresponding silencing 
strategies used to preserve the hegemonic discourse on women.
In order to understand the context of this debate and its progress, we have to stress its 
interdiscursive and intertextual character, in several meanings of the term. Namely, 
the launch of this debate in the parliament relies on the knowledge and usage of other 
discursive events. On a more general level of the inter/discourse, this debate should 
be seen in the light of all the previous debates on gender that had taken place in this 
parliament cycle (1997-2001), especially the yearly positive assessments of the 
abortion bill (in 2000 and 2001), and the negative assessments of the two ‘equal 
status’ legislative projects (in 1999). All these debates represent the discursive battle 
over femininity in this particular institutional context. In terms of a more immediate 
discursive background, it is provided by the event of the New York conference itself, 
and the events that immediately followed it, such as the press conference with the
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head of the Polish delegation as well as the protests of women’s organisations 
present at the conference. More importantly, the key texts that both started the debate 
and were interdiscursively evoked, were newspaper reports on the events in question 
and an official open letter issued by women’s NGOs and addressed to the 
government. The main point of criticism was the alleged opposition of the Polish 
delegation to the inclusion of phrases dealing with women’s discrimination, the 
diversity of women, the rights to sexual orientation and reproductive choice in the 
final conference document.
This battle over the meaning of women’s issues is being performed in the wider 
public sphere including the media’s pressure on the political institutions; in this case, 
the govemment.^^^ A difference of public opinion on the issues was clearly stated in 
the media.
A further basis for the discursive event in the parliament was provided by another 
sphere taking an active part in this struggle over the discourse on women: the 
independent women’s organisations whose representatives were present at the 
conference. The protest letter issued by them constitutes a discursive response to the 
position on women presented by the Polish delegation:
The particularly criticised statement related to questions about rights for sexual minorities was 
quoted in the same newspaper report as: ‘Concepts that are being introduced open up the space no 
longer fo r  tolerance, but fo r  affirmation- said Kropiwnicki- There will be no tolerance fo r  
paedophiles!
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(..,)Polish law does not include any statements against sexual rights. Moreover, The 
Constitution of RP [Republic o f Poland] forbids any form of discrimination, which also 
concerns discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Furthermore, this stance is not 
in accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty, which explicitly forbids discrimination on the 
grounds o f sexual orientation, and to which Polish law is being adapted in the process of 
integration with the European Union.^^^
The open letter also voiced the understanding of the main mechanism of domination 
of the hegemonic discourse - exclusion of alternative position or exclusion form any 
interaction^'^^:.
(...)  Despite numerous attempts at contacting the government, including the Office of the 
Government Envoy for the Family, made by the women’s organisations, they were not 
allowed to participate in the consultation before the conference.(..
This protest letter is an example of a feminist discourse demanding inclusion and 
negotiation of discourses on women within the political sphere. It represents an 
interaction of feminist organisations and information centres (such as OSKA which 
distributed the protest letter to the media) with the institutions of political power. A 
high degree of resistance to the official position and a demand for change, or at least 
a demand for interactive engagement, is thus put forward.
OSKA, (National W omen’s Information Centie) ‘The protests o f women’s circles regarding the 
position of the Polish government at the New York conference. (June 2000), www.oska.org.pl
The comment of OSKA centre including the text o f two such protest letters states that they became 
the basis for the M P’s debate on the issue in the Parliament.OSKA, www.oska.org.pl (June 2000)
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The debate is a relevant sample of the struggle over meaning in its content as well as 
its progress. The debate consisted of the contributions from 13 speakers who made 
16 utterances from the rostrum (recognised by the Vice Speaker), excluding the 
inserted remarks coming from seated MPs and the interactions with the Vice Speaker 
controlling the debate. "^^  ^ Among the 13 speakers who occupied the floor, 6 were 
women (of which 4 represented the challenging discourse, here in the position of 
critiquing the government delegation). This proportion is significant as it represents 
one of the most women-driven debates connected to the negotiation of femininity 
that I have encountered while researching numerous parliamentary debates. 
Although not all of the utterances could be included in the analysis, nor could I quote 
the whole of the utterances i n c l u d e d , m o s t  of the speakers and the arguments 
presented are analysed. In most cases the analysis of the included utterances follows 
the chronological order of the speakers, unless I perceived an utterance to be directed 
at an earlier utterance than the immediately preceding one.^ "^ "^
241 Ibidem.
The number of turns taken would be much higher as several utterances continued despite 
interruptions or even short exchanges with the Vice Speaker.
Such an analysis would be impossible for reasons o f space, and it would also be superfluous to my 
research aim.
The actual order of the utterances is indicated by their numbers.
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5.3 The analysis
The actual question starting the debate mentions some of the points of contention 
over the meaning of ‘women’s issues’ arising from the conference:
(Utterance 1, Exchange 1)
M P Iw ona S ledzinska-K atarasinska:
Polish public opinion is shocked by the reports about the participation o f  the Polish government 
delegation in the special session o f  the plenary meeting o f  the UN, a delegation under the leadership 
o f  minister Kropiwnicki. The session was dedicated to evaluating in the world exactly the 
implementation o f  the document called a Platform fo r  Action, passed in 1995 at the UN world 
conference on the problems o f  women.
The reports are quite correct because they were confirmed after the return by minister 
Kropiwnicki himself, who acknowledged at a press conference that the information which reached 
public opinion is correct. A nd thus, firstly, the Polish delegation voted against the signing o f  the fina l 
declaration, because, among other things, there was a formulation forbidding discrimination on the 
basis o f  sexual orientation. Secondly, the Polish delegation questioned the necessity o f  respecting and 
implementing women’s rights as human rights, and, when asked about the reasons fo r  such a position 
and about not maintaining European standards [on w om en’s rights]at the meeting with UN 
representatives, [the delegation] explained that [Poland] is not in the [European] Union yet, so it 
doesn’t necessarily need to follow  all these standards.
A nd finally, minister Kropwnicki himself, in his speech at the plenary session [ o f  the UN. 
conference], at least in my evaluation, did not talk on the subject. It might have been difficult to show 
the achievements in ameliorating wom en’s situation in the last five  years, but it was possible to 
develop the wonderful statement which exists in the Polish constitution, and at least show this as a 
real success and achievement. The actions fo r  the fam ily and the actions which exist in our [Polish]
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law and in our legal system aimed at the protection o f  unborn life were not the actions that were the 
subject o f  the conferencef...) And the statements that the participation o f  women in public life is 
rising were completely untrue, because unfortunately, this participation is actually falling. And also 
the attempt at marginalising or even calling marginal the phenomenon o f  violence in the fam ily is 
shocking, at the time when, fortunately, fortunately, we have such a degree o f  freedom that painful 
phenomena o f  this kind, which have always existed are known to the public opinion and the 
authorities are trying to fig h t them. There is probably no reason to hide this and call it marginal. I ’m 
not interested in the views/
Vice Speaker Jan Krai: / - Mrs MP, you have gone over the time three
times already
M Pi Just the last sentence, M r Speaker.
Vice Speaker: You are starting the third minute.
- The topic is serious, M r Speaker, because/
Vice Speaker: / /  understand
MP: ...it does not relate to the private views o f  the members o f  the delegation, these I  do not go into, 
only [my point is related to] the position o f  the government o f  a country, which has it written in the 
constitution, that nobody can be discriminated fo r  whatever reason, which is aspiring to a quick 
membership in the European Union. This is what I  mean and this is my question: How does the Polish 
government intend to neutralise the fa ta l effects o f  this appearance on the international forum?
Vice Speaker: Thank you very much. I  apologise fo r  that remark, the topic is important, but the 
regulations are an important issue as well, and they limit me. I  want to be fa ir  and execute the rules 
that bind all o f  us equally.
The beginning of the debate is interesting as it represents both the struggle over the 
content of the discourses on women and at the same time it presents the other side of 
this struggle: the battle over the terms of access. The female MP is asserting à high
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degree of power in taking up the debate and in going over the ‘allotted’ time of one 
minute to present her position. Not only does she present her case, she also 
challenges the rules of this particular form of interaction.
The example clearly points to the struggle over content as always also happening in 
terms of the struggle over the process of discourse as social interaction. The female 
MP fights for the floor to present what is perceived as very important by her. But it 
may be controversial and therefore marginalized. That is why she takes care to make 
it a serious and complex criticism. However, this means contending the one-minute 
rule of the allowed time to pose her question.
The speaker herself comes from a position where the rules of the debate are there to 
be broken, if  they are broken for the ‘right’ reason. Altematively, her going over the 
time suggests her subversion of the rules as not democratic at all but constraining 
adequate voicing of her position. In this case she succeeds in resisting the 
interruption by the speaker, obviously aimed at silencing further points on the ground 
of the rules of conduct: the one-minute question time allotted to the questioner. She 
even manages to gain an acknowledgement of her position from the Vice Speaker, 
that her action is acceptable (‘I understand’). However, the Vice Speaker also asserts 
his power over the terms of access using his institutional power to silence and the 
institutional discourse which is believed to be liberal and fair. Having seen this 
example of voicing an alternative discourse and a successful resistance of exclusion
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(by interruption and by control' over the terms of access), it is interesting to see the 
way in which the debate proceeds.
In terms of the launch of the debate proper, the female MP asserts the power to 
subvert the hegemonic discourse by clearly voicing the alternative position (the 
criticism that abortion law was not an appropriate focus of the event and the criticism 
of the minister’s description of family violence as ‘marginal’ serves the purpose of 
both undermining the hegemonic discourse and hinting at a more appropriate 
position on women). She employs the strategy of a metadiscoursive exposition of 
domination (both of exclusion and diminishing of women’s voices) in the Minister’s 
choice and assessment of subjects discussed at the conference. She thus reclaims the 
silenced position and inserts it back into the debate (the position of women’s rights 
as human rights and the understanding of violence and discrimination), and thereby 
claims solidarity of perspective within this position (by reference to a shocked public 
opinion). To do so, she directly evokes or implies both the press conference and the 
subsequent newspaper reports that allow her to claim that the information which 
reached public opinion is correct. Having thus voiced the silenced position and 
resisted silencing by the hegemonic discourse^"^ ,^ she manages to problematise the 
legitimacy of this perspective as the right way to construct women.
As represented by the minister’s statement at the conference and possibly, as performed by the 
challenge o f her right to floor by the Vice Speaker. The motivation of the later is unclear, by the effect 
is silencing.
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It has to be noted here that the minister facing the criticism, although present jn  the 
room, does not take part in the discussion. Instead, a female government official 
(Envoy for Family Affairs) is given the responsibility to represent ‘the government 
position’. In this way, the criticism’s force is immediately diminished as it cannot be 
directly answered. The institutional ‘terms of access’ thus pre-determine the degree 
to which a debate can be engaged in at all. The counter-discourse is in a way 
assigned a losing position in as much as its intervention loses force since it cannot 
become an open debate; the accountability of the criticised person is avoided by the 
choice of the ‘defending’ speaker (a choice made possible by bureaucratic mles). 
The Envoy employs the strategy of further evasion and diminishing of the criticism. 
She does that using institutional and legal jargon, which makes her response very 
vague:
(Utterance 2)
Government Envoy for Family, Maria Smereczynska:
I  would like to say at the beginning that Polish government carefully prepared fo r  the conference, that 
is why the minister -member o f  the Council o f  Ministers, who supervises the governmental council on 
people that' deals with these issues as well, became the head o f  the delegation. (...) As fo r  the 
conference itself, it concerned the evaluation o f  the situation after five  years o f  implementation o f  the 
document [Platform fo r  Action] and all the documents previously passed by the United Nations stated, 
this, [...] [there was to be] no negotiating o f  the negotiated document, passed with difficulty in a 
consensus in 1995, in a consensus that satisfied nobody, [there was to be] no opening o f  negotiations 
on the topic o f  the document. ( . .  .)However, voices were heard that, it is necessary because the time 
is passing to modernise everything and, in relation to this, these, negotiated in difficidty, expressions
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from  five  years before, should be enlarged by more up-to date ones that were being discussed, which 
are to take into account more issues related to this topic. (...[Meanwhile these were indeed phrases 
and statements, which had never been defined in any other documents o f  the United Nations, which 
were to appear there fo r  the firs t time without practically any reference. These were the three 
statement related to sexual rights, related to the diversity o f  women and related to sexual orientations. 
( - )
The issue concerning the marginalisation o f  the phenomenon o f  violence-ifyou read the 
whole sentence and the context o f  this expression without those two previous sentences and [without] 
the end o f  this sentence, then indeed given in this way, it loses its sense, while, the whole sentence is 
to reflect that the problem is not a widespread problem in Poland, however, it is such an important 
problem, having huge implications fo r  morality, [and] impact on social life, that at this moment it has 
been given mainly into the hands o f  the county centres fo r  fam ily help and is being dealt with, and 
nobody intends, nor is it implied in these sentences which appeared in this speech, that the problem is 
marginalised. The fa c t that it is defined in this quantity does not mean that it is marginalised, it ju s t  
means that it is not a widespread problem.
-
In this utterance, credit is given to the minister as the government’s choice of 
delegation chief^^ and then the speaker proceeds to diminish the validity of the 
conference statements on women ‘on institutional grounds’ and ‘in legal terms’. The 
Envoy responds to criticism by stating that the demanded statements on women were 
inappropriate and unjustified in the conference context, thus supporting the criticised 
individual and his position. It has to be noted that the speaker distances herself from 
the issues in question by using vague or evasive statements. For example, in the 
phrase describing the proposed changes the source of these proposals is described as
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voices were heard’ and the document in question is referred to as 'everything’) the 
content of the new formulations of women’s rights is initially not stated but referred 
to as ‘more up-to date ones that were being discussed, which are to take into account 
more issues related to this topic’. Neither the problem of women’s issues nor the 
statements in question are mentioned without a long introduction into the 
institutional discourse on the conference and its ‘acceptable’ purpose: the evaluation 
of the program and not further negotiation of its terms. Finally, the speaker asserts 
the minister’s position on the problem of marginalising violence against women, 
using the argument that describing a problem as marginal is not an action of 
marginalising it, but rather an assessment of its (small) quantity.
We can see from the degree of vagueness employed that this position is far from 
secine in this moment of the debate, and, indeed, it is successfully undermined by the 
original speaker:
(Utterance 3) -
M P Iw ona Sledzînska K atarasinska:
Mrs Minister [the envoy] I  have this complete sentence here and I  know what it says. That firstly. (:..)
Secondly, I  have this question, I  d o n ’t know i f  you are in a position to answer it but maybe 
you have someone to consult. Thus, I  have found  the affirmation o f  knowledge received earlier in the 
interviews with M r minister Kropiwnicki in the context o f  the press conference. I  am sorry that in 
none o f  these reports were there these explanations you have ]ust so pointedly and reliably given here.
This is done using his rather obscure government function unrelated to gender issues. It is meant to 
counteract the implied point that since the M inister’s portfolio is strategic studies and his stance is
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However, the accusation that the head o f  delegation was maybe not exactly the person best oriented 
in the subject [area] in which he had to move has justification, at least in this that during one o f  
meetings or a conference the minister'distinctly happened to make semantic mistakes when he mistook 
homosexuality with paedophilia.
It is clear from this immediate response that the ground gained by the start of this 
debate will not be easily lost. Indeed, the speaker uses the strategy of persistence of 
the focus of perspective, refusing to accept the ‘better judgement’ of the government 
official on the meaning of the violence against women as a marginal problem in 
Poland. She refuses to accept the strategy of evasion while employing irony to 
undermine it (the assessment of the reply as ‘pointed’ and ‘reliable’). Then she gives 
further support for her criticism of the Minister’s suitability for the conference, 
implying his homophobic attitudes: he mistook homosexuality with paedophilia 
suggests a conservative attitude of criminalising homosexuality. In this way, the 
attempt at silencing of this criticism is resisted.
However, the next speaker employs another silencing technique in an attempt to 
reverse the direction of the debate:
(Utterance 4)
M P M arek  Kaczynski:
First o f  all I  would like to heartily thank the Polish delegation fo r  their stance on the plenary session 
o f  the UN (Applause)
widely known for his conservative views, he was not ‘the best’ person to head the delegation.
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I  would also ask a question: Can the stance which meant supporting the equality, dignity and rights o f  
man and woman in all spheres o f  life, taking the fam ily as the natural environment fo r  a human being, 
supporting the right to life from  conception to natural death, the right to education, opposing the so 
called homosexual marriages and opposing abortion- can such a stance shock the Polish society?(...)
The male MP reverses the initial criticism, undermining the insistence of the first 
speaker that she represents the point of view of the public opinion on the issue, by 
negating the possibility of a ‘shocked’ public opinion. This is meant to diminish the 
initial perspective by delegitimising its initial claim to solidarity of perspective: 
while the first speaker based her assertion on the claim to represent a ‘shocked’ 
public opinion, this speaker also claims that he represents a point of consensus of the 
majority. The speaker claims solidarity on the issue in his own discursive position by 
thanking the minister for his stance, and indeed, he achieves support for this as 
manifested by the applause. He then rephrases the ‘content’ of the stance represented 
by the minister as the only possible and only acceptable position. He brings back 
abortion as the key point of reference for women’s issues, but mixes it with liberal 
feminist pronouncement of ‘dignity and rights of man and woman in all spheres of 
life’. He therefore performs a strategy of domination by co-opting of the counter 
position and claiming it for his own. This is also seen in the choice of phrases ‘the 
right to education’^ "^  ^together with and following the pronouncements of ‘the right to
The right to education of women is not a point o f contention here, neither is it similarly a focus of 
right-wing politics aimed specifically at women. O f course, it sounds acceptable and laudable point to 
include in order to present this position as concerned with women’s issues.
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life from conception to natural death’, and ‘the family as the natural environment for 
a human being’.
This discrediting of the perspective was at first resisted by the next speaker. In her 
utterance, she reclaims the legitimacy of her position, by insisting that an even wider 
notion of public opinion can be used to back up her criticism:
(Utterance 5)
Posel Izabella Sierakowska:
(...) you [the minister] know perfectly well that the group [o f countries] among whom was the Polish 
government, represented by a minister from  Solidarity Electoral Action, found  itself-as the journalists 
in New York described it- in an unholy coalition. And who was there, in that unholy coalition - I ’ll ju st 
remind you. Thus, Vatican, where there are no women, Libya, which is known fo r  supporting 
terrorism, Iran, governed by Islamists, Algieria, moving between a fighting Islam and military 
dictatorship, fanatically Islamic Sudan and Pakistan, and at present ultra-Catholic Nicaragua. And 
occasionally this was jo ined  by Cuba. Well, I  don’t know how did you fee l in such company?
Mrs Minister! [ directed to The Envoy] I  do not expect a response from  you. (...)
In this assertion of legitimacy of perspective, the speaker uses the ‘international 
public opinion’ by evoking the reactions of New York journalists. Of course, this 
claim relies on performing a discursive construction of civilisational identity, of ‘us’ 
(implying democratic, European, secular states) as opposed to all the countries that 
are here shown as the ‘other’: dictatorial, fundamentalist, undemocratic, Islamic or 
Ultra-Catholic, most of them non-European. Despite the obvious Euro-centric, 
Western and Christian (‘unholy coalition’) undertones of such a classification, some
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attention is given to how the classification should be read in relation to women’s 
issues: stating exclusion and absence of women (‘where there are no women’) or 
implying limitations of women’s rights (according to ‘general’ perception of 
undemocratic regimes). Nevertheless, the power of asserting one’s position is very 
high in this case, in fact, it is close to the exclusionary rhetoric of a hegemonic 
perspective: one corresponding to a European, or Western perspective as the only 
right perspective.^"^^ This utterance is using such strong categorisation for the 
purpose of employing irony in assessing the delegation’s stance: a listener will 
immediately juxtapose the secular and Europe-oriented rhetoric of the government in 
many areas of politics with this non-European and fundamentalist perception of 
women’s rights.
What is also worth noticing is that in this utterance the speaker states that she does 
not expect an answer, suggesting that there is no real communication possible or that 
something makes it not worth getting an . answer to what is clearly formulated as a 
question directed at an individual. In this way, the speaker marks her awareness of 
the artificial character of the situation where the individual under criticism, though 
present in the room and therefore able to hear the questions, is not responsible for 
answering them.
Indeed, from a feminist standpoint it is the preferred perspective, but it is not a pre-closed singular 
vision of womanhood. On the other hand using such a simplified counter-argument helps to mask the 
far more exclusionary and singular position that the hegemonic discourse together with 
fundamentalist discourses are proposing in relation to women. The argument is possible by the 
contradictions inherent in the proposed liberal feminist discourse which is arguing for pluralism and 
tolerance and at the same time having to privilege some discourses over others.
Such an assessment is immediately taken up and this position is later characterised by the Envoy as 
intolerant a n d ‘bordering on racism’.
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Interestingly enough, co-optation of feminist discourse was widely used, together 
with the attempt at exclusion of the points presented, by a strategic redirection of the 
topic of the debate (topic control):
(Utterance 6)
Posel J a n  Kulas:
I  understand, M r Speaker, M r Minister [directed to minister Kropiwnicki?] that accepted traditional 
pro-family values cause protest from  such MPs as a moment ago... [referring to Izabela Sierakowska] 
(Izabela Sierakow ska from  the bench; I  adore the family, but what does it have to do with the 
issue?)
M y firs t question relates to the issue o f  what positive values, what good changes in the civilisational 
promotion o f  Polish women were presented at the conference (for one, the issue o f  education, which is 
undoubtedly important) Second question. D id anybody at the conference think about, suggest some 
methods, resources, ways o f  increasing the participation o f  women in the public life, that is, in the 
Parliament, local governments? I  have a feeling  the situation was worse while SLD (the Alliance o f  
Democratic Left) was in power.
In this case, the speaker also brings back the ‘appropriate’ perspective of ‘accepted 
family values’ as the right and unproblematic way to deal with women’s issues at the 
conference, (strategy of re-direction of topic) again undermining the solidarity of 
perspective used by the initial speaker. This is a way of diminishing the criticism as 
not commonly acceptable, similarly to the previous speaker. Such is the point of the 
first comment.
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However, the female speaker addressed again refutes this attempt to redirect the 
perspective, and with her inserted question maintains the persistence of focus (as the 
question of women’s rights and women’s situation and not a question of family). 
Then the co-optation of feminist issues such as women’s education and share of 
power in government is performed by putting the issues forward as the concern of 
the speaker (and, by extension, his party as can be implied by the subsequent 
criticism of the left-wing party previously in government). This concern implies 
criticism of the conference, doubting whether issues of promotion and education of 
women were considered at all. The exclusionary source of position is signalled in the 
phrase ‘civilisational promotion of women’ implying that women are backward and 
uncivilised.^^®
In this utterance, not only elements of the feminist discourse are co-opted, the whole 
debates shifts from any discussion of women’s issues in relation to the conference to 
the discussion of the inadequacy of the left-wing political forces. Of course, the 
discourse of party politics is widely employed in this context to dominate as well as 
to resist, as will be pointed out in other contributions.
The negation of the counter discourse’s insistence on representing women’s 
standpoint on women’s issues and women’s solidarity (a denial of the persistency of 
perspective) is further performed by the following speaker:
250 This phrase discloses a patriarchal discourse on civilisation as a male achievement, to whicli
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(Utterance 7)
M P Czeslaw Ryszka:
There appeared a statement [in the debate] that Polish society, that women’s organisations voiced a 
disapproval towards the Polish delegation, lead by M r minister Jerzy Kropiwnicki. As fa r  as I  know, 
the Federation o f  Catholic Women, a very numerous organisation, maybe the most numerous, voiced 
approval fo r  M r Minister. Unless, i t ’s some different women...
(a voice from  the benches; Not Polish ones)
Well, maybe not Polish ones, because the Polish ones belong only to SLD [The Alliance o f  
Democratic Left]
Here, the validity of the claim to solidarity^^^ is undermined and, subsequently, the 
women who voiced the criticism of the minister are problematised as ‘not Polish’ 
and ‘leftist’ (with the interactive help of another MP’s intrusion). The contradictory 
propositions that this collaborative speech makes are interesting: Polish women 
equals Catholic women (i.e. those who supported the delegation) but also Polish 
women ‘only belong to SLD’. This contradiction probably shows the awareness 
of the struggle over the allowed femininities that is taking place in this particular 
discursive moment, but also mirrors wider changes underway in Polish society. It 
exposes the battle over the categorisation of women at the intersection of gender, 
nationality and political allegiance: from this position women need to be Catholic 
and conservative (right-wing) to be ‘truly’ Polish. At the same time, the recognition
women can only aspire.
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is there that Polish women increasingly support the political left (perceived as the 
closest to feminist views). The purpose is to problematise the Polishness of such 
women and to diminish their input into the debate. Therefore, it is a strategy of the 
diminishing of the position represented by the initial speaker and those sharing her 
position. Of course, this actual stretch is also incoherent and, at the same time, can be 
read as sarcastic, both of which show the degree to which the categorisation 
underway here is a point of a heated struggle, not a point of negotiation.
Nevertheless, this strategy of diminishing and problematising Polish women using 
the Catholic-nationalist discourse is being resisted in the next utterance:
(Utterance 8)
M P, Bronislawa Kowalska:
M r MP [Czeslaw RyszkaJJ think that, fortunately, not everything in Poland must be Catholic and that 
is the whole victory o f  our democracy.
(...)M r Minister. In Poland there is no lack o f  intelligent women, as can be seen in this chamber, and 
so, don’tyou  think that women should most often give voice on women [issues]?
In this utterance, apart from resisting the strategy of the diminishing of the woman’s 
voice in this debate, the speaker also clearly and, for the first time, openly asserts the 
gendered nature of the problem. The point is put across that it is not just the
Referring to the initial voice in the debate, and to the further interdiscursively evoked texts such as 
the open letter o f women’s organisations and some newspaper reports.
The Alliance of Democratic Left, the main left-wing party.
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conservative views, or lack of knowledge that made the minister the wrong 
representative at the conference, but his gender as well (specifying that there would 
have been numerous women better prepared for the job). This point refers to the 
exclusion of women’s voices from the debate and possibly a strategic diminishing of 
women’s issues by the choice of (this particular) male head of delegation. Thus, the 
exclusion and silencing is resisted by being named. Importantly, the speaker does not 
say that women should always discuss issues related to women, and she does not say 
that any woman could do it (as is implied by the statement that ‘there is no lack of 
intelligent women’).
This proposition later gets argumentatively redefined by a male MP:
(Utterance 14)
M P Jozef K orpak:
A t the beginning, I  would like to disagree with the statement which appeared here, that only women 
should speak about women and men about men. Personally, I  believe that it shoidd not be like this, 
definitely not.
fa voice from  the benches: Discrimination)
I ’d  like to ask two questions. Firstly, do those persons who, at present, are criticising M r minister 
Kropiwnicki, that is mainly the Parliamentary Women’s Group promote equating o f  the rights o f  
homosexual relationships with the rights o f  married couples, not excluding even the right to the 
adoption o f  children by such relationships?
And second question. Is it not hypocritical, according to Mrs minister [the Envoy], to voice criticisms 
about hiding the violence in the fam ily in a situation when in the media such violence is present 
everyday, and those parties that are represented by you [the Parliamentary W omen’s Group] do
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nothing to change this state o f  affairs, so that there would not be this violence in the media? 
(Applause)
When the gendered aspect of the situation is raised (by reference to the silencing of 
women’s voices/representation), the argument is immediately undermined 
(diminished) as not right and not desirable. There are two important aspects to this 
strategy. First of all, the speaker strategically diminishes the argument by 
overgeneralising it so that it appears out of all proportions, as if it suggested that only 
women should talk about women’s issues and men should only talk about men’s. 
The qualification ‘in most cases’ that appeared in the original is strategically lost and 
substituted by ‘only’. Secondly, any reference to the context of the conference on 
women is lost. The initial point becomes more ridiculous when redefined as if stating 
‘women should talk always about women and men about men’. This speaker co-opts 
liberal discourse of gender-neutral representation, the voice of ‘liberal principles’ to 
exclude the gendered criticism.^^^ As a result, misrepresenting women ceases^ to be 
the point of criticism.
The immediate reaction coming fiom the room (an MP shouting: ‘discrimination) 
may be understood as resisting this redefinition through a strategy of the persistence 
of focus. It suggests the silencing of women (discrimination) is the key problem, not 
the preservation of the mask of gender-neutral discussion. The argument of the 
speaker, ‘both genders have a voice’, is here exposed as ‘discriminating’, or
O f course, this argument also redefines the criticism of the already gendered (men-dominated) 
representation as it if  was a criticism o f a gender-neutral reality.
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oppressive because it masks the reality of men’s dominance and women’s exclusion 
in having equal access to voicing their interests. Here, we have an example of 
exclusion being named and meta-discursively resisted.^^"^
The further two questions of the speaker represent a direct move at securing the 
power of the hegemonic discourse and silencing the initial criticisms by undermining 
two of its content areas (redirection of the focus - topic control). First, the point 
about the delegation (the minister himselQ negating the women’s rights to sexual 
orientation is here upheld, by directly negating a conception of such rights, making 
them unacceptable by picking up the most ‘controversial’ aspect of these rights 
(adoption of children by homosexual couples).^^  ^ Homophobic attitudes are thus 
clearly asserted as the hetoresexual norm and are upheld as nonnegotiable. Having 
thus silenced the position which argues for even a limited conceptualisation of such 
rights, the speaker then undermines another important area of dissent: the 
conceptualisation of domestic violence against women. He achieves this by 
redirecting the discursive focus away from a critique of the family (which in this 
discursive position is unproblematic and ideologically positive) to the ‘appropriate’ 
area of concern about violence: the media. This is another ideologically loaded 
domain, where violent representation in films and the press is to be perceived as a 
‘real’ problem (mainly a problem for the ‘morality’ of women and children). But in
On the other hand, it is possible that the shout actually supported the speaker’s statement, i.e. 
suggested that i f  women were to speak about women it would be a discrimination o f the other 
gender’s right to speak. This contradictory interpretation seems less likely.
Such a definition of ‘rights o f homosexual relationsips’ negates any possibility of considering less 
'disputable issues, such as social security, taxes or inheritance problems that might have otherwise 
been redefined.
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this situation, it is primarily evoked to undermine the legitimacy of the initial 
arguments as related to women’s issues, where violence was perceived primarily in 
relation to women’s material existence in the family.
The exclusion of women’s legitimate voices is also aided by a trivialisation of the 
gendered aspect of the debate. Interestingly enough, this is achieved by celebrating 
the masculinity of the male involved:
(Utterance 16)
Maria Smreczynska (The Government Envoy for Family):
(...)I have to say that after these various mispleasures that happened to the Polish delegation- hot 
deservedly- we have received information [comments] from  the parliamentarians o f  the European 
Union, that the ch ief o f  the Polish delegation waj' a real man. (Applause) (...)
While asserting the support of other parliamentarians, the speaker is claiming that the 
support consisted in praising the masculinity of the criticised politician. That calling 
someone ‘a real man’ is considered a valid point to uphold his authority in this 
situation is important to note. The phrase ‘a real man’ suggests toughness and 
chivalry, the appreciated heterosexual masculine characteristics. It appears from the 
statement that being ‘a real man’ is both enough to represent women and, in this 
instance, goes hand in hand with having conservative views about women’s rights 
and sexual minority rights (here homophobic attitudes are unproblematic). This 
understanding is supplied by earlier discussions of what constituted this ‘masculine’
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performance of the minister. What is most telling, this particular heterosexual 
appreciation is offered by a female politician given the responsibility to defend the 
male minister’s performance from the ‘attacks’ of female parliamentarians.
The ‘humorous’ element of this gendered reading of the situation is then picked up 
by the Vice Speaker^^^ in order to diminish the tone of the debate even further:
(Exchange 2)
Vice Speaker:
Thank you Mrs Minister [\h.Q envoy]
I  am also not ashamed o f  being a man (Cheerfulness in the room, applause)
This remark provides a humorous tone to the debate, with the speaker stating the 
obvious, in a way as if to suggest that masculinity had been the point of criticism. 
This is a strategic redirection of the argument, suggesting that the point of argument 
was that men should be ashamed of being men (a listener will here quickly supply 
the stereotypical view that the feminist politicians are men-haters, and are wanting to 
discredit or eradicate masculinity itself, rather than the forms of power exercised by 
men). Such a statement is also ‘funny’ as can be judged by the applause and 
cheerfulness of MPs: a trivialisation of the whole debate is thus achieved.
At that time, (during the envoys utterance) another Vice Speaker takes over the debate. This is his 
first statement in this debate.
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Interestingly, the assertion of masculinity in this situation is amusing only in a 
situation where masculine speakers normally pose as gender-neutral politicians (with 
the authority over the representation of women’s interests).
However, to claim that it is the only right-wing politicians and the controllers of the 
discursive situation that are guilty of trivialising women’s concerns in this situation 
would not present the whole picture. Occasionally, the male politicians that get 
involved in the criticism of the hegemonic position do so by employing equally 
exclusionary discourse themselves. In this debate, one such voice is also present:
(Utterance 10)
M P W ojciech Nowaczyk.
(...) And a question: did the minister want to endear him self to the right-wing government orientation 
with his position [at the conference].
Next question: Was it fo r  this obedience that he was rewarded by the prime minister with a m inister’s 
position? Doesn ’t M r Minister Kropiwnicki as a man fea r  the revenge o f  women fo r  that, in a typical 
feminine way?
That is an epoch-making question)
In this set of questions, posed early on in the debate, a male politician starts from 
within a party politics discourse of alliances and rewards for the presented views and 
he ends up with a question which degrades and delegitimises the critique offered by 
women at the beginning of the debate. It need hardly be pointed out that the
Unfortunately, as we had seen in earlier examples women, are not similarly allowed to celebrate 
their femininity in this context.
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stereotyping and insulting characterisation of women’s possible reaction to the 
problem as ‘a revenge in a typical feminine way’ discloses highly exclusionary and 
patriarchal discourse. The comment is insulting enough to be ridiculed by another 
politician who ironically sums up the last question as ‘epoch-making’. It is indeed 
important to notice, as such moments disclose the exclusionary and diminishing 
intent of some politicians who pay lip service to women’s discursive positions, while 
being far from a position of solidarity or even understanding of these positions.^^^
We can aheady see at this stage that the gendered aspect of the debate is raised but 
then successfully ridiculed and silenced in numerous ways. Most noticeably, the 
political discourse predominates in the discussion of the problem and it finally 
overshadows it. Here is a further example:
(Utterance 13)
MP Jan Kasprzyk
In relation to the above I ’d like to ask M r Minister, why in the makeup o f  the delegation there was no 
representative o f  the opposition, not even o f  moderate [opposition] fo r  you?
M y second question is connected with a certain answer to the colleagues from  AW Sf^^ I f  the majority 
o f  the society shared your views there would be 460 o f  you in this room [the total number o f  - 
parliamentary seats] (applause)
In relation to the above. I ’d like to ask, as nobody in this room can speak o f  total support, and so 
various views are being represented/ '
This is by no means tme in all the cases of male politicians taking up the ‘women’s voice’. Some 
o f the male contributions to various debates I have studied identified with women’s position and even 
with feminist critiques of the society.
Solidarity Electoral Action: a coalition o f right wing parties.
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(A  voice from  the benches./Wj fo r  now we are in government)
/You have rightly said: as fo r  now.
The remark of this speaker still implies the connection between the content of the 
views represented at the conference (views on women’s issues) and the political 
parties which the members of the delegation represented: that is the ‘conservative’ 
versus the ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ views. But slowly, the debate is turned into a 
discursive battle over political power. That the political power is paramount to the 
power to define what counts as women’s interest is implied by the assertion: ‘I f  the 
majority o f the society shared your views there would be 460 o f you in this room’ 
and the subsequent non-verbal response of applause. The intruded remark is quite 
interesting in that it is an even more explicit assertion of the power to define, and we 
have to bear in mind what is being defined, that is, what counts as legitimate 
women’s issues and human rights issues.^^° We are witnessing here one of many 
moments when this battle for meaning is acknowledged to be a direct consequence of 
political divisions. In this respect, women are again silenced: they are excluded from 
speaking as women on women. There is no space to speak from without the political 
identification; their concerns are clearly subordinate to party politics and, in this 
institution can only be voiced as part of party politics.
Apart from the redirection of the argumentation away from women’s concerns into 
the discourse of political party competition and the subsequent silencing of any
260 In this case, especially the issue o f freedom o f sexual orientation, judging from the previous 
utterances.
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debate on what counts as women’s issues and women’s representation, we must 
point here to another important resource that can be used for such exclusionary 
mechanisrris. This is the omnipresent redirection of the discussion of women’s issues 
into the abortion debate. Of course, this equation is important for the construction of 
the ‘appropriate femininity’ which is ongoing here, but the resource is being used 
also to exclude any other, less controllable, topics and voices in the debate. Such 
redirection occurs aheady early on in the debate:
(Utterance 12)
M P Jacek  Szczot:
M r minister, recently the press office o f  the UN made a report from  the speech o f  M r minister and 
there was a phrase [stating] as i f  Poland supported human life from  his (sic!) birth to death. I  d on’t 
know i f  this was M r minister’s statement or the official government’s position? It is known, though, 
that in accordance with the Polish law the limits o f  life are completely different in Poland.
(...) And third question, a short one. What public opinion [was shocked]? Is really Polish public 
opinion shocked by the statement and the appearance o f  the Polish delegation in New York? Isn ’t this 
a simple manipulation o f  the frustrated fem inist groups? Thank you. (applause)
(M P Bronislaw a Kowalska: Radio Mary will give you a good campaign)
The first ‘question’ brings the whole debate into the discursive domain of abortion, 
using a criticism of a formulation that was used in the Internet report from the 
minister’s speech. This constitutes another moment exposing the discursive battle 
over femininity were abortion is the main battlefield, the very centre of the 
exclusionary discourse. But it is important to notice that this discursive move into the
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‘appropriate’ understanding of human life as starting from conception, and not 
birth,^^  ^ is more than an envocation of the exclusionary discourse. In this context, it 
is powerful way of silencing of other contributions and points made earlier related to . 
women’s issues. And, put in these terms, similarly to the problematisation of the 
rights of homosexuals, it silences any move at renegotiating women’s reproductive 
r i g h t s . T h i s  is a particularly intricate mechanism of topic control by insisting on 
some particularly ‘nonnegotiable’ definition as the core of the focus of the debate.
Argumentatively, this also provides a justification for the final question in this 
utterance which undermines and diminishes public opinion evoked by the initial 
criticism. Although the phrase ‘Polish public opinion’ had initially been used, it is 
perceived as relating to Polish women’s opinion here. Furthermore, the stereotypical 
insulting characterisation of the women concerned as ‘the frustrated feminist groups’ 
is about diminishing such a subject position, dismissing it as not relevant, or outside 
of what might constitute an ‘acceptable’ public opinion. This discursive power to 
diminish by an insult is resisted by the female MP, who, in her intrusive remark, 
counter-diminishes the speaker’s standpoint by ascribing it to the ultra-conservative 
Catholic radio station which would cherish similar views.^^^ This exchange marks 
the core of the struggle again' as the struggle over ‘legitimate’ representation of 
women (and of morality, the state, the civil dialogue). The redirection of the debate
A question far more problematic, as it is not defined as such in the Constitution, but in the ant- 
abortion bill.
The assertion o f the ‘limits o f life in Poland’ as different from those in other countries goes back to 
the very centre o f the hegemonic discourse’s power to define/create reality.
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into ‘abortion domain’ raised by this speaker is successfnl: in the end of the debate it 
is his question that is addressed by the Envoy as the very last one.
Perhaps the most telling example of exclusion within this particular discursive 
situation is another exchange with the Vice Speaker, where an exclusion of the 
counter-discourse is again achieved by the control of the terms of access:
(Exchange 3)
Vice Speaker:
The time assigned fo r  questions in current affairs has been filled  up. The parliament thus finishes the 
discussion o f  this point o f  the daily agenda. Unfortunately, according to the regulations the time has 
been exceeded by fifteen minutes.
(MP Wojciech Nowaczyk: We have not received an answer.)
Vice Speaker: I  can do nothing about that.
Mrs minister wanted to add something? Please.
The Envoy:
I ’d  like to answer M r MP Kasprzyk, that the situation o f  county centres fo r  fam ily help was not the 
subject o f  the discussion at this conference, so I  think that we can talk about it on another occasion. 
Indeed, there are reports that this [help] has already started to function.
Vice Speaker; very much
(a voice from  the room : the Internet page,..)
The Envoy fo r Fam ily Affairs: -
The Internet page- Indeed there occurred a mistake on the Internet page made by the employees o f  the 
United Nations. There was a letter filed  by the ch ief o f  the Polish delegation asking fo r  correcting
Radio Mary, is a religions. Catholic station, far from a widely accepted voice o f ‘public opinion’. It 
is considered to be ultra-nationalist and fundamentalist and on the other hand is increasingly 
supporting right-wing political parties.
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this and today the Internet page is corrected and the statements are correct, so there is no mistake 
there now.
The Vice Speaker: I  cannot allow further discussion. I  have closed that point, Ih a ve  to stick tq_ the 
regulations. (Applause)
In this exchange it is vital to notice the mechanism of direct exclusion (the cutting 
off of further debate by the Vice Speaker) and the differentiated terms of access of 
speakers representing two sides in the debate. It is worth noticing that the point 
raised by one of the male MPs, stating that they ‘have not received an answer’ 
[presumably to the criticism of the Polish representation at the conference] is simply 
refuted as beyond the Speaker’s ability to deal with: ‘I can do nothing about that’. 
The two other questions that are allowed to be answered by the Envoy represent 
questions in no way connected to the initial criticism of the Polish delegation at the 
conference. The first answered question marks a successful redirection, in the course 
of the debate, of problems of violence as addressed by ‘centres for family help’- 
successfully defined as a problem of the family, not a gender issue.
The last question that the envoy answers at the very end of the debate re-establishes 
the power of the hegemonic discourse in dictating the subject matter worth a serious 
report: the problem of the protection of life from conception, regardless of women’s 
in terests.N ow here in the end of the debate is any deliberation of the points raised 
initially present. More importantly, women’s voices about how their issues were (and 
should have been) constructed are no longer addressed.
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The exclusionary end of the debate in relation to the terms of access, is also revealed 
in the last statement of the Vice Speaker. The silencing has been achieved by 
referring to the institutional discourse of the Parliament as a legitimate reason for 
ending the debate, regardless of whose questions were and were not answered. The 
purpose of this last move at domination is recognised and supported by the ensuing 
applause. The decision to end the debate is applauded, which suggests that there is 
more meaning to it than simply successful control of the institutional proceedings. It 
is possible that the direction into which the debate went (which is away from the 
initial concerns) is accepted by some MPs as a victory and therefore applauded. This 
moment clearly shows the exclusionary discourse in a winning position. At the same 
time it points out that there was a real struggle indeed, not just a defence of a secure 
position.
On a more general level, the exclusionary character of the institutional practice of a 
‘parliamentary debate’ is exposed here. The message coming out of the Vice 
Speaker’s evocation of the ‘rules of conduct’ is not so much that fair and controlled 
exchange of ideas is the purpose of a parliament, but that the true purpose is the 
securing of political power. That is, the rules are there to be broken but the issue is 
who is allowed to break them. That the government official is given the last word on 
the matter is to be expected as part of the hierarchical organisation of this 
institutional context. What is more telling, she does not use her last contributions to
As part o f the ministers’ statement at the conference, quoted on the Internet.
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address the initial grievances to which answers are still being demanded. These go 
unnoticed and are dismissed by the Vice Speaker as impossible to answer, and 
unworthy of further discussion time.
In the case of this parliamentary debate, none of the criticisms raised strongly by the 
counter-discourse was allowed to shift the balance of power over representation, 
though the struggle over meaning was very pronounced. Despite numerous powerftil 
moves of the counter-discourse into this debate (following a successful launch-of it), 
the hegemonic discourse successfully regains its dominant position through the 
strategies of exclusion (mainly through topic control), diminishing, and occasionally 
co-opting of some of the areas of the feminist critique. It seems safe to state, that the 
hegemonic power over the representation of women (in discursive and political 
terms) is successfully silenced, though not without a hard struggle for retaining the 
dominant position’s legitimacy.
5.4 Summary: assessing the power struggle between discourses in the
process o f the debate
In this analysis, I was concerned with the understanding of discourse as a process in 
order to answer Research Question 2: How can the power struggle between the two 
discourses on women be captured in the course of a political debate? (How can the 
interaction of different subject positions either secure and subvert domination?)
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In general, the power struggle could be captured well in my example of a particular 
parliamentary debate: one of the positions represented challenged and the other 
maintained the hegemony over the representation of women.^^^ The outcome of my 
analysis suggests that despite the unstable position of the hegemonic discourse on 
women, it is being successfully maintained as the ‘right’ way of constructing women 
in the Polish political sphere. And, indeed, the parliamentary debate I have analysed 
here presents such a moment of hegemony (dominance) being re-established. Yet, 
this position needed to be fought over, as the counter-discourse demanded a re­
negotiation of the dominant meanings. This demand manifests a degree of power as 
well: the power to resist, and, potentially, transform the dominant representations. In 
the course of this debate the counter discourse is successfully silenced, but the 
preserved domination is shown to be temporary and precarious, which in no way 
diminishes its negative effect for possible alternative discourses on women.
The more specific research questions concerned the mechanisms of securing such 
power in the discursive process. The two questions stated:
R.Q.2.1 How, on the level of interaction, does the dominant discourse exclude the 
counter-discourse or dominate the process of constructing the meanings of 
femininity?
265 Both in the political and discursive sense of representation.
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R.Q.2.2 How does the counter-discourse resist and subvert the domination in order 
to open space for the negotiation of the meanings of femininity?
The feminist linguistic conceptualisation of the mechanisms of domination and 
resistance proved an adequate tool to capture these mechanisms. As far as answering 
R.Q.2.1 is concerned, the following mechanisms were observed and discussed in this 
analysis;
1. Exclusion through non-response. In most cases this was done by a strategic 
redirection of the focus of the debate (a form of topic control): a refusal to 
maintain the proposed focus and an introduction of other subject areas. Examples 
of this strategy include: Utterance 6, Utterance 7, Exchange 2 (Vice Speaker), 
Utterance 12, Exchange 3 (the Envoy). .
2. Exclusion through control of terms of access. Usually carried out by the Vice 
Speakers by cutting off particular speakers and ending the whole debate, such as 
in Exchange 1 and Exchange 3. Similarly, exclusion through interruption, seen 
particularly in the initial exchange with the Vice Speaker (Exchange 1) belongs 
to this category.
3. Diminishing/ trivialisation by insults, humour and irony. This strategy was as 
common as topic control, it involved the Vice Speaker (Exchange 2) and some of 
the speakers: Utterance 7, Utterance 16, Utterance 12, as well as non-verbal 
response by other MPs (‘cheerfullness’, ‘applause’).
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4. Co-opting of discourse. This strategy was present in several contributions by 
appropriating some areas of focus of the counter-discourse. This was particularly 
visible in Utterance 4, Utterance 6, Utterance 14.
These mechanisms were carried out in the actual process of the debate, in the end 
allowing to maintain the powerful/dominated position of this particular perspective. 
However, it has to be noted that the battle was still over the content of the dominant 
constructions of femininity: it was the fight over the representational elements of 
discourse that was embedded into the interactive moves. The aim was securing the 
power over discourse (on women) also through the power over the terms of access to 
the discursive situation itself. Moreover, the multifunctionality of these moves has to 
be mentioned, any utterance can and usually does carry out more than one fimction: a 
part of an utterance might be diminishing while another one might be co-opting. 
Also, the same part might potentially carry out several functions, therefore the 
interpretation of them will always be incomplete and potentially open to critique. 
However, by using the methodology of a feminist linguistic critique, the analysis 
hoped to pinpoint some of the most important aspects of power play in this 
discursive event. •
As regards answering R.Q.2.2, some attempts at empowerment, or strategies of 
resistance, were found as a direct response to the strategies of domination. Yet, they 
also represented more than that: they were at the same time assertions of the 
alternative position’s power to define women in ways other than the dominant ones.
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As far as the actual interactive situation studied is concerned, the following strategies 
could be found:
1. Persistence of the focus of perspective: subverting attempts of redirection of the 
topic of debate, voicing of the excluded position: Utterance 3, intrusions to 
Utterance 7 and Utterance 14.
2. Solidarity of perspective: claiming legitimacy of perspective, naming the 
attempts at diminishing their legitimacy. This was done, for instance, in 
Utterance 1 (the claim to solidarity put forward) and Utterance 5.
3. Challenging the terms of access: demanding more inclusion into the interaction, 
resisting control over the floor time, resisting the manipulation of the debate. 
Examples of this include Exchange 1, Utterance 3, Exchange 3.
4. Counter-diminishing by irony: while humour was not found in my examples, 
suggesting that its use would be self-diminishing and threatening the legitimacy 
(seriousness) of the argument, elements of irony were present in Utterance 1, 
Utterance 3, Utterance 3, Utterance 5, intrusion to Utterance 12.
All in all, the strategies of domination were being answered with varying degrees of 
strength and success by the strategies of resistance. The most difficult to find was 
resistance to the strategies of co-optation: since this strategy appropriates the 
meanings that are acceptable for the counter-discourse; only upon an in-depth 
reflection on the motivations of particular positions/utterances could such a reaction
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be possible. In this context, I have not noticed clear examples of the resistance to co­
optation.
The general outcome of my study is the assertion that resistance demands a form of 
meta-discursive awareness: it requires the ability to judge the discursive process and 
voice such judgements. The perceiving, naming and commenting on domination 
strategies is seen particularly in moments when the key discursive aspects of the 
battle over content or over the terms of access are exposed. The very launch of the 
debate (and the content of the criticism) is a form of such meta-discursive evaluation 
turned into discursive action, other moments include Utterance 3, Utterance 8, 
Utterance 12. Of course, meta-discursivity was also used by the hegemonic discourse 
to maintain its power, especially in assessing the challenging position as a 
‘manipulation’ (o f‘public opinion’, o f ‘accepted values’, of the ‘rules of conduct’).
All in all, it can be stated that the battle over the power in discourse in this particular 
situation is quite pronounced but the hegemonic discourse ‘wins’; the dominating 
strategies are successful, as the initial criticism of the government delegation is 
completely silenced. In this debate, the ‘appropriate femininity’ is obviously being 
fought over, and for the time being, maintained, with all the discursive and (potential 
non-discursive) effects of such a development temporarily upheld. The very concrete 
critique of the representation of women’s issues is refuted and, in consequence, so 
are the possibilities of a redefinition in the representation of women’s reproductive 
rights, women’s (and men’s).right to express their sexual orientation, and the
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political representation of women’s interests. As a result, also the material interests 
of women who do not fit the obligatory heterosexuality or obligatory maternity 
upheld here are compromised. /
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CONCLUSION
How we understand sexual difference determines the type o f society that we will find possible, 
appropriate or desirable.^*^^
1. A review o f the theoretical background and the aims o f the thesis
This thesis begins with an inquiry into the concept of ‘women’s language’, first as a 
sociolinguistic area of research and then as a feminist linguistic concern. However, 
after a careful investigation of the more recent feminist theories on language and 
gender and the poststructuralist approaches to language in general, I pursue the 
approach that ‘women’s language’ amounts to a complex ideological construct of 
femininity. This understanding follows an investigation of the existing theories on 
the power of/in language as a central issue for feminist linguistics and feminist 
theory in general. This approach is then pursued further: discourse of women is 
theorised as ‘discourse on women’. Therefore, linguistic theorisations of women’s 
language are seen as part of the ongoing construction of gender difference, which 
comes to embody what women are by recounting the ‘difference’ in communication 
(easily implying a difference in reasoning, argumentation, abilities, etc.). As Deborah
266 Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory ( Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 91
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Cameron pointed out ‘it could be that “the problem of women’s speech” is a figure 
for the problem of femininity in a world where gendered identities are increasingly 
unstable.
This theoretical approach is then pursued further by the use of theories that explore 
the workings of power and ideology in discourse understood not as linguistic 
production only but as a form of semiosis working in a social context and amounting 
to an ongoing construction as well as a performance of the acceptable social 
relations. In this way, an understanding of the various ‘discourses on women’ as 
constructions on femininity is formed. The various poststructuralist discourse 
theories are a useful tool in theorising such gender constructions in social 
communication. This is why poststructuralist, feminist and critical approaches to 
discourse are examined. The Critical Discourse Analysis’ theorisation of the 
dialectical functioning of discourse as both social action and its representation is a 
particularly useful definition of discourse that I have adopted in this thesis. My aim 
has been to try to combine such an understanding of discourse with the general 
feminist interest in gender and social life and with the feminist linguistic exploration 
of the relations of domination in interaction.
My aim has been to use these theories to study the discourses on women in the 
Polish political sphere. This meant finding the theoretical and methodological tools 
that would be suitable for my investigation of the parliamentary debates and that
Deborah Cameron, T erèa / Hygiene (New York: Routledge, 1995), 202.
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would allow me to make some substantiated observations on the workings of power 
and ideology in this discursive location. I have concentrated my analysis on the 
concepts of categories, frames and repertoires, which I found particularly useful in 
illustrating the power of discourse seen as text (without forgetting the dynamic and 
performative character of such constructions). It has to be noted here, that all the 
possible aspects of categorisation, the relationship between categories and 
discourses, or the exact difference between frames (conceived here as narratives or 
simply discourses) and repertoires (understood as more abstract thematic choices) 
will need further theoretical work, which is outside the scope of this thesis.
On the other hand, I have also adopted some analytical tools used by feminist 
linguistics which aim to study the workings of power in interactions, be it verbal or 
mediated ones. These I have called strategies of domination and resistance, and I 
have applied them to the analysis of discourse seen as a process (without ignoring its 
textual character). Of course, my use of this type of feminist linguistic analysis of 
interactions was limited by the type of material I chose to analyse (available to me in 
a mediated form), the type of research questions I tried to answer (which were quite 
general and exploratory rather than narrow) and the scope of this thesis.
However, despite these limitations I was able to point to two kinds of power play in 
my material: struggles over the content (representational function) of discourse and 
over the terms of access to discourse. This supports the critical theorisation of 
discourse offered by Fairclough who points to ‘struggles in and over discourse as a
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focus for an ideologically-oriented discourse a n a l y s i s S i m i l a r l y ,  his earlier 
theorisation of power in discourse as: ‘controlling and constraining the contributions 
of non-powerful p a r t i c i p a n t s a s  opposed to power behind discourse: for example 
seen in discourse types understood as effects of power^^® can be explored by the type 
of analysis I undertook.
In this thesis I have tried to consider theoretical and methodological tools available 
in order to make a clear statement of how the discourses on femininity I was 
analysing are constructed and argued for without overgeneralising them. I did not 
want to make vague statements or descriptions about the symbolic understanding of 
women in Poland, or even in the Polish political language using the popular notion of 
‘discourse analysis’ which amounts to a haphazard and often unfocused 
reinterpretation of given texts. On the other hand, I hope that my work does not, as 
Michael Billig put it: ‘pronounce on the nature of discourses, without getting-down 
to the business of what is actually uttered or written’. I n s t e a d ,  I concentrated on 
particular texts chosen from a larger studied material in order to investigate the 
discourses on women in the Polish political debates.
Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 87. 
Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (London and New York: Longman, 1989), 46. 
Ibid., 58.
Michael Billig, ‘Whose terms? Whose ordinariness? Rhetoric and ideology in conversational 
analysis’ Discourse and Society 10 (40), 545.
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2. A summary o f  the research on the power struggle in discourse
My analysis aimed at answering the following general questions on power in 
discourse of the studied texts/interactions:
R.Q.1 How can the effects of power struggle be captured in the construction of 
discourses on women in the political debates?
R.Q. 2 How can the power struggle between the two discourses on women be 
captured in the course of a political debate?
The understanding of discourse as a (textual) construction was employed to answer 
the first research question and the perspective of discourse as a process was adopted 
in order to answer the second one. As far as the perspective of discourse as text is 
concerned, it allowed me to pinpoint the effects of the power to define, which are 
already inscribed (and being re-inscribed) into discursive positions. The analysis of 
two parliamentary debates in Chapter 4 discloses a struggle over the meanings of 
femininity to be codified into legal provisions. The representatives of one ideological 
position maintained hegemonic notions of femininity through interpretive choices 
such as the use of specific categories, frames and repertoires. The produced 
discourse constructed a very exclusionary and traditional notion of the ‘ideal’ .or 
‘desirable femininity’ though it also managed to co-opt some of the elements of the 
counter position, if they were not perceived as completely threatening the hegemonic 
position. The counter discourse was not only resisting the dominant categorisations, 
but it was also undertaking a similar construction of femininity, though one where
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there was more space for definitions of women in relation to work, experience of 
discrimination or violence, and equal rights, going beyond the ‘obligatory 
motherhood’ as the dominant categorisation of women.
The second analytical chapter (Chapter 5) relied on the understanding of discourse as 
a process, in order to capture what was previously left outside of the analysis: the 
power play in the interactive process studied within a more contextual framework. 
This analysis aimed at pinpointing possible mechanisms of the power struggle 
between the represented positions, both as a struggle over content and terms of 
access. I have utilised the feminist linguistic theorisation of the mechanisms of 
domination and resistance in interactions to study the process of a parliamentary 
debate on gender. Various strategies of domination were seen throughout the debate 
(such as exclusion, diminishing, co-opting) but strategies of resistance could be 
pointed out too, suggesting possibilities for opening up the public space to the 
articulation of women’s interests: for example, demands for inclusion and 
accountability were made. Interestingly, the co-optation of the resisting position was 
performed by certain speakers, and this strategy was not successfully answered.
Yet, the parliament’s highly exclusionary character makes it a difficult fighting 
ground when it comes to negotiating with and subverting the dominant notions of 
femininity as all the debates analysed in the previous chapters show. These debates 
are important to study not only because they come from a particularly exclusionary 
institution when it comes to ‘women’ issues’, but because they have real effects for
201
non-discursive practices. As long as a particular hegemonic representation of women 
is maintained in this sphere, there are direct consequences for the material reality of 
women’s lives. Abortion is the key issue here, but so is maternity leave, economic 
conditions of working women, the legal status of homosexual women, and many 
other areas of women’s existence and self perception.
The analysis I carried out leads to a general conclusion that there is indeed scope for 
theorising and researching the hegemonic power in discourse. This is the power to 
define in the sense of maintaining control over the representation of reality, a closure 
of meaning, or simply meaning control. It is exercised on the level of text and the 
discursive process simultaneously. That is, a closure of the acceptable meapings, 
subject positions, conceptualisations is carried out by the interpretative choices 
within the content of discourse, while at the same time the negotiation of meaning is 
prevented by a control over the interaction process, where alternative positions are 
silenced and excluded while the dominant, the ‘right’ position is continually put 
forward. It is interesting to note, that the hegemonic discourse on women serves not 
only the construction of women as it is favoured by the state at the time, but it is a 
way of defining the state itself through instrumental uses of gender. Gendered 
discourses become signifiers of the construction of national identity/nationalism as 
well can symbolise the political identity of the speakers. In my analysis, it was 
obvious that the debates around gender have a function of marking political positions 
as ‘left’ or ‘right’. More generally, the understanding of the state, relations of 
citizens to the state and appropriate scope of politics to intervene in the life of
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citizens were being constructed. It is in this sense that Gal and Kligman argue that 
there is much more to political debates on reproduction than just controlling 
women’s sexual behaviour or defining the boundaries of the acceptable femininity:
We have found that in case after case, debates about reproduction can be understood as coded 
discussions about claims to political legitimacy. More precisely, the issue of reproduction is 
one o f the means by which morality and desirability of political institutions is imagined, and 
claims for the “goodness” o f state forms are made. This use of debates about reproduction as an 
allegorical, indirect way o f talking about the political future is by no means peculiar to 
postsocialist transformations.^^^
This understanding of the functions of the political discourse on reproduction could 
be extended to other gender-centred debates, like the ones I have analysed in this 
thesis. However, my main aim at this stage was to concentrate on the constructions 
of femininity rather than on notions of the state, nation, and the politics itself. This, 
of course, does have some significance for further research into the gendered 
constructions of politics.
The notion of discourse utilised here makes space for the conceptualisation of 
resistance and social change, not just of domination through discursive practices. 
Indeed, it turns out that the hegemonic power of closure of meaning may be 
successfully resisted by the demand for inclusion, again, working both on the level of 
content and the process of meaning creation/negotiation. The difficulty in asserting
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that such a power is not the hegemonic one is great. In order to be a resisting type of 
power, the position or discourse it constructs needs to be self-reflexive and open up 
space for new meanings, without securing them into another hegemonic position. 
This difficulty is connected with the feminist agenda for empowerment which is not 
to be ‘power over’ others. This problem is particularly visible in my examples of 
parliamentary discourse, which usually lead to particularly exclusionary practices. 
Nevertheless, its importance and potential for achieving positive change should not 
be underestimated, precisely because an engagement with power is necessary to 
transform the existing power relations. Whether the sort of liberal feminist discourse 
represented by the MPs in the Polish parliament constitutes a non-exclusionary 
women’s discourse is not certain. The point is that resistance must work towards a 
positive transformation of the social relations as well as of the politics on women. As 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough state ‘whether articulatory shifts in discourse constitute 
substantive shifts in identity or resistance to domination depends (...) on how the 
moment of discourse is inserted in the social process overall (...).’^ ^^  Similarly, 
Weedon points out: ‘The degree to which marginal discourses can increase their 
social power is governed by the wider context of social interests and power within 
which challenges to the dominant are made.’ While there are indeed signs of 
change in the Polish politics^^^, whether it will be a positive and substantial for 
women is still to be seen.
Susan Gal and Gail Kligman The Politics o f  Gender After Socialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 28.
Chouliaraki and Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press, 1999), 14.
Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 80
See the postscript.
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3. Strengths and limitations o f  the analysis
First of all, the starting point for my analysis has been the generalisation that there 
are distinct ideological positions present in the discursive events studied, and that 
they can be seen as the hegemonic discourse and the counter-discourse. Such an 
assumption was made on the basis of the theoretical background and previous 
research into the gendered political debates, where two distinct positions were 
observed. My initial assessment of the research material I gathered supported this 
direction. Nevertheless, it represents a generalisation of a complex and fluid set of 
possible discursive positions and power relations.
Yet, in order to substantiate such claims and arrive at any generalisations about the 
content of discourses or their ideological investment, an analysis of a range of texts 
taken from a particular discursive location was required. This is why I have decided 
to include two debates in my analysis of discourse as a text in Chapter 4, recognising 
that it is not a comprehensive study of all the possible aspects of the discourses on 
women coming from this sphere. Still, such an analysis is more exploratory then one 
that covers only a single discursive event. Moreover, it has to be pointed out that this 
choice meant that other aspects of discourse, such as various aspects of context and 
interactive process were not discussed.
Of course, even the main discourses themselves are very complex in their content; 
the potential for an analysis of textual elements is inexhaustible, which is why I
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decided to pay special attention to categories, frames and repertoires within the 
framework of argumentation. Moreover, it has to be understood that the discourses 
on women are constantly evolving and undergoing transformations; the discursive 
creation of femininity is ongoing. However, there are still strands to be identified in a 
particular chunk of data, which make it possible to pinpoint the ideological 
investment of the main positions. I have used these categories in order to explore the 
question of the effects of power in discourse. Of course, the analysis aimed at a 
partial, exploratory answer only, not at a closure of the ‘problem’, and that is all it 
could possibly have hoped to achieve.
On the other hand, when I concentrated on the interactive process in the second 
analytical chapter, it was in the hope of providing a balanced inquiry into the 
working of power in discourse seen on the level of actual interaction. This was to 
explore power as a dynamic process, a series of dominating and resisting moves 
rather than an entity belonging to an institution, a discourse or a speaker. The form of 
analysis I undertook in this chapter, was not as in-depth in as a Conversation Analyst 
would treat such data, but it was pitched at the general level of exploring the 
speaker’s moves in relation to the discursive positions they were arguing for. This 
was enough to point out the silencing and resisting mechanisms of power in this 
discursive event.
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4. The materiality o f discourse and the possible extension and
application o f the research
On quite another level, I want to consider once more the problem of the material 
effects of discourse. These are by no means straightforward effects. As Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough point out ‘it is important to recognise the social importance of 
discourse without reducing social life to discourse - a  reductionism characteristic of 
postmodern views of the social world that is a constant threat to discourse
276analysts’. In this form of discourse material I was analysing, social practices and 
subjectivities are partially pre-scribed and restricted through discourse. The 
Parliament is obviously a state institution of power, with real material consequences 
following from its debates. Following repeated discursive formations of women’s 
roles in this context, women continue to be treated as primarily mothers (this 
influences views on women’s professions, emotional characteristics, material needs, 
likes and dislikes). The lives of women are impacted in this way as well as their 
identities. On the other hand, material practices of resistance and subordination are 
not the same as discourses which prescribe or limit them. For instance, women do 
continue to have abortions, despite the hegemonic discourse on women’s 
reproductive rights coming from the state institutions and the church, and codified in 
the law. However, they have to that in secret, often in bad conditions with no 
guarantee of proper medical care and with the fear of the possible repercussions if 
found out. The resulting practices are therefore partly the effects of the political
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discourses of the Polish elite and the Church, while they can in no way be reduced to 
them.
A final question that can be posed in relation to this type of research relates to its 
‘usefulness’ outside of academic context, especially in feminist politics/activism. 
After all, all critical social science, as well as feminist scholarship is aimed at 
impacting the social life at least in terms of providing less exclusionary models of 
public sphere, or, indeed, of public discourse. I agree with Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough that critical linguistics can at least, and maybe only, provide others with a 
more reflexive, critical thinking about social life without which it is impossible to 
have agency in contemporary, discourse-dominated society.^^^
Perhaps the most interesting parallel to the type of critical linguistic research that I 
have been pursuing in this thesis can be found in the work of Carol Lee Bacchi, who 
postulates the notion of category politics applied to the political process of lobbying 
for gender equality legislation.^^^ In her work, a critical and a political awareness of 
the implications of ‘naming’ is postulated, for example the political implications and 
uses of categories such as ‘positive discrimination’, ‘affirmative action’ and ‘gender 
equality’ are explored. The orientation of this type of research is ‘drawing attention 
to the political uses of categories and working to produce understandings of
Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 6.
Ibid., 9-10.
Carol Lee Bacchi, The Politics o f  Affirmative Action: ‘Women 'Equality ’ and Category Politics 
(London: Sage, 1997)
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categories which have effects we deem d e s i r a b l e T h i s  is an approach parallel to 
the Critical Discourse Analysis but aimed at impacting actual policies. In this 
respect, an interesting question is the potential application of Critical Discourse 
Analysis and feminist methodology to a study of political institutions, particularly in 
terms of the so-called ‘discursive institutional practice’. Some forms of discourse 
analysis are very popular among political scientists and social scientists in general, 
but concepts such as repertoires and frames have not been widely used. There is 
undoubtedly potential for multidisciplinary research or cross-fertilisation of the 
different disciplines of social science in the area of discourse analysis.
As far as a possible relationship between feminist research and feminist action is 
concerned, policy advocacy or simply feminist activism have different contexts and 
different, if overlapping concerns than feminist scholarship. Again, I agree with 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough that there should always be a dialogue between the two 
but this should be done without simplifying discourse analysis.^^^ In this respect, my 
work situates itself as a theoretical practice, not activism, at least as far as this thesis 
is concerned. The main goal of such feminist research, and indeed of critical 
language analysis, is to provide one with tools for a more in-depth critical 
assessment of social and political reality.
Ibid., 12.
280 Chouliaraki and Fairclough., 9, 10.
209
5. A postscript to the context o f  the analysed debates
When this work was created (during its last stages) the political balance of power 
shifted. The elections of 2001 have resulted in a changed from the previously right 
wing to left-wing government. Some of the issues central to the resisting discourse as 
analysed in this work (such as equality legislation) have been taken up during the 
electoral campaign and some positive change in the discourse of the prospective 
politicians can be noted. Indeed, as the political power shifted, the power of 
particular discursive representations started to change too. The position described 
here as resisting gained some power over the representation of women, with effects 
for the wider public debate. Indeed, one could argue that it could become more of a 
hegemonic construction, once the emancipatory and inclusive positions it allowed 
gain more acceptance. On the other hand, some of the new political forces in the 
parliament represent even more conservative or more populist discourses on 
femininity than the ones presented in this thesis. And thus, the battle over the 
constructions of femininity represented in this thesis is still being fought with the 
same intensity.
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Appendix 
Full transcitp of the parliamentary debate analysed in Chapter 5.
Debate on the Polish delegation at the UN Session on Women. (June 29, 2001: 
lô*** point of the daily agenda)
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rol: Pani posel Iwona Sledzihska-Katarasihska zwrocila siq do prezesa Rady 
Ministrew z pytaniem dotycz^cym udziatu polskiej delegacji pod przewodnictwem Jerzego 
Kropiwnickiego w sesji ONZ w Nowym Jorkuposwiqconej sytuacji kobiet na swiecie. Proszq bardzo, 
pani minister, o sprecyzowanie czy rozszerzenie pytania.
Posel Iw ona Sledzinska-K atarasinska: Czyli rozumiem, panie marszalku, pani posel? 
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rol: Pani posel. Posel Iwona Sledzihska-Katarasihska: Dziqkujq bardzo.
Polska opinia publiczna jest zbulwersowana doniesieniami o udziale polskiej delegacji rz^dowej w 
tej specjalnej sesji Zgromadzenia Ogolnego ONZ, delegacji rz%dowej pod przewodnictwem ministra 
Jerzego Kropiwnickiego. Sesja poswiqcona byla ocenie wdrazania w zycie, na swiecie wlasnie, 
dokumentu zwanego platform^ dzialania, uchwalonego w 1995 roku na swiatowej konferencji ONZ 
poswiqconej problemom kobiet. Relacje i doniesienia sq, raczej prawdziwe, poniewaz zostaly 
potwierdzone po powrocie delegacji przez samego ministra Kropiwnickiego, ktory podczas 
konferencji prasowej przyznal, ze informacje, ktore przedo-staly siq do opinii publicznej, s^ 
prawdziwe. A wiqc, po pierwsze, polska delegacja glosowala przeciwko podpisaniu deklaracji 
kohcowej, dlatego ze m.in. znalazlo siq tam sformulowanie zakazu dyskryminacji z powodu orientacji 
seksualnej. Po drugie, polska delegacja kwestionowala koniecznosc przestrzegania i wdrazania praw 
kobiet jako praw czlowieka, a na spotkaniu z przedstawicielami Unii Europejskiej pytana o powody 
takiego stanowiska i niedotrzymywanie standardow europejskich, thunaczyla, ze jeszcze w Unii nie 
jest, a wiqc niekoniecznie musi tych wszystkich standardow dotrzymywac. I wreszcie sam minister 
Kropiwnicki w swoim w yst^ ien iu  na sesji plenamej, w mojej przynajmniej ocenie, niekoniecznie 
mowil na temat. Bye moze tmdno bylo pokazac w tym piqcioleciu osi^n iqcia  w poprawie sytuacji 
kobiet, chociaz mozna bylo rozwin^c naprawdq znakomity zapis, ktory istnieje w polskiej konstytucji, 
i przynajmniej to wskazac jako rzeczywisty sukces i osi^gniqcie. Niekoniecznie dzialania na rzecz 
rodziny i dzialania, ktore istnieje w naszym prawodawstwie i w naszym systemie prawnym, shiz^ce 
ochronie zycia poczqtego, sq_ tymi dzialaniami, o ktore pytano na tej konferencji. To bardzo wazne, 
tak. Tylko ze - dlatego o tym mowiq - chyba niekoniecznie na tym fomm. Takze dose zaskakuj^ce w 
tych wypowiedziach byly stwierdzenia - tak jakby to byly dokonania ostatniego czasu - o wyzszosci 
wyksztalcenia kobiet nad wyksztalceniem mqzczyzn. To jest zjawisko polskie od dawna, dobrze, bye 
moze, ze tak jest. Ale zupelnie nieprawdziwe byly stwierdzenia, ze zwiqksza siq udzial kobiet w zyciu 
publicznym w Polsce, poniewaz, niestety, on siq wlasnie zmniejsza. I takz szokuj^ca jest proba 
zmarginalizowania, wrqcz nazwania marginesem zjawiska przemocy w rodzinie, w momencie kiedy 
na szczqscie, na szczqscie, mamy juz taki stopieh wolnosci, ze tego typu patologiczne bolesne 
zjawiska, ktore zawsze istnialy, s% znane opinii publicznej i wladze staraj^ siq je  zwalczac. Nie ma 
chyba powodu, aby to ukrywac i nazywac marginesem. Mnie nie in teresu jpog l^dy ...
W icem arszalek J a n  K rol: Pani posel, juz trzykrotnie przekroczyla pani czas.
Posel Iw ona Sledzihska-K atarasihska: Juz ostatnie zdanie, panie marszalku.
W icem arszalek Jan  K rol: Trzeci^minutq pani zaczyna.
Posel Iw ona Sledzihska-K atarasihska: Sprawa jest powazna, panie marszalku, poniewaz... 
W icem arszalek Ja n  KrohRozumiem.
Posel Iwona Sledzihska-Katarasihska: ...nie dotyczy tylko prywatnych pogl^dow czlonkow delegacji, 
bo w te nie wnikam, tylko prezentacji stanowiska rz^du pahstwa, ktore w konstytucji ma zapisane, ze
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nikt nie moze bye dyskryminowany z jakiegokolwiek powodu, ktore aspimje do szybkiego 
czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. O to mi chodzi i st^d moje pytanie: Jak rzz^d polski ma zamiar 
zneutralizowac fatalne efekty tego w yst^ ien ia  na fomm miqdzynarodowym?
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rol: Dziqkujq bardzo.
Przepraszam bardzo za tq uwagq, temat jest wazny, ale regulamin tez jest powazn^ spraw% a on mnie 
ogranicza. Chcq bye sprawiedliwy i jednakowo egzekwowac te zapisy regulaminu, ktore nas 
obowi^zuj^. Do odpowiedzi zostala upowazniona przez prezesa Rady Ministrôw pani Maria 
Smereczyhska - sekretarz stanu, pebiomocnik rz^du ds. rodziny. Proszq bardzo pani^_ minister.
Sekretarz Stanu w K ancelarii Prezesa R ady M inistrôw  Pelnom ocnik Rzqdu do Spraw  Rodziny 
M aria  Sm ereczyhska: Dziqkujq bardzo.
Panie Marszalku! Wysoka Izbo! Chcialam na wstqpie powiedziec, ze rz^d polski dokladnie i z duz^ 
uwag^na przygotowywal siq do tej konferencji, m.in. dlatego szefem delegacji zostal minister - 
czlonek Rady Ministrôw,ktôremu podlega rz^dowa rada ludnosciowa, rowniez zajmuj^ca siq tymi 
problemami. Na konferencji o takiej randze w Organizacji Narodow Zjednoczonych pojawiaj^ siq 
praktycznie co najmniej ministrowie tworz^cy sklad Rady Ministrôw poszczegobiych krajôw. Zresztq, 
muszq przypomniec, ze w 1995 r. szefem delegacji na konferencjq pekihsk% na ktorej dyskutowano i 
przyjmowano dokument kohcowy: Platformq dzialania, byl owczesny minister, wicepremier Luczak, 
ktory byl w tym momencie szefem Ministerstwa Edukacji Narodowej albo KBN - tego dokladnie nie 
pamiqtam. W kazdym razie ranga delegacji byla wysoka i st^d taki sklad delegacji. Natomiast sama 
konferencja dotyczyla oceny sytuacji po 5 latach wdrazania dokumentu i o tym, ze taki ma bye ksztalt 
tej konferencji, mo wily wszystkie dokumenty przyjmowane wczesniej przez Organizacjq Narodow 
Zjednoczonych, l^cznie z ostatnimi dokumentami przyjmowanymi przez komisjq ECOSOC w ONZ 
jeszcze w marcu tego roku: zadnego negocjowania dokumentu wynegocjowanego, z tmdem 
przyjqtego w konsensusie w 1995 r., w konsensusie, ktory nikogo praktycznie nie zadowalal, zadnego 
otwierania negocjacji na temat dokumentu. Natomiast jest to przeglz^d sytuacji we wszystkich krajach, 
ktore ten dokument wtedy akceptowaly. Tych kilkanascie rozdzialow, kilkanascie roznych zagadnieh, 
kilkanascie roznych pol, ktore SE^ poswiqcone w tym dokumencie relacji kobiet w tych obszarach 
dzialania, mialo bye poddane przegl^dowi; jak  to wygl^da w roznych krajach, w roznych obszarach 
swiata, jakie zostaly poczynione postqpy w tym zakresie. W zwi^zku z tym nie bylo zadnych decyzji 
rz^dowych, zadnych stanowisk rz^dowych, zadnych dokumentow, zreszt^ dokumenty ONZ, ktore 
wczesniej przychodzily, mowily o tym, ze nie stanowisko rz^du jest potrzebne, tylko przegLd 
sytuacji 5 lat po Pekinie, i z takimi decyzjami rady delegacji roznych rz^dow przyjechaly na tq 
konferencjq. Takie bylo tez, w swietle tych wszystkich dokumentow ONZ, stanowisko przygotowane 
u nas przez pracownikow urzqdôw; popieramy to, co ONZ powiedzial i nie bqdzie renegocjacji 
dokumentu, natomiast przegl^d sytuacji 5 lat po konferencji w Pekinie. Takie bylo konsekwentnie 
stanowisko w czasie pracy komitetow przygotowawczych na tejze konferencji. Natomiast pojawily 
siq glosy, ze nalezy, bo czas plynie, wszystko unowoczesnic i w zwi^zku z tym te z ^trudem 
wynegocjowane zapisy dokumentu sprzed 5 lat nalezy poszerzyc o zapisy nowoczesniejsze, jak  o nich 
mowiono, ktore maj^ uwzglqdnic wiqcej kwestii dotycz^cych tego tematu. Tymczasem byly to 
rzeczywiscie frazy i stwierdzenia, ktore nigdy nie byly definiowane w zadnych dokumentach 
Organizacji Narodow Zjednoczonych, ktore tam siq mialy znalezc po raz pierwszy bez, praktycznie, 
odniesienia. Byly to trzy stwierdzenia dotycz^ce praw seksualnych, dotycz^ce roznorodnosci kobiet i 
dotycz^ce orientacji seksualnych. Do tej pory w dokumentach ONZ te trzy sformulowania nie mialy 
zadnych definicji, w zwi^zku z tym byla to jakby techniczna proba wstawienia nowych pojqc do 
wynegocjowanego dokumentu i na to kraje w trakcie dyskusji nie wyrazaly zgody. Te pojqcia, te trzy ■ 
sformulowania znalazly siq we wczesniej przygotowanym przez parlamentarzystow Unii Europejskiej 
dokumencie, ktory do nas trafil w ostatniej chwili z zapytaniem: popieracie czy nie popieracie. Byl to 
dokument, ktory byl przygotowany przez kogo innego, do ktorego nie mielismy wglz^du, tylko w 
ostatecznej jego formule przygotowanej do podpisu, a to nie jest sposob, bo jak  siq nie ma mozliwosci 
wziqcia udziahi w tworzeniu dokumentu, to tmdno od rqki siq zgadzac na podpisanie tego, co jest 
podkladane, Po dmgie, Polska w tej chwili jest w trakcie negocjacji dokumentow dotycz^cych sfery 
spolecznej. Nikt z nas nie mial zadnego upowaznienia ani uprawnienia z zespohi negocjacyjnego do 
aprobowania dokumentow, ktore jeszcze sq, negocjowane. Bylo to stawianie nas w takiej sytuacji, ze 
w tej chwili wszystko juz popieramy, to jest zespol negocjacyjny, ktory nad tym dyskutuje i konkretne
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dokumenty przyjmuje. Poza tym jest dmga sprawa, dokument, ktôry byl przedkladany jako ten, 
ktorego rzekomo Polska nie chciala podpisac, ktôry zlamala, nie jest dokumentem, ktôry wymusza 
przyjqcie tych pojqc, to zresztq, bylo potem wyjasnione i sq_ w tej chwili juz podpisane listy przez 
kilkudziesiqciu parlamentarzystôw Unii Europejskiej, ze grupa, ktôra przygotowywala ten dokument, 
nie miala mandatu na formulowanie takiego stanowiska i na procedowanie tego stanowiska w taki 
sposôb na fomm Organizacji Narodôw Zjednoczonych, dlatego ze s% kraje, ktôre maj^ zapisane w 
swoich konstytucjach daleko wiqksze obostrzenia nawet niz Polska, jezeli chodzi na przyklad o 
ochronq zycia, o ochronq wolnosci czlowieka i one w tym zespole krajôw Unii Europejskiej 
wystqpuj% w zwi^zku z tym nie s^ to dokumenty, ktôre namszaj^ w jakikolwiek sposôb czy gwalcq, w 
jakikolwiek sposôb dokumenty narodowe tychze krajôw. Tak ze to nie jest sytuacja, ktôra zmuszala 
do tego czy spowodowala to, ze jakiekolwiek dokumenty ze strony Unii Europejskiej zostaly 
zlamane.Teraz kwestia deklaracji koncowej i zastrzezenia. To zastrzezenie bylo warunkowe. W 
dokumencie koncowym tejze konferencji nie znalazly siq zapisy, do ktôrych zastrzezenia siq odnosily, 
w zwi^zku z tym wamnkowosc tego dokumentu jest spelniona w tym sensie, ze wszystko zostalo 
powiedziane w taki sposôb, ze te zastrzegane trzy elementy stracily w pewnym sensie racjq bytu. 
Kwestia dotycz^ca marginalizacji zjawiska przemocy - jezeli siq czyta cale zdanie i kontekst tego 
sformulowania bez tych dwôch wczesniej szych zdah i kohcôwki tego zdania, to rzeczywiscie 
podawany w ten sposôb traci on sens, natomiast cale zdanie ma odzwierciedlac to, ze ten problem nie 
jest problemem powszeclmym w Polsce, natomiast jest tak waznym problemem, maj%cym ogromne 
implikacje w zakresie moralnosci, wplywu na zycie spoleczne, ze w tej chwili zostal w Polsce 
zlozony w rqce przede wszystkim powiatowych centrôw pomocy rodzinie i jest to problem 
rozwi^zywany, natomiast nikt nie mial ani zamiam, ani nie wynika to z tych zdah, ktôre w 
wystztpieniu siq znalazly, ze problem jest marginalizowany. To, ze on jest w ilosci tak okreslonej, nie 
znaczy, ze jest marginalizowany, tylko znaczy, ze nie jest problemem powszechnym.
Myslq, ze w tym zakresie, przynajmniej na te czqsciowe pytania, ktôre wstqpnie zostaly postawione, 
tak chyba odpowiedz by wygl^dala. Dziqkujq bardzo.
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rol: Dziqkujq bardzo pani minister.
zgloszenia do pytah dodatkowych. Pani posel Katarasihska ma pierwszehstwo, moze zadac takie 
pytanie, nastqpnie zapisani sq_ pahstwo poslowie: Marek Kaczyhski, Izabella Sierakowska, Jan Kulas, 
Czeslaw Ryszka, Bronislawa Kowalska, Anna Sobecka, Wojciech Nowaczyk, Danuta Ciborowska, 
Jacek Szczot, Jacek Kasprzyk.
Czy ktos jeszcze? Pan posel Korpak, pani posel Jasztal.
Kto jeszcze? To tyle, zamykamy listqpytaj^cych.
Proszq bardzo, po pôl minutki. Pani posel Katarasihska.
Posel Iw ona Sledzihska-K atarasihska: Pani minister, ja  to zdanie mam tutaj w tekscie w calosci i 
wiem, jak  ono brzmi. To raz. Dwa. Mam takie pytanie, nie wiem, czy pani jest w stanie na nie 
odpowiedziec, ale bye moze ma siq pani z kim skonsultowac. Otôz potwierdzenie wiedzy uzyskanej 
wczesniej znajdowalam w wywiadach z panem ministrem Kropiwnickim na tie relacji z konferencji 
prasowej. Ubolewam, ze w zadnej z tych relacji nie znalazly siq te wyjasnienia, ktôre pani tutaj nam 
przedstawila tak rzeczowo i rzetelnie. Jednak stawiany zarzut, ze przewodniczz^cy delegacji moze nie 
do kohca byl osob^ najlepiej zorientowanq_ co do tematu, w ktôrym przyszlo mu siq poruszac, ma 
uzasadnienie chocby i w tym, ze podczas jednego z tych spotkah czy tez w czasie konferencji 
wyraznie nawet semantyczne blqdy zdarzaly siq panu ministrowi, kiedy pederastiq mylil z pedofiliq_.
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rol: Dziqkujq.
Pan posel Marek Kaczyhski.
Posel M arek  Kaczyhski: Dziqkujq, panie marszalku.
Chcq przede wszystkim serdecznie podziqkowac polskiej delegacji za stanowisko, jakie 
zaprezentowala na sesji specjalnej ONZ. (Oklaski) Pragnq tez zadac pytanie: Czy wysts^pienie 
polskiej delegacji, ktôre polegalo na uznaniu rôwnosci, godnosci i praw kobiety i mqzczyzny we 
wszystkich sferach zycia, uznaniu rodziny za naturalne srodowisko istoty ludzkiej, uznanie prawa do 
zycia obejmuj^cego okres od poczqcia do naturalnej smierci, prawa do wyksztalcenia, sprzeciwienie
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siq legalizacji tzw. maizehstw homoseksualnych czy sprzeciwienie siq aborcji - czy takie stanowisko 
moze bulwersowac polskie spoleczenstwo? To, co uslyszalem na tej sali, a mianowicie ze taka jest 
reakcja na to polskiego spoleczehstwa, po prostu mnie zbulwersowalo. Jest wprost przeciwnie, 
spoleczenstwo polskie w zdecydowanej wiqkszosci popiera takie stanowisko. Jeszcze raz dziqkujq 
panu ministrowi i calej delegacji za takie stanowisko. Dziqkujq bardzo.
W icem arszalek Jan  K rol: Pani posel Izabella Sierakowska.
Posel Izabella Sierakowska: Panie Marszalku! Wysoki Sejmie! Panie Ministrze Kropiwnicki!
Jest pan niezlym ekonomist% pana pogl^dy sq, pahskimi poglq^dami. Bardzo szanujq pana poglq^dy, 
akceptujq pana pogl^dy, pogl%dy pana partii, ale nie akceptujq zupelnie tego, co siq stalo. A 
mianowicie doskonale pan wie, ze ugrupowanie, w ktôrym znalazl siq polski rzqd, reprezentowany 
przez ministra Akcji Wyborczej Solidamosc, znalazl siq - jak  to powiedzieli dziennikarze w Nowym 
Jorku - w nieswiqtej koalicji. A ktôz tam byl w tej nieswiqtej koalicji - ja  tylko przypomnq. A wiqc 
Watykan, gdzie kobiet nie ma, Libia, ktôra jest znana ze wspierania terroryzmu, Iran, rzq^dzony przez 
ajatollahôw, miotajqca siq miqdzy wojujq^cym islamem i dyktaturq^ wojskowq. Algieria, fanatycznie 
islamski Sudan i Pakistan oraz obecnie ultrakatolicka Nikaragua. Dochodzila tam w porywach jeszcze 
Kuba, panie ministrze. No, nie wiem, jak  siq pan czul w  tym towarzystwie? Pani Minister! Ja nie 
oczekujq od pani odpowiedzi. Moje pytanie, dlatego ze nasze pytania, moje i pani posel Waniek, 
podobnie byly sformulowane...
W icem arszalek J a n  K rol: Ale do kogo pani kiemje to pytanie? Posel Izabella Sierakowska 
Do pana premiera Buzka! I od pana premiera Buzka oczekujq odpowiedzi na pytanie: Jakimi 
kryteriami kierowal siq pan, stawiajqc na czele polskiej delegacji rzqdowej ekonomistq, zajmuj^cego 
siq na co dzieh sprawami gospodarczymi i niemajqcego teoretycznego ani praktycznego 
przygotowania do wypowiadania siq w pomszanych na Swiatowej Konferencji Kobiet zagadnieniach? 
Czy sformulowany w art. 32 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej zakaz dyskryminacji z jakiejkolwiek 
przyczyny obejmuje zakaz dyskryminacji ze wzglqdu na orientacjq seksualnq^? Jesli tak, to czym rzq^ d 
polski uzasadni sprzeciw polskiej delegacji rzqdowej w przedmiocie wpisania zakazu dyskryïninacji 
ze wzglqdu na orientacjq seksualnq. do deklaracji koncowej Swiatowej Konferencji Kobiet? Jeszcze 
jedno pytanie. Czy wypowiedzi ministra Kropiwnickiego reprezentujq. stanowisko rzq^du 
Rzeczypospolitej, a jesli tak, to czy rzq.d uznaje, ze skoro Polska nie jest jeszcze czlonkiem Unii 
Europejskiej, a jedynie aspimje do czlonkostwa, nie musi w tym zakresie dostosowac swojego 
stanowiska do stanowiska Unii Europejskiej? Ostatnie pytanie. Czy procès dostosowania naszego 
prawa do prawa obowiqzujqcego w Unii Europejskiej nie obejmuje ochrony praw kobiet oraz praw 
mniejszosci? Do pana premiera Buzka.
Wicemarszalek Jan Krôl: Dziqkujq.Czyli pani nie oczekuje odpowiedzi.
Posel Izabella Sierakowska: Nie oczekujq odpowiedzi, tak. Dziqkujq.
W icem arszalek Jan  Krol: Pan posel Jan Kulas.
Posel Jan  Kulas: Rozumiem, panie m arszalku, panie ministrze, ze uznane tradycyjne wartosci 
prorodzinne budzq, sprzeciw takich poslanek miqdzy innymi jak  przed chwilq,...
(Posel Izabella Sierakowska: Ja  uwielbiam rodzinq; co to ma do rzeczy?)
Pierwsze moje pytanie dotyczy tego, jakie pozytywne wartosci, jakie dobre zmiany w awansie 
cywilizacyjnym polskich kobiet zaprezentowano na tej konferencji (chociazby kwestia wyksztalcenia. 
i edukacji, co niew%tpliwie jest istotne). Dmgie pytanie. Czy na tej konferencji zastanawiano siq, 
proponowano jakies metody, srodki, sposoby w celu zwiqkszenia udziahi kobiet w zyciu publicznym, 
a wiqc w parlamencie i w samorzq^dach lokalnych? Odnoszq wrazenie, ze najgorzej w tym wzglqdzie 
bylo chyba jednak za rzqdôw SLD. Dziqkujq.
(Posel Edw ard W ende: Juz ma pani odpowiedz.)
(Posel Izabella Sierakowska: A ja  wcale nie chcialam odpowiedzi)
W icem arszalek Jan  K rôl: Dziqkujq. Pan posel Czeslaw Ryszka.
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Posel Czeslaw Ryszka: Dziqkujq, panie marszalku.
Padlo sformulowanie, ze spoleczenstwo polskie, ze organizacje kobiece wyrazily dezaprobatq wobec 
polskiej delegacji, ktôrej przewodniczyl pan minister Jerzy Kropiwnicki. O ile wiem, Federacja 
Kobiet Katolickich, bardzo liczna organizacja, moze najliczniejsza, wyrazila uznanie dla pana 
ministra Kropiwnickiego. Chyba ze to sqjakies inné kobiety...
(Glos z sali: Nie polskie.)
No, moze nie polskie, bo polskie to tylko do SLD nalezq.
Mam takie pytanie. Panie ministrze, czy to prawda, ze posiedzenie, o ktôrym mowa, bylo prowadzone 
w sposôb wysoce niedemokratyczny czy wrqcz napastliwy - pani przewodniczqca atakowala pahskq 
osobq - i ze panskiej obronie wystqpili delegacji ionych krajôw? Wiqcej, ze sprawa siq nie zakohczyla 
i obecnie w
Parlamencie Europejskim trwa dyskusja na temat zlego prowadzenia obrad w Nowym Jorku, tzn. 
Poszerzenia zakresu tematycznego konferencji i pozwolenia sobie na ùpominanie delegacji 
suwerennego pahstwa.
W icem arszalek Jan  K rôl: Dziqkujq. Pani posel Bronislawa Kowalska.
Posel B ronislaw a Kowalska: Dziqkujq uprzejmie, panie marszalku.
Panie posle, myslq, ze na szczqscie nie wszystko w Polsce musi byc katolickie i to jest cale 
zwyciqstwo naszej demokracji. Mam trzy pytania. Panie ministrze, w Polsce nie brakuje mqdrych 
kobiet, o czym chociazby swiadczy ta sala, a wiqc: czy nie uwaza pan, ze o kobietach powinny 
najczqsciej wypowiadac siq kobiety? Dmgie pytanie. Panie ministrze, ile osôb wchodzilo w sklad 
polskiej delegacji i kto reprezentowal polska opozycjq? I, panie ministrze, czy nie uwaza pan, ze 
powinien pan zwrôcic do budzetu pahstwa koszty pobytu pana i calej delegacji, poniewaz delegacja 
nie reprezentowala poglqdôw calego spoleczehstwa, a tylko Zjednoczenia Chrzescijahsko- 
Narodowego? Dziqkujq bardzo.
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rôl: Dziqkujq. Pani posel Anna Sobecka.
Posel A nna Sobecka: Dziqkujq, panie marszalku.
Wysoki Sejmie! W nieprzyjaznych dzialaniach i naciskach z powodu wyrazonego stanowiska na 
fomm sesji ONZ naszej delegacji powolywano siq na traktat amsterdamski. Moje pytanie brzmi: Jaka 
jest tresc art. 13 traktatu amsterdamskiego? Dziqkujq.
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rôl: Dziqkujq. Pan posel W ojciech Nowaczyk.
Posel W ojciech Nowaczyk: Dziqkujq bardzo, panie marszalku.
Pan minister Kropiwnicki, czlowiek jak  dotqd znany z odwagi prezentowania swego zdania w tym 
omawianym przypadku zajql stanowisko dose szokujqce. Cytujq to, tak to bylo okreslane. I pytanie: 
czy tym stanowiskiem chcial siq przypodobac prawicowej orientacji rzqdowej? Pytanie kolejne: czy 
za tq uleglosc zostal nagrodzony przez premiera.-stanowiskiem ministra? Czy pan minister 
Kropiwnicki jako mqzczyzna nie obawia siq za to zemsty kobiet w sposôb typowo kobiecy? Dziqkujq 
bardzo.
(Posel E dw ard W ende: To jest pytanie epokowe.)
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rôl: Pani posel Danuta Ciborowska.
Posel D anuta Ciborowska: Dziqkujq bardzo.
Panie Marszalku! Panie ministrze, proszq odpowiedziec mi na nastqpujî^ce pytanie. Otôz po powrocie 
delegacji polskiej media informowaly o rôznych sprawach, w tym nie bylo pelnej jasnosci co do tego, 
czyje stanowisko, tak prawdq môwi^c, reprezentuje delegacja polska. Jezeli delegacja polska - to 
powinna reprezentowac stanowisko rz^du.
I w zwi^zku z tym moje pytanie brzmi: Panie ministrze, kiedy, na ktôrym posiedzeniu, Rada 
Ministrôw dyskutowala i wypracowala to stanowisko i w zwiz^zku z tym czy takie wlasnie stanowisko 
Rada Ministrôw polecila polskiej delegacji prezentowac na tej konferencji? Dziqkujq.
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W icem arszalek Jan  K rôl: Dzi^kujç.Pan posel Jacek Szczot.
Posei Jacek  Szczot: Dziqkujq bardzo.
Panic ministrze, niedawno shizba prasowa ONZ na stronie intemetowej zamiescila relacje z 
wyst^tpienia pana ministra i tarn znalazlo siq stwierdzenie, ze jakoby Polska popierala zycie czlowieka 
od jego urodzenia do smierci.Nie wiem, czy to bylo stwierdzenie pana ministra, czy tez stanowisko 
oficjalne polskiego rz^du. Wiadomo przeciez, ze zgodnie z polskim prawodawstwem granice zycia w 
Polsce sq. zupelnie inne.
Drugie pytanie. Kto by! szefem polskiej delegacji na konferencji w Pekinie, ktorej podsumowaniem 
byla w j
koncu konferencja w Nowym Jorku?
I pytanie trzecie, krotkie. Jaka opinia publiczna? Czy aby na pewno polska opinia publiczna jest 
zbulwersowana w yst^ ien iem  polskiej delegacji w Nowym Jorku? Czy nie jest to zwykla manipulacja 
sfhistrowanych grupek feministycznych? Dziqkujq. (Oklaski)
(Posel B ronislaw a Kowalska: Radio Maryja zrobi wam dobr^ kampaniq.)
W icem arszalek Jan  K rol: Pan posel Jacek Kasprzyk.
Posel Jacek Kasprzyk: Pani Minister! Panic Ministrze! Jezeli stanowisko przez pana prezentowane 
bylo omawiane na jednym z gremiôw rz^dowych, to chcialbym siq dowiedziec, czy ono bylo 
jednoznacznym stanowiskiem, czy tez byly inne zdania, chociazby w Radzie Ministrow, na temat 
pogl£\dôw przedstawionych w imieniu rz^du przez pana.
Drugie moje pytanie zwic^zane jest tez z pewn^ odpowiedzi^ kolegom z AWS. Gdyby 
wiqkszoscspoleczenstwa podzielala panstwa pogl^dy, to byloby was 460 na tej sali i krzywa poparcia 
by wam rosla. (Oklaski)
W zwi^zku z powyzszym chcialem zapytac pana ministra, skoro nikt na tej sali nie moze powiedziec
0 pelnym poparciu, a wiqc s _^reprezentowane rozne pogl^dy...
(Glos z sali: Jak na razie jeszcze my rzz^dzimy.)
Slusznie pan powiedzial: na razie. Wobec powyzszego chcialbym zapytac... Panic marszalku, czy 
mogq?
Wicemarszalek Jan Krol: Proszç.
Posel Jacek  K asprzyk: Wobec powyzszego chcialbym zapytac pana ministra, dlaczego w skladzie 
delegacji nie znalazl siq przedstawiciel opozycji, moze nawet umiarkowanej dla pana?
Kolejne moje pytanie skierowane jest do pani minister. Pani minister, byla pani uprzejma powiedziec, 
ze problemem przemocy w rodzinie zajmuj^ siq centra. Mamy juz za sob^ponad rok doswiadczeh w 
tej dzialalnosci. Czy jest pani w stanie ocenic skutecznosc dzialalnosci powiatowych centrow pomocy 
rodzinie w zakresie zwalczania tych patologicznych zjawisk? To wszystko, dziqkujq bardzo.
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rol: Dziqkujq. Pan posel JozefKorpak.
Posel JozefK orpak : Dziqkujq, panic marszalku.
Na wstqpie chcialbym siq nie zgodzic z twierdzeniem, ktore tutaj padlo, ze o kobietach powinny 
wypowiadac siq tylko kobiety, a o mqzczyznach - mqzczyzni. Osobiscie uwazam, ze tak nie pow ino. 
bye, na pewno.
(Glos z sali: Dyskryminacja.)
Chcialbym zadac dwa pytania. Po pierwsze, czy te osoby, ktore obecnie krytykujq, pana ministra 
Kropiwnickiego, to jest glownie Parlamentama Grupa Kobiet, promujq. zrownanie praw zwiqzkow 
homoseksualnych z prawami malzenstw, nie wykluczajq^c nawet prawa do adopcji dzieci dla takich 
zwiqzkow?
1 drugie pytanie. Czy zdaniem pani minister nie jest obhidne stawianie zarzutow panu ministrowi 
Kropiwnickiemu o ukrywanie jakoby przemocy w rodzinach, w sytuacji gdy w mediach ta przemoc
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jest na porzq^dku dziennym i tutaj ugrupowania, ktore panstwo reprezentujq, szczegolnie SLD, nie 
robiq_nic, zeby ten stan rzeczy zmienic, zeby tej przemocy w mediach nie bylo? Dziqkujq. (Oklaski)
W icem arszalek Ja n  K rol: Pan posel Kasprzyk cos sobie pilnego przypomnial, tak? 10 sekund, 
proszq bardzo.
Posel Jacek Kasprzyk: Przepraszam. 10 sekund.
Panie ministrze, co stalo na przeszkodzie, aby stanowisko, ktore pan zamierzal reprezentowac, bylo 
omawiane rowniez w ktorejs z komisji sejmowych? W parlamencie o tym dokumencie nie 
dyskutowano. Co bylo takq^przeszkod^?
W icem arszalek J a n  K rol: Dziqkujq.
Bardzo proszq paniq_ minister Mariq Smereczynskq, o udzielenie odpowiedzi.
(Posel W ojciech Nowaczyk: A pan minister Kropiwnicki?)
Pan minister Kropiwnicki nie ma upowaznieh, ale jak bqdzie chcial zabrac glos...
(Posel W ojciech Nowaczyk: Protestujemy.) Pan premier upowaznil paniq. minister Smereczynsk% 
Proszq bardzo.
S ekretarz S tanu w K ancelarii Prezesa R ady M inistrow  Pelnom ocnik R zqdu do Spraw  Rodziny 
M aria  Sm ereczyhska: Dziqkujq bardzo.
Panie Marszalku! Wysoka Izbo! Wrocq jeszcze raz do tego, co juz wczesniej powiedzialam, 
mianowicie do tego, ze pan minister Kropiwnicki byl szefem delegacji. Wspomnialam juz o tym, ze 5 
lat temu szefem delegacji byl owczesny wicepremier, pan minister Aleksander Luczak, ktory byl 
wtedy albo szefem KBN, albo Ministerstwa Edukacji Narodowej - to siq akurat w tym roku zmienialo
- i ktory, jak  chyba wszyscy wiedz% tez nie jest kobietq_. Czyli 5 lat temu tez tak to wyglq^dalo i 5 lat 
temu rowniez opozycja do tej delegacji nie byla zapraszana. Jesli chodzi natomiast o to spotkanie, 
ktore bylo w Nowym Jorku na poczqtku czerwca, to delegacja rz^dowa pojechala tam przedstawic 
sytuacjq w 5 lat po Pekinie. W zwi^zku z tym - juz wczesniej to powiedzialam - ze strony Organizacji 
Narodow Zjednoczonych nie bylo wymogu, sq, na to dokumenty i paragrafy, przedstawiania 
stanowisk rzqdowych. Nie bylo wiqc tez wymogu przygotowywania stanowiska rzq^dowego, ktore 
mogloby bye prezentowane gdziekolwiek w celach dyskusji, natomiast jezeli parlament nie byl 
zainteresowany i nie zadal takiego pytania, to tez nie bylo powodu wychodzenia z tym do parlamentu
- przeciez o konferencji wiedzieli wszyscy.
Tak ze wracajqc jeszcze raz do kwestii szefa delegacji na tq czerwcowq, konferencjq, trzeba 
powiedziec, ze pan minister Kropiwnicki jest, owszem, ekonomistq, i na pewno, tak jak pani posel 
byla uprzejma powiedziec, dobrym ekonomistq, natomiast w latach 1991-1992 byl szefem 
Ministerstwa Pracy i Polityki Spolecznej, ostatnio zas - Rzq^dowego Centrum Studiow Strategicznych, 
gdzie istnieje departament polityki spolecznej, a przede wszystkim odpowiada za rzqdowq, Radq 
Ludnosciow% ktora tymi problemami rowniez siq zajmuje. Juz wczesniej zresztq, powiedzialam 
panstwu, ze tak wyglq^da ta sytuacja. Obie te instytucje przygotowywaly wszystkie materialy na tq 
konferencjq - i wczesniej, na uzytek raportu dla Organizacji Narodow Zjednoczonych. Jezeli chodzi o 
informacje, ktore otrzymala opinia publiczna za pomocq, prasy, to nie mojq.jest rzeczq. oceniac, co 
prasa robi z tym, co otrzymuje. Mogq tylko powiedziec, ze sama udzielalam dhigiego wywiadu 
przedstawicielce jednej z bardzo poczytnych gazet i do dzisiaj to siq nie ukazalo. Tak ze myslq, iz 
zainteresowanie prasy tym tematem jest bardzo jednostronne i rzeczowe wyjasnienia, rzeczowa 
informacja po prostu prasy nie interesuje. Natomiast wszyscy dziennikarze sq. zainteresowani taniq.. 
populistykq, ktora jest im podsuwana przez rozne srodowiska, moze niezadowolone z takiego obrotu 
rzeczy, jaki mial miejsce w zwiqzku z podsumowaniem tej konferencji czerwcowej w Nowym Jorku, 
5 lat po Pekinie - niezadowolone, gdyz ten dokument kohcowy nie zawiera tych sformulowah, o ktore 
tak mocno i halasliwie zabiegaly srodowiska zwiq^zane przede wszystkim z ruchami feministycgnymi. 
Tak zresztq tez wyglqdala sprawa tego spotkania parlamentarzystôw Unii Europejskiej, ktorzy 
zapytali o to, dlaczego siq nie przylqczamy. Juz wczesniej wyjasnialam, ze nie jest naszq sprawq 
negocjowanie dokumentow Unii Europejskiej, nie jestesmy do tego upowaznieni, natomiast nie bylo 
zadnych przekroczeh w odniesieniu do tych dokumentow. Przytoczq fragment traktatu 
amsterdamskiego w polskim thimaczeniu: "Nie naruszajqc innych postanowieh niniejszego traktatu i
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w granicach uprawnieh przyznanych Wspôlnocie na jego podstawie, Rada, dzialajqc jednomyslnie, na 
wniosek Komisji i po porozumieniu z Parlamentem Europejskim, moze podjqc stosowne dzialania, by 
zwalczac dyskryminacjq z powodu plci, rasy lub pochodzenia etnicznego, religii lub wyznania, 
inwalidztwa, wieku lub orientacji seksualnej". Jest duzo warunkôw, ktôre muszq byc spelnione 
wczesniej, zanim w ogôle takie dzialania zostanq podjqte, i to jest sytuacja, ktôra absolutnie nie 
uprawnia do automatycznego dzialania zgodnie z tym traktatem. Zresztq, tez wspomnialam o tym 
wczesniej, po tych wszystkich wydarzeniach, po rozmowach, ktôre prowadzily parlamentarzystki 
przede wszystkim ze srodowisk komisji rôwnosciowej w parlamencie Unii Europejskiej, przyszly 
pisma adresowane do pana premiera - mamy je - z informacjami, ze panie z tej komisji nie mialy 
mandatu na formulowanie takiego stanowiska, gdyz Parlament Europejski nie wydal decyzji, nie 
upowaznil tego srodowiska, tych grup do prezentowania takiego stanowiska. Zresztq ostatecznie 
prôby wpisania tych dodatkowych, niezdefiniowanych sformulowah nie powiodly siq - nie znalazlo 
siq to w tym dokumencie.
Tu chcialabym powiedziec - tez to bylo podniesione i na konferencji prasowej, i wczesniej - ze nie 
bylo pomylki co do pederastii i pedofilii, dlatego ze w szerokim pojqciu - zresztq zostalo to 
podkreslone bardzo wczesnie na spotkaniach komitetu przygotowawczego - to stwierdzenie nie 
wyklucza tak drastycznych zachowah, ktôre towarzyszq innym zachowaniom seksualnym. W zwiqzku 
z tym to byl jeden z argumentôw, ktôry rôwniez funkcjonowal w czasie prac komisji, nie ma tu mowy
0 zadnej pomylce i nie jest to pomylka.
Muszq odpowiedziec na jeszcze jedno pytanie, ktôre zresztq pojawialo siq wczesniej w prasie. Teraz 
byla uprzejma je  zadac pani posel Sierakowska, ktôra môwila, ze Polska znalazla siq w gronie krajôw 
wymienianych przez paniq posel. I tutaj nie zgadzajq mi siq dwie rzeczy, dlatego ze z jednej strony 
jest tak ogromne wolanie o tolerancjq dla wszystkiego, natomiast z drugiej strony jest tak drastyczna 
nietolerancja, graniczqca praktycznie z rasizmem. Nikt nie ma prawa oskarzac innych narodôw o 
cokolwiek (Oklaski), stawiajqc w takiej sytuacji, i dlatego tego stwierdzenia zupelnie nie rozumiem. 
Z jednej strony bowiem zqdanie ogromnej tolerancji, a z drugiej strony tak nieprawdopodobna 
nietolerancja. Tak ze tutaj odpowiedz na to praktycznie jak  gdyby nasuwa siq sama.
Kwestia orientacji seksualnych, ktôra tez przez paniq posel Sierakowskq byla podniesiona. To bylo to 
stwierdzenie, o ktôrym byla mowa, ze jest niezdefiniowane, i ono nie znajduje siq do tej pory w 
dokumencie pekihskim, z trudem wynegocjowanym. Byla ogôlna zgoda prawie 190 krajôw, ktôre 
braly udzial w tych wszystkich przygotowaniach do konferencji, ze nie moze byc poszerzania 
dokumentu pekihskiego o zadne no we sformulowania. To byla sprawa czysto techniczna, nie bylo 
zadnej dyskusji na tematy zwiqzane z definiowaniem tych sformulowah.
1 a propos jeszcze tych informacji i pytah, ktôre dotyczq obecnosci mqzczyzn na takich spotkaniach, 
muszq
powiedziec, ze cale prezydium tejze konferencji i osoba prowadzqca to byli mqzczyzni. Calq 
konferencjq prowadzil mqzczyzna i wszyscy zasiadajqcy w prezydium to byli mqzczyzni. Muszq 
powiedziec, ze po tych rôznych przykrosciach, ktôre polskq delegacjq spotkaly - niezashizenie - 
otrzymalismy informacjq od parlameptarzystôw Unii Europejskiej, ze szefem polskiej delegacji byl 
naprawdq prawdziwy mqzczyzna. (Oklaski)
Takie opinie dotarly do nas od parlamentarzystôw Unii Europejskiej, ta korespondencja w dalszym 
ciqgu do nas naplywa i naplywa korespondencja do pana premiera. To, myslq, tyle tytulem wyjasnieh. 
Dziqkujq bardzo. (Oklaski)
(Przewodnictwo w obradach obejmuje wicemarszalek Sejmu Franciszek Jerzy Stefaniuk)
W icem arszalek Franciszek Jerzy  Stefaniuk: Dziqkujq pani minister.
Ja tez siq nie wstydzq, ze jestem mqzczyznq. (Wesolosc na sali, oklaski)
Czas przeznaczony na pytania w sprawach biezqcych zostal wyczerpany. Sejm kohczy wiqc 
rozpatrywanie tego punktu porzqdku dziennego. Niestety, wedlug regulaminu czas zostal 
przekroczony o 15 minut.
(Posel W ojciech Nowaczyk: Odpowiedzi nie otrzymalismy.)
Nie nie poradzç.
Pani m inister cos chciala dodac? Proszç bardzo.
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M aria  Sm ereczyhska: Panu poslowi Kasprzykowi chcq odpowiedziec, ze sytuacja powiatowych 
centrôw pomocy rodzinie nie byla przedmiotem dyskusji na tej konferencji, myslq wiqc, ze przy innej 
okazji na ten temat mozna porozmawiac. Owszem sq takie doniesienia, ze to juz w tej chwili zaczqlo 
funkcjonowac. Dziqkujq.
W icem arszalek Franciszek Jerzy  Stefaniuk: Dziqkujq bardzo.
(Glos z sali: S trôna intemetowa...)
M aria  Smereczyhska: Strona intemetowa - rzeczywiscie na stronie intemetowej znalazl siq blqd, 
popelniony przez pracownikôw Organizacji Narodow Zjednoczonych. Zostalo zlozone przez 
przewodniczqcego polskiej delegacji pismo z prosbq o sprostowanie tego i juz dzisiaj ta strona 
intemetowa jest poprawiona i zapisy sq prawidlowe, tak ze nie ma tam juz w tej chwili blqdu.
W icem arszalek Franciszek Jerzy  Stefaniuk: Nie mogq dopuscic do dalszej dyskusji. Zakohczylem 
ten punkt, muszq siq trzymac regulaminu. (Oklaski)
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